University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

1952

Bosnia-Hercegovina in British diplomacy, 1875-1878
Arthur John Dahl
The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Dahl, Arthur John, "Bosnia-Hercegovina in British diplomacy, 1875-1878" (1952). Graduate Student
Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 1699.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/1699

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

IM BRJflSH OIPLOMACTI, l8t5-lS?8

fey

AlfBIIR J. |4HL
1.4., *oatasa Stat® Ifaiirersity, 1951

Pi*es©nt#4 la partial
of tl3» r#qalp®»eiits for t&@ d®gr®» of
m&m%9T ©f Arts

i«OT-4»A mAtm miimBiJt

1952

UMI Number: EP34452

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI
Dtowtatfon PublisNns

UMI EP34452
Published by ProQuest LLC (2012). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

ProQuest*
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 -1346

ffels thesis teas

approved fey %hm Board of Kxaa-

la@rs la partial falflll.»@nt of thm rmqulw®m&ntB tor the
d©gr®® of luster ©f 4rts.

I.I.I

Ctealraajj, ©f tfe« l®ar«! of Kica«la®rs

/

/,
BeftK of til® "4r«idaat« Se&ool

Sate

y

'k\

-11-

/l-V2^

mmmiMmmMfB

flie &«atlior is lad@tot@€ to Profeasor
Oscar J. Mmmmm f&r tlie subj@et aad titl®
of tfe« t^#®ls ftM for <5tM®r vsluatel© sugr
gestlons.

fbanlcs ar# du« l^ls Oabl Sole

f#r r®«3lBg tiiff @3atlr@ wAfiyserlpt.
A, J. B.

Ill*

tAWlM

or eOlTlIfS

V

ISftOBOCTlOl
GBmtm

I. nnmQCMBMmh m^mmm
II.
111.
jv.

?.
VI.

WAR ASB

II fOi MMMAm

i
tO

QQMwmmm mn mmmo-L . .

5©

mstim

50

A SH«

a iws-io-fttMisH was

Wmcm MB PIPL«a^

^PlACl ¥IT1 BOIQR**

81
lOf

mmhiomMm

13^

~%r-

ISTROOOCtlOS
fh@ chronological seop© of this study eoTsrs the
period from July B, l$75 to July 16, 1878.

On th® fora#r

date an Insurrection occurred in th© Ttirklsb provlnee of
Herzegovina and rapidly spread northward into tb® fyrklsji
provlnc® of Bosnia.

Tin® two provinces. Inhabited by a aalaly

Serbian population, were Turkey's oat®r»oat Suropeaa terri
Serisla and Montenegro, lying to "the west s.ad south

tories.

west of Bosnla-israsgoTlna, w@r@ part o-f the Turkish Saplr#
in lurop®, but ©aofe was practically lBd«p#ndent, toeing only
under tbt© suseralaty of tb.® Sultan,

fh® Serbians aad Mon

tenegrins, b#ins of the saae nationality aa the Bosnians
and Serz®govinlan.s, aided tU® lasurreetlonists.

Turkey

failed In her attempts t© r«stor® peace, so the European
Fo-wers lnt©rv®iied.
c©asful.

fh.«lr InltriJil intervention was unsue-

Tht0 situation b«c«»© sore and aor© aggravated,

eventually oaueing two wars. fh@ crisis, as vl@w@d by Brit
ain, ended on July 16, 1878 with Lord B#&coiiafield'b announceaent to the Bngliah people that he had brought them **P©ace
with Honor.*
This study Is confined to a consideration of British
policy in so far aa It was prosptsd by Balkan ©vents, 187578.

Maturally, the diplosacy of this brief period aust be

-V-

considered in the framework of Britain's -rital interesta in
til© B&lkane and l©ar East, ©specisllj- in relationship to
Russia.

Doaestic considerations, in so far as they gtr®iigth-

efii»d or weakened Disraeli's hand, also lie within th® seope
of this surrey of British diplomacj.
Bosnia-Ber^^PSOTlRS in Britiah Diploaacy. 1875-1876.
in Ti©w of Beajaain Maraeli's domiaant rol© in BritislJ
policy, i® eentered T©ry Miaeh about the figure of the Conservativ© Party L©ad#r.

4,» Prim® Minister, Disraeli wa»

alffiost solely reaponsibl© for British foreign polisy in
the period from 1875 to 1878. If It were not for the con
stitutional right of Englani's monarch to advis© and b® ad
vised, this history could not hAT« b@en written.

Much of

th® material was eontain«d in th© letters froa the Prise
Minister to Queen Victoria.

During th# period, th® a@ab©rs

of the British Cabinet wero not allowed, by custo», to keep
aiinutes or records of th® Cabinet aeetings.

Th®re «r« so®®

standard sources which th® author did not use, such as Die
Grosse Politlk der guropftiaehen Rabinette. 1871-1914.

In

plac® of th® latter, h® used Gteraaa Diploa&tic Docuffients.
1871-1914. an English translation of ths docuffients from
Pi€ Grosa® Folitlk which bear laost directly on English
history.

A coaparleon of th» doeu«®nts appearing in th@

two collections deaonstrates that no Tital o®lsslons ap
pear in the shorter Qerm&n Diploaatic Docuaent®.

-Yi««.

CMAPfSt I
mmcoESBwuh diplomacy

In July, 18?5, tM© Slair Inhabitmnts of Hers^govlna,
SQutlieni Bosisla, p@fm6#A to psy tS3E.®s or to p#rfora labor
services, A fiarki^to. t^rm was disprntobed to eo«pel %b&
peasants to fulfill tb@lr otoligatlona, but» on July 24, it
met vith d#terisln©d reslstsa## aad was defeated. fh@ initi
al succsas of tlie peasants eaeouraged a spreading of the
in©tjrr@etlon, and aid rapidly cam® fro® Bosniejas, Serbians
and Mont«3a«griiis.

Tb® eau®#s of the uprising *»r® sore @eo-

noaic and social than, politieal, with unbearable fiscal burd®as aad religiotaa oppr®ssiO-n b«ing th@ sabj€ict of tb® ffiost
loudly voiced complaints, and with laiB@iitations of corrup
tion b«lGg often heard.

For long®r than a d®eade the area

had been th© scene of aerioua tturest.

Mr. Holffies, the

British con#ul in Bosnia, reported. In i860, that

th®

conduct of the Turfeish authorities in these proviaees hstd
been aufficient, in conjunetion with foreign agitation, to
bring Boenia to the very verge of rebellion, whilst the
Herzegovina was in a state of war.'**^

In 1867» '?lt and *73

1. J, A. R. Marriott, The Sastern Question: to Historical
atudy in European. Diploffiaey (Oxford. 191?), 282ff.

th® British Foreign Offie® received additional report®
froii Mr. Holmes describing '*Hh® open bribery and corrup
tion.,"* and saying that **of all case® of Rustic®, whether
between Mussulmans alon®, or Turks and Christians, ninety
out of a hundred are settled by brib«rj alone.•
fh® fsst spr#ad of the r#v'olt in, Bosnia and H©rz@goTitia oaui«d soa® concern in th® capital® of Surope.

Loadon

was content, at first, with instructing h®r Minister at
to r®preseRt to th® Awitrian goY®ra»®nt that:

Her Majesty'3 •Cioir®rn®®iit would be glad to learn
that th© CJoT«rEiffi«iit of Austria-liaagarir had tak®Q
steps to secur® th# p®ac® of th® frontier and to
present th« distmrtoaBe®« ia Hereego-vina froa r»celving support or eneourag^aeat from Austrian
t«rritorj.3
Th# British ageat at B«lgrad« wae instructed in a similar
«ana®r, ®.nd Sir H. Elliot, the British tobasandor
etantlnople, was a8k.#d. to

at Coa-

dissuade th® Prine® of MoRtenegro

fro® helping thos® who had struck for freedoai.'

At this

point England was much In favor of noii-int®rv©ntiom.

Dis-

rn.®!!, th© Pri®e Minister, desired that Turkey should re
solve the sltUfttlOR.

The coatiaeatal powers, however, were

desirous of joint action, by the consuls, and England adhered
reluctantly, as es« be seen in a telegram frosa Disraeli to
Derby, th® Foreign Minister, August 24, in which h© said;
2.

Ibid. 282ff.

3. H. C. Thoffison, The Oitmolnp^, furk; Impressions of a
Journey through the"tfestero Balkans (London, 1897), 214.
4.

Ibid. 214.

-3Is- no alteraativ®, bwt 1 don't like It,'^5 vh®n
ag,re«lGg to a Cotisalar ffilsslon B®rbj used these words;
H«r Majesty's Qo:vernm0nt ©onseiat^d to this step
with r®l«cta,ac©, as they douht®d tJae ®:Kpedi@n©y
of th@ l«t«rT©Btion of Foreign Qonwytln, Such sm
int®rirentl©ii, I r@«&rk&d, was scare^lj ©oapatibl®
with th® independent a«tth©rltj ©f th« Port©; it
offered mn lnduc®i!©iit to in«urr®etioii as a ®#aiig
of appealing to ferelga syapathy against ftarklsh
rule, and it sight not improbably ©p@ii th® %fay
to further diplomatie lnt-@rf@r@B-e® ia th© iateraal affairs of th© #aplr®.^
tfe® p#»,swat l@«td«'rs, ill S®pt#«to»r, presented th®lr
cas® to th® consuls, d^aandiag rellgloue freedoa, taxation
reforms, the right to gl^@ ©vldsnee In the courts, and the
formation of a local Chrlstlsa .aiilltift,

Thej suggested th®

followliag alt#raatlv® r#»®dl@@: (1-) land to which-jtrhaj" istght
®mlgrst®; (2) Bosnia and H«rE«gorlaa %o b® aa sutonoaous
state und»r a Christian prlne®; or (3) a teaporsry foreign
oceupittlon..'^

furk®y would a©t »cc«d® to the deaaads of the

insurgents, fh® lstt®r, %n turn, would not accept the proails#® of Turkey. Persuasioas of the consuls availed riothl.iis,
so th© aedlatloii of th® Powers failed to restore peace, and
the revolt continued to spread.
The British desire that the Powers remaia aloof
fro® the new situation is easily understood in the light
of Brltala's tradltioaal Balkan policy.

Her Near-Eastern

5. W. F. Moneypeimy and Q. 1. Suckle, The Life of Benjaatin
Disraeli. £&rl of Beaconsfield {2 vols., rev., R.Y., 1929),
II, 884. Tol. II is used exclusively ia this study.
6. fhoffisoti, Qutgoiag furk. 214.
7.

Marriott, Eastern Queatloa. 285f.

dlploaaoy was b»®®d upon tii® fre&ty of Paris of 1856 as
Q
sodlfled by the freaty of Loadon of 1871, e, cosbinatlon
of treaties aalnly significant ia that It represented a
d^clsiv® eh®cl to Russia'© advaac® into tli» Balkatis.

Aa

important aspeet of the Treaty of 185€ w®-® the provision,
contained im Article ¥11,. wfaieb secured for the F&wern th&
right of coasid®riag aay violation of furkisii integrity to
to® ®a question of general interest.fMs right was affiraed by Article fill of thm Treaty of 1871.^®

British

policy aft«p 1856 was on® of isoa-ln.t«rTe-ntion in. the Baliteaas,
H©r d@»and that the eoiatln®nt&l Powers follow ths san® polley
was valid fro® the point of vl®w of th@ Law of Hatloos,

It

was, in addition, ideally suit#<l to Britain's sajor iater©sts.

fh® ©hl®f of these wss th® ffiainteasnee of b^r e»pir@,

and, sine® Britaia viewed RbissIr as a pot#ati«il dissturber
of her Asiatic X»plr®> this sad® England highly deslroas
of a &krop®ai3. furte@y standing h®tw©®n Bussia and tb®
Straits.

H»ac« the attempt of any Power, hut particularly

Russia, to aeddl® In Turkish affairs In such manner as to
threaten her territorial iotegrlty was Ixjund to coaeern
Britain.

The British fear of Eiissia was hased upon theh

Bfltl^sh eonception of Russlaa laperialls®, the Russian
threat to the balance of power, Russian autocracy, and
8. T, E, Holland, ed., The European Concert in the Eastern
Question; A Collection of Treaties and Other Puhlic Acts
(Oxford, 1885), 241-255
272-277.
9. Ibid.
10.

245.

Ibid. 275.

Rasalan resetion,^^ bat more #specl®lly upon Britlsb,
und«rst«it41ns of Russia's trade problexs. 4s long as
the Straits w®re controlled bj fur&ey the trade to and
from Russian Blaok S®a ports was Ywlnerable.

Ineld^tits

coatiBually farmsd the fl&®es of British fear, Mo^seow,
In

1S6T,

pla.y®4 host to a Paa-Slaf congress, glvlag to

th© «ov®s®nt a tt#w energy; Patt-Slav llter&tur© was ctreulat®d eTeryvhare ia the Balksnaj Russian unl¥@rslti®s
attracted «or@ SerblaBS, Montenegrins, Bofflnli.ns, and Bu.l«
gmrlans than preTlously,
official support.^®

The Bov@ii®nt reeQived ftsassian

Russia took advantage of the Franco-

Fruaaian War to r«pudlate th# Black sea clauses of tha
Treaty of 1856.

fhough this was a violation of the Law

of latlons, S«@si& w&a a'ol@ to force her will on Brit
ain &nd th© Fow®r® at London, where th© latter signed th®
Treaty of 18T1 wfeieh legmllaM th® Rttssian action,2-3
These_actloas and othars toy Russia gave Britain little
hope of a rapprochement.
A second British Interest was her trade.

British

liiv@«tor8 had looked to th® S@ftr Es®t and wmrm aaeoclated
th®r# with rsilroada, »ftrtE®t8, aad general commerc®, furk»y
had procured m&nj lo&as fro« British financiere. If Russia
shoald be allowed to conquer Turksy, British subjaots, aad
11. M. ¥» Tyler, The European Powers and th® Near Saat.
1875-1908 (Mirmeapolls, 1$25), *6-50.
12.

Marriott, Eaetera Question. 283f.

13. t. P. Oooch and J. H. B. M«at®raan, A Century of Britiah
Forelmi Policy (London, 1917, 18), 24.

-6thus Britain, uroiald lose bug© »umm of »oney, and Britlsto.
trade would b© ©©verelj daaaged.l^ Saturally, In tiaes of
crisis iB the lear East, money and trading interests exer
ted pressure ia t-ii® rigbt places in favor of the s&intetianee of furkish integritj and the status quo.

4t various

times am opposing pressure was torougbt to bear upoa the govem»ttt toy tkat section of th®- po'pulace vhlch was usually
syiipathetic to tfe® nationalities im th® Balkans, wanted to
see Turkish alsrul© removed, and other political and ter
ritorial arraagements aade.

However, money and trading

interests were more powerful and closer to govemaeatal
©ireles, ®o their will prevailed, and Sagland dedicated
beraelf to tb® cause of »mliitalning furkey in Europe.
By Octo^r the Imrde.a of coato^t la Bosala-Herssegoviaa
is.ad overtaxed Turklafe. fins-aces, vMcib, becsus© of ttoe misrule
of th.®

Sultan,^5

were In no eondltlon to stand a ®illtary

eaapslgn in it® outersoet provinces,
nine foreign loAss prior to 1875.^^
October

furlcey had received
When she announced on

that sb® could not pay th® interest oa th® public

14, fyler, Europ®«a Powers. 48.
15, A. Debidour, Histolre dlploaAtlaue de 1*lurope; Depula
1'ouverture du eonf^r^a de ylemae Jusqu[m 1&~fermeture du
eotmrhB 4e Berlin. lBi4»l8yW'(2 roi&,. Paris, I891), II» 478.
Where be s&ysT'^bd-ul-Azis . . . iilourdie chaque Jow
peu plus par les grossiers plalalrs du bare®, auxquels 11
sacrlflait avec une psrfalte insouciance tout aon teaps et
toutes lee resources du tresor public.**
16, R, ¥. Seton-Watson, Britain in lurope. 1789-1914; A
Survey of Wormlm. Policy (Caffibridge ,""19387» 512.
17.

Tyler, European Powers. 56

debt, ths csfdltors, of wfe©® aaaj were Sigllsh, deaand®^
action to taring an ®nd to ii©stilltl©a in the proTlnc^s and
to put furklsk fInane©® In order.M@ra#li realized tfe&t
th® S&8t«rn Qusstiou a©w fft©@d hia*

Xn a l@tt@r to l,ady Brad

ford, written lov®«'b8r 3j h& esid:
Matters ar« larg© stod pr#®#ing# PIT® wemka ago
Russia, and indeed all th® Or«®t Powers^ agreed
'the H®rs, quest!©a was settled.' fh& Frlnm of
Sarvia etoangsd bis Ministry, mt their dietation,
to ensur® that result# But this extraordisaary,
and quit# nmforeaeen^ bankruptey of the Fort®
has set ©Terytbimg ag&lu in fla«.®, ®ad I really
bell^v® Hh# last@ra. Quastioa,' that has feauiat®d
Europe for a c@ntury, aad wli[leh] I thought the
Crlaean War had adJoum#d for half .another^ will
fall to ay lot to ®tteou»t®r-»dar® I say to 8«ttl«?^"
It fflight to® henaficial, at this point, to exmrnlnm
brl#fly th® poliey advoeated hy Diara©li, fh© last#ra
Question wa® only a part of th® problem of proteetlag th«
British S»plr®j whioh was Blsr«©li's for«®ost conesm.^®
In desliixg with this probl@«,, h© was »otlvat®d by a fear of
Russia, which *asiount®d to a aonoaariia.

Conmqwstiitiy, his

every action wa» for th® porpose of restraining Russiam influesic® a»oag th® Balkan Slave, and praventing any Russian
advance toward Constantinopi®.

He believed that this could

he best aceoapliehed by a strict adherence to the treaty of
Paris of 1856, aad it was on this principle that he aade his
18. W. S. Davia, A Short History of the Hear East: Froa the
gomdins of ConBtantinople (330 A.D. to 19^S) {l.l., 1925), 351.
19.

Moneypenny and Buekle, Life of Disraeli. 886.

20.

Ibid. 875.

21.

Davis, A Short History. 332.

stand.

22 Disraeli's traditional fear of Russia was subfitaia-

tlated by reports fro® Sir Henry Uliot, ths British Ambas
sador at Constantinople, who *la@lft®d that th® rebels wrm
sneouraged by Russia in every possible way; that the l«ad#ra
*©t at the hous® of Yonln, th® Eusslan oonsul at Eagusa; and
that they wer© ald®d bj Inforsatlon supplied by Igsatlef M®8#lf.'*^5

R@port» of thl.s natiir# strengthened Disra.@ll ia hie

d®t©rainatlon that th®r® ahoold be no rearr«iag®»®ats »ads 1q
th0 Balkans, at l®it,st aot without his coassat.

fh« craatloa

of independent &l&r states, he thought, would slaply throw
th«ffl Into th# hsKds of Russia, or, at th® rerj laa«t, greatly
increa®# Russian str«agth.^^ Ia th® light of th® faji-SlaTlst
Boveaent, this Hn« of reasoaing was well grounded.

fh©n

too, Oisra®!! did not b©ll@T® in the capacity of th® Balkan
p#opl«8 for self-goT#rM<fent»

fhls 1® illu«trat®d in a letter

of October 1 to Lady Bradford in which h® eoaaents on the
Augtrlaa proposal for autonoaiy for Boaaia-Herxegovlnas
*Faney autonomy for Bosnia, with a aixed population; autonoay
for Ireland w[oul3 d b® l®ss absurd, for there ar® more furk®
in proportion to Xtlaos in Bosnia than Ulster r, the three
other proviaeea. , . .*25

22. Moaeypenny and Buokle, -Life of Msraell. 881.
23. Cited in ¥. L. Linger, European Alliances and Alignments.
1871-1890
1951), 69.
24. fyler, European Powera. 59.
25.

Mon«ypenny aad Buckle, Life of Diaraeli. 885.

-9toother factor tak^n Into eoBsideration by Disraeli
at all times was tli® greater liBportsnee of th@ Eastern Ques
tion to England as a result of the opening of the Suez Canal
In 1869.

Tbls b@ea»e th« shortest rout# to India and wist be

protected above all ©Is©,^^

Tbls protection h» intended to

secure by an individual actioa, and »anlfeated a r®luetaao®
to eo-op®rate witb. the Powers,m wtts ©laarly shown dur
ing the period of «@4iatioii bj the Consuls,

X®t, tbla lack

of eo-operation on hi® part was aot to b# construed by tb®
Powers as an invitittioia for tb@a to act without bia in the
Balkans, fo s«k.@ sur@ tbst this waa elearlj understood h®
ftddr®ss®d a warning to thsa, Sov«»to«r 9, in a 8p®@eh on
Lord Mayor'a Daj.
Sow that tb© fimfljaeial catastro-phes in furk^j had
r«viv@d tb0 struggle in Bosnia, it could not b«
denied that cireu®staae@» w«r® eritical. The
0r®at Powers iaaedifttely lnt©r@st#d, toowaver,
had e3c®rels@d, and h@ b#li@-r@d wjuld coritinu® to
©x©rois«, a wi®® forb#ar®.ne# s and h® was there
fore eoiiYlae#d that p«ac« would b« ssintftined and
ths public opinion of lurop# a&tisfied. But he
significantly added that, though th® interests of
th® I»p@rlal Powers in this question were aor®
direet, they vere not aore coMiderable than those
of Great Britain; aad 'those to wfeos the conduct of
your sff&irfi is now entrusted are deeply oooscioue
of the nature and magiiltude of those British iaterests» and those British interests they are resolred
to guard and ffiaiataln.'2o

'

4s if ia verification of hi© atinouneed forward policy, Disraeli,
on the twenty-fifth of Sovesber, startled the Powers by
26. L&nger, l^ropean Alll&aeea« 73.
27. fyler, European Powers, 5928.

Cited in Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 888.

-10annowicing ttoat th.® British ao¥©ra*®Bt bad parehased- th©
S]aediv®''s sharss in th@ Sues

Canal,^9

g® was, IMeed;.,

consclous of the nature and. magnitude of thofie Brltlsli
Interests."
On Jaauary 3, 1876 Count Beuat^ Austro-Hungarlan
Ambassador la aigland,_, delivered a diepatob to Beffey froa
Count .iMdr&BSf, th# Austro-HiinsaFiaB. Foreign Mlnl«t©r»50
This dispatch, coattoaly referred to as tb« Andrassj Not®,.
wa» issued on D©e«i!ber 50, 1875» as the product of tiie Joist
efforts of Cl#rfflamyj Ruasiaj and. toetria,^^

It ©xpfeased s

d®alre of th« pQw«rffi to restore p@ae» In Bos?ila-H©rz®goflnas
and to effect this p#aee It Invited the Gu&raGteelBg ?ow#r®
to Join In th@ preseot&tloa of the aot@ to Turkey.

It

stat#d tliat S©rtei« and Ment^aagro wer® to b@ pr@T@at@4 fro-»
Joining in tfe# ln»urr®ctlon.

Speolflo demands were mm&»

upon Turkey to grant religious llt>«rtj, to abollsb tb© far»ing of taxes, to turn some of the r«venu@ from direct tax
ation back to the proTlnc®8, to better the condition of the
rural population, and to allow the establlshsaent of a coaffiiSBlon

to OY©rs©@ the raforas.

It ended wltb a request that

Turlcey furnisli the Pow«rs with s forsal notification of
29. Britisli and For#ig:n. Stat® Papers. 187'^-1875» ¥ol. 66
(Compiled by the Librarian and Keeper of tb® Papers, For@ign
Office, London, 1882), 670, There wer« 176,602 ehares pur
chased for 4,000,000 pounds sterling less the proportlon&ta
yalu® of l,o4o shares.
30. Sir Edward lertslet, ®d., fhe Map of Europg by Tremtj;
Showing the Varioue Folitlc&l snd ferrItorial Changes which
have Taken Place Si.ac0 th« General Peace of 1814 '(4"volg.,
London, 1^91),
24l8. Only ¥ol. rf la used in this studj.
31.

Marriott, Eastern Question. 286.

-11aeeept&nce.^^

Derby's Incllstatlon was to adhere,

Dls!ira®ll, f»©lins slighted toy th® action of the Three Powers
liid®p@nd®ntly of lagland, and f©@ll».g tteat adh,®r®ne® mlglit not
b® in Englaad's beat later®sts, s®at a t@l®gra» to Derby on
January

9, In which he saldi

. . . W® shotild pans® before assenting to tli® Austriaa,
proposal....
I t-Mnk it will IftM .^s iH & f»l»® po®ltloa, and it
wottld b@ pref®r®bl® to app«ar Isolated,, wh[l0h]
I «8w«llf depr#eat#, than, for th# sake of a. si®ulftted anion, wla[lebj will laot last aanj montfes,
eabaras® ottr®#lir®g, whea iad@p«ad@.iit aetlon «ay
b® accessary,5^
A r«qtaest that Britain Join tfee other pow«r» in tb©
pr«s0ntatiom of the lot® w«» delivered by Masmrtis, fxitklnh
representat!•«, to Derby om January 17.^5

speech from

the throa® on tM« op^fiing of Parlisffl:0nt iadleated Britain's
adherence, but warned that sh@ womld not disturb furklmh.
liidepen.d®Be@-.5^

Ob th# tweaty-flfth Derby dispatched a re

ply to thi© Aadrassy Mot® which r®presented a formal sdher«ne®,37 a.a<i

alao pointed oat that preTious Turkish Irad»8

bad already promised to earry out th© indicated

reforms.36

fh@ Andrasay Mote was pr®8©nt®d to furkey on Janu&ry 31,
32. Hertal^t, Map of Eurom, 2418-29.
33. Tyler, guropean Powera. 60.
34.

Moneypenny and Buckl«, Life of PiBr&ell. 891.

35. Ibid. 891. Dlsraall to Bradford.
36.

Ibid.

891.

37. France and Italy had readily given adherence.
38. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2430-40.

-121876,^^ and In two weks Turkey issued & oirculsr to the Powers,
accepting all poiiite of refora but one, tbat being releveut to
direct taxatioa,^^ Tbis att««pt of the Powers to restore
peace to th® proTln©#®

in failtir®, baeause ''tb® iasar-

gents refused to accept tbe prograa laid down and deaanded a
aor© extensive sch#»© ©f refora® as wll as guarant©-®® by
tb# Powers that tb® reforms would b@ ©arried
Tbis failtir® waa quickly followed bj another, tbat
of an stt©iapted rapproaebm®nt between Q®r®anj and Saglaad,
wbicb. If it had b«en suee©ssful, algbt ba^e av®rt®d the
Rusao-Turkisb War, »i««strck initiated a conversation with
Lord CNlo Biiss@ll, tb® British Aabassador at Berlin, on January
2, 1676.^^

Tb® eonf?@rs®tion d®alt witb tb© ^attitud® of the

Powers towards tb« Tttrkish qnsgtioa,* and expressed a hope
harbored by Bisasrek tbat b© ®lgbt get *'lnto closer toucb
with Lord D«rby,* tb«,s bringing about an ©xcbsage of idea.®
betw®©ii England and his own eountry,

Tb@ long con-s'ers&tloii

a»ount®d to aa invitation to Britain to work »ore closely

with Q^rmo-nj in finding sojb® solution for tb® problea pr®s©at®d by tbe outbreak in Bosnia-Herzegovina.on February
39•

Tyler, gar0P#an Powgrg, 60,

40, Hertslet, Map of Europe. 244lff,
41. fyler, ^rop@&ia Powerg. 60,
42, Lang©r, Suropeao Allianees, 76,
43. S,,f, S, Dugdale, J. W, Gerard and J. ¥, Headlaa-Morl®y,
geraan Piploaatie DocMentfi, ly1-1914 (4 vols., N,X. & Lon
don, 1928), I, 20, bSIow'to Mtester, Hereafter referred to
as geraan Pipiogatic Doeuiaients. Only vol, I is used in this
study.

-131, Bisaarek talked again, to Russell.

He reiterated tela sitt-

cmrm deslr® for pesc©, a peac® which h@ thought mlgbt b@ ®or®

©asilj ffiaintaiG«d with der^anj a«i4 England working together.
fh® English Aabaesador, lo reporting hto»s» pointed out that
"we should lose no time in glviag Priac® BieaarcM; to tanderstand that we ehsll to® r®adj to act with Germany."^5 fi^®
seal with whieh Hmssell advocated that Snglaad work with
Seraiany stirrM Queeji Victoria to action.

On Fehraary 9,

eh® wrote as follows to h@r Foreign Minister:
fh® Qu®®n th#r«for« thinks thiit it is of the atmoat
iaportaoee that w® should aeeept the proffered aid
of Q&Tmmny, ». strong state whose interests ar« th®
saa® aa ours and whos® poliej ean or should seldom
b# opposed to that of an Inglish governaemt. . . .
fh© Queen considers that tho la|»rtanc® of ®stat>lishing: a liiik between th© two countries CRimot
to® OT#rrat@d, and desir®» e«ra®-«tlj to iapreas
upon Lord Derbj tb© a^c^sglty of authorising Lord
Odo Russell to enter Into fr©e and unrestricted
coaffiumlcAtlOB with Prlae® Bls«arck upon E«.et#rii
affairs,^6
D@rtoj was not quite as eager ae the
h© b@li®ved that th® offer was

,'though

to be accepted, as th#

assistance of Prine® Biflmarek in carrying into effect Bagllsh
•riews on lastem subjects might under certain circuastaacea
be of incalculable 'ralue.'*^?
44.

He warned, however, that ""more

Langer, Suropeayi Alliaaees. 78.

45. G. S. Buckle, ed., fhe Letters of Qamen Victoria; SeconA Series t A Selection from her Xa.legtps' Correspondence
and Journal Between the Years'TSSl" and 1878 (2 vols.. N.Y.,
1926'^, II, 443» (^een to Derby. Only vol. II is used in
this studJ.
^6.

Ibid.

443f.

47. Derby to Queen.
893.

Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli,
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aiay to© Intended hj this coaiaunlcatloo than meets th® ey®,^
and. h.0 wondered "what assistance Eagland Is expected to glv©
in. return for that which Is offered.In order that this
auspicion would not jeopardize the posalMlity of a working
sgreeaent with G-epasBf, Disra®!! urged upoa. Dmrhj that h©
co-operate "with the offers and overtures of Prine® Bisffiarck.**^9 g® as is'#!! as Darby, realized that Blsaarclc was
a dangerous aaii, but h@ h®lie¥©d that "if a concerted aetloTi
on public affairs hetweeti (Jermssy and England toe established
. . . th® ehatic®® of so great a ©alaalty as s general, or
(tfen coasiderabl©, war would . . . b® infinitely

.**50

r#duc#d

fhus, Derby drafted a reply to Blsaarok, which h0 submitted
to Disraeli for approval.

Th© old ma®t@r added a fin&l

paragraph and th« r@ply was dispatched, but it pro"9«d in
sufficient to briGg about th@ hoped-for agreement. Blsffiarck
reaained with th® fhr®© Saperora L@agu», and England worked
al©n«.51
Th® chiefs of th® rebel forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina
c&5B« together on February 28 and decided to resume with
double vigor th© battle which, in th® cold of the winter,
had been carried on at a slackened
48.

Xbld. 893.

49.

Disraeli to %ueeii.

50. Disraeli to Derby.
raell, 893f.

pace.52

gy March,

Buckle, The Letters. 444.
Money penny and Buckle, Life of Ma-

51.

Ibid. 894.

52.

Debidour, Histolre diplomatique. II, 485.

-15approxlmately 156,000 r«f«g©«s from th© provinces had
©nt®r©d neighboring states, and, with tb® increasiag pop
ular agitation in Serbia and lont@a,©grt), the situation was
beeoalns critlesl.53 Sortebakoff ®x©rt©d preasur® on Austria
for another seating of the l»p«ror®, but Aadrassy ref-used.

On

May 7, how®irer, an Incident occurred Ctb© marder of tb® Frencb
and G-erisan consuls by m fanatical »ob) which proiroked Andrasgy to aoe-ed® to the demands of Gortcbakoff for a ffi#«tlng,5^
^ecordlRglys on May 13, the note, .r«f«'3?r#d--'to-..aa-tbe"-B»rl't& ^
M#»orandii», was isauM. fh® t@xt of tb© H^morsndus ^as in
stronger language tban tbat of tb® pr©vlou® Andrassy -Not®,
It contained: proposal® for co®bia®d n&v&l mor&mentM for
protection of Turkish aubj«cts, and for a reatorstlon and
»aint©nanc© of peac#; a proposed aralstlc© for two »ontb@;
a plan of furkisb reconetructloa of bouses and ebureb«s,
and of Turkish subslstene® for returnees to tb® provinces;
provisions for tb® ©etablisbMent of a r«ll@f coismigsionj
ffietbods for ceseation of hostllltl#©; and a stipulation
permitting consular ©uperTlsion.

Mor® laportant than tb®

tK)dy of th© Meaaorandua was tb« concluding note, which stated
that If the tsras of the note were aot fulfilled at the end

of the two-month araslstice it would be necessary for the
Powers to *suppleisent tbeir dlplotcatlc action by the sanction
of an agreement with a iriew to such efficacious saeasures as
53. Langer, European Alliances, 81.
5^.

Debidour, Rlstolre diploa&tique« 48?.
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lalglit »pp«8.r to be d#m®nd®d In th« laterest of generRl peace,
to check the evil and prevent its

development.*55

fb.® British Ambassador in Q@Tmsaij was presented
with the Seffiorandytffi, oa tke d&t@ of l8s«@,56

lavlt^d

to proGur® Britlsbi adher®ae® wltMn two 4ajs»57 Disraeli was
onrag®d; be abfflol«t«lj was not a .saa to b® so slighted.

On

Maj 16 h® r®ftd a long aote to tb® Cebinet, giving tli« fol
lowing reasons for aoii-adfe®r@nc»:
(1) H® Disraeli b©ll@v©@ It is laposslbl# for tb®
Suitaa to r@0oa8traet tb@ houses and ebureii©® of
the lnsurg@istsor to find food for th@ r@f'age®a,
(2) fb® distribution of relief by »ans of such
a Coffi«issioa ss tbat proposed, would b® a bug© syst®*
of iadlserlaiaat© alasgiving, totally b#yond tb®
power of the Fort© to «ff®ot, and utterly d®aoralising, to aay eouatry.
{ 3 ) Tb® coBeentration of tro<>p.s In certain plsees
would b@ A«liv®rlag up tb@ wtiol® country to sia&reby,
partieularly wb®a tb« ia-sitrg®at» are to r®talB th@lr
arms.
(4) fbe 'consular supervision' would r®duc® tb@
authority of th@ Sultan to a aulllty; and, without
a fore© to support it, supervision would b# l»posglble.
(5) Tfc© bop© of restoring tranquillity by tbes«
asan.® b^lag, in Mr. Disraeli's opiaion, grouadleas, w# should tb»a b« asled to 'Join in taking
ffior® efficftclous aeaaur®# in tb« i»t«rest8 of
peace,' wbieb, it is supposed, aeans taking more
©fficaclous laessures to break up tb@ EiBpire.SS
Disraeli infortaed the cabinet, moreover, that b® thought it
would be fftr better for

furlE;@y

to give up Sosaia-HerE^govliia.

than for England to give adb®sloa to tb© Meaorandu®, and tbat
55.

Hertslet, Mmp of Surojge, 2459-63.

56.

Ibid.

57.

Lsttg«r, Su.rop@an Alll&neee. 82.

58.

Moneypenny and Buckle, Lif# of Disr&ell, 896.
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-17also it aight be better for TurM®j to surrender th® proTinees ^thaa adopt th© alterfiative now

offered.**59

fjj®

sltuatioa was iiad®®d serious wiien Dlsr®©!! woial4 agre# to
a possible <liss@ab@ring of Turksj.

Consistent with Ma poll^'ej,

above all, h@ intended to hold Russia, ®T«a if nee^ssary to
S'iT® up the provlaces to Austria.

Tbe Gabinat stood solidly

behind their Frlm® Minister, bat the Qaeea was Imrd-won-oirer.
She wrote to Disraeli tiiat she disliked being separated
froia th® Powers and that she f@ar@d that "Turksj will looM
to ttB to b.®lp her ^g4ftaat the rest of Europe, and that ws
shall thus preclpitat# rath«r than prevent th® cataatropb®
ET®ntually Disra®!! was able to eonvlrice h@r, and Brltala
sent a foraal reply to th® Me-morandu® on May 19*^^

This r@*»

piJ was a bl«.Qket r®fusal to Join th© Fow®r» is th® j^norand-ua,
The May murders &t S&loaika created great alara among
th@ Christians at Constmtlaopl®, so, for the purpose of dl»-pelllng th© fear, Sir Henry Elliot inforffl®d Mffllral DruamoM,
at Jaffa, "that his «arly presence at Constantinople sight
b© very useful, and that h@ would be glad if he would bring
the squadron to Besika Bay.*'^^

ord®rs were transaitt«d to

the fleet on the twenty-fourth.^^

fh® Pow«rs were prone to

connect this event with Britain's defiance of the Powers in
59.

Ibid. 896.

60. Buckle, Th® Letters. 453.
61. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2464-68.
62.

Ibid.

2464-68.

63.

Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 898.

-18refuslBg to co-op0rat» with the® in a preaentatioa of tb®

Berlin M@fflorand«ffi.

Cotisequantly, there was uneasy feeling

in the Capitals of Europ®, bat less than a week lapsed be
fore th.©r® occurred » aajor ev#at, which completely altered
the situation.

A pal»e« revolution la furk#y placed a new

Sultftn, Mttrad, at tb© hela.

B-e pr©f®saed.

prograffiae of

eoastitutlonal reform and of fri©-ndly co-operatioa witli for
eign Powers.'"64 Ingland, tli.«r©after, ©asllj- persuaded th®
Powers to wlthirmw th® B«rlia Memorandiia.
raeli aanounced;

On Jun® 9 Dis

**'fher@ is & coaplet® uaderstandlag be

tween us and th,@ Qr^mt Powers that ther© should b# no uadu®
pressure put upon tk@ new So-fereigii of Turkejrj tha,t

md

fctis couBsellop® should h«T® tie® to astur© their sasaur®®.'*^5
Tlaus, Brltlsli d,iplo»acy was to hav® & r@spit©.

It

®u8t fcua-sfe b«#ii w®leo»«, for a#®trly » f®sr had been, spent la
eontinual negotistiott.

In July tJa© insurrection had. occurred.

Sngl&nd would hav© pr®fer®d « policy of noa-int«rf#r®ne®, but
external pr#88ur«s bad been too groat and reluctantly she had
joined the Powers in an att@»pt to mediate the dispute through
the Consuls, fhe dciaaad® of th© insurgents having b«®n @xe#8slv®, ffiediatioa had failed.

In October the Sultan had an-

nouncad his repudiation of the isterest on the Turkish for-*
eign debt, so asany Bjigllsh financier®, as >f®ll as those of
other nation®, had begun to deaand active interventtlon.
the turn of the year, the todrassy
IMd. 900.
65.

Ibid. 900.

At

Mote was being studied in

-19England, Turkish lr).sist©nce that England Join the Powers in
the presentation of the note, had brought England into th©
European concert.

The note, though accepted by Turkej, had

proven no more effective than mediation by the consuls. fh@
following month England had experienced another failure, an
attempted rapprochenent with {Jermanj.

The Salonika murders

and the Berlin Memorandu® occurred in Maj.

England, had re

fused to join the Powers at that time, and had sent her fleet
to Beslka Bay, an action somewhat misinterpreted bj the Powers.
The Berlin Meaorandum had never been forced on Turkey, because
of the palace revolution whioh had placed Murad on the throne.
Truly, it had been a busy period for the British statesmen,
who could show little for all their work—only that they had
aade the Powers awar® of the fact that there was still an
England, that she would have to be reckoned with as in the
days around mid-century and before. The fleet at Beeika Bay
was the proof of this. Yet, up to this point, diplomacy
had been unsuccessful, for the insurrection was expanding,

an ever present danger to the existence of the Turkey-inlurope which England deemed essential to the maintenance of
her Empire,

CHAPTER II
¥AB MD MASSACRE lU fHE
Less than a month passed sftsr th® dispatcfe of the
British Fleet to

Bay before tfo© British Foreign

Office had warnings of ImpeMiag danger in the Balkans.

On

June 20, 1876 Bertof wrot#, relatiY« to th®s© warnings, that
'^in-deed if th# report be true that the Princ# of Serbia has
asksd for the (iovernorship of Bosnia, the real troubles ar©
^unt about to hegin.

The demand is so absurd that It can

be put forw&ra onlj as an excuse for a quarrel; a»d I doubt
whether ®fen Russian Influence could prevent war. If it were
sad© and refused.Disraeli, having r®e@iv«d verification
of the dlsturblag report, realised th@ need for iaiiediat©
action. y«t the course® of action open to him were f©w.
In his analysis of th® situation, Russia waa the k@y pover.
If she were willing to co-operate with the other powers, war
sight be averted.

Thus, representations were mede to th®

European Powers to bring their Influence to bear upon Serbia
to maintain peace, Dieraell's instructions to Deroy, on
June 28, were that the British Foreign Office should dispatch
1. Derby to Ponsonby.
raeli, 905f.

Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Dis
-20-

-21-^
a d©clarstioB to Eusaia, statlag that '*if war takes pl&c©
between Turkey and S®rirla, and th© Porte ia vletorious,
and seeks the legitiast© consequences of victory» as, for
©xaapl®, th® restoration of Belgrade . . . that if Russia
Interfere under th®s@ eircuastane®s, the position of affairs
will be considered bj England as »o8t grav®.'*^

Also, th®

instructions suggested that d@t@r®la©d and quick efforts b©
»ad® to det&eh, Montenegro froo Serbia. In Disraeli's words
—**Ev®n feoura ar® precious.
fo understand Serbia's deaand that sh® be allowed
to occupj Bosnia-Hi@rz©goTiaa, It ia nesessary to survey
briefly the preceding dec&d®, Serbia had long nurtured
a hope to acquire th« two provlneea, coffiposed of a aaialy
Serb population.

Ov«r th.r«e-fourths of the 1,100,000

population w©r» Clariatlaa Slavs

fh« altern&tiv© to west

ward Serb expansion was ©xpanslon lato Macedonia. This,
Serbia did not d®sir®, because th© population was so slxed
that it was ^Ifflpoaslble to say where th© Serb population'*
ended and the Bulgarian began.^

As early as 1866, when

Crete roae in revolt against Turkey, Serbia agreed with
Euffianla to work mutually for independence.

On Septeaber

25, 1866, a Serblan-Monteaegrin Treaty was signed, followed
2.

Disraeli to Derby.

3.

Ibid. 908.

Ibid. 908.

Ibid. 886.
5. E.W. Seton-Wateon, The Balkans. Italy and the Adriatic
(2nd, ed., London, 1916127i~"

-ga
by *& tentative Gr^ek-Roumanian Treaty (February 1867),
th« crucial Ssrblan-dreek Treaty (August 26, 186?)

tfo®

military eon-rention between Gr®©oe and Serbia of February
28, 1868.'*^

Tbe teras of the 0re®k-Serblan Agreetaent pro

vided, among other tblngs, tiiat Serbia was to acquire BosniaHersegovlna,'^ Tbe pliins not maturing, Serbia, in 1871 »• S-Pproacbed the Powers with tbe **propositi©n that tbe two pro
vinces be occupied by Serbia under tbe suzerainty of tbe
Sultan,"®

Heltber Auetrls nor Russia dared open tbe E®st«

era Queetiori at that ti»e, «o Serbia gained nothing ®ore
tban vague proislaes tiiat at so®® future date #be .^®lgbt•tb#•"••
p®rffiltte«3 to aake soae "»CQUiaitions in. tbis direetlon.^^
f&® Ineurreatlon in Bosnia «.ad Heraegovina appeared
to the Serbs and Monteaegrlas to be tbelr golden opportunity.
It was impossible for tb® goveraaeata of the two countries to
prevent their subjects fro® aiding their oppressed brothers
in the neighboring provinces,Only the concerted influ
ence of the Powers pi^veaated Serbia and Montenegro from
entering the war.

In the latter part of May, 1876, after

the failure of the Berlin Meaoranduffl, one of the more able
Russian aray officers, fchernayeff, placed himself at the
disposal of the Serba. Be was given the coaiBBand of the Serb
6.

Langer, Kugi5p«&n Allisncea. 6lf.

7«

IMd. 62.

8. fyler, Suropean fowers. 65.
9. Ibid. 65.
10.

Langer, luropeaa Alllancea. 81.

-23srasj.^^

On Jua© 9 Iwrkey dsasaded of Serbia that sh@ explain

her recent arolng and make her intentions known.

Tii© Serb

army, under the new coffi®and®r, was eager to Initiate a cgjBipaign, HO the govemaent, recently assured of aid by a treaty
of allianee with Mont©n®gro, w&© scareely disposed to bow to
the daaands of furk«y.

Instead, It countered with tb# dsaand

that the Turkish troop© ®vaeuat®. th« provinces and permit
Serbia to occupy Bosnia,

Mont®n@gro w&a to b© p@nBitt®d to

occupy Herzegovina.^-2
It was thla demand by Serbia, that stirred th# Britlak
Foreign Office to action. Though th© Powers eo-operated with
Britain In attempting to indue© Serbia and Montenegro to ab
stain fro* so drastic a move as a declaration of war, failure
resulted,Serbia was counting h«a¥ily upon revolts, which
ahe belle-yed would break out #Y®rywhere in the Turkish Empire
following a Serbian attack upon Turkey, and upon an antici
pated disintegration of th© Turkish army.^^

She was eon-

fident of Tletory, so, on June 50, 1876, she declared war
against Turkey.Montenegro followed with a declaration
11.

Dsbidoar, aiatolr® diplomat!qu^, II, 491.

12.
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15.
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14. French A»bassador at Constantinople to French Foreign
Miniater. Affaires etrangeresi doeuaeats dlplosiatlques;
affaires d'Orient. 1575-1576-^877 (Paris, 1877), 157f.
Hereafter referred to as French Piploaatlc Documents.
15.
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of war on July 2.^^

¥©ry slioptly thereafter, th© insurgents

of Bosnia-Heraegoviaa declared, tlieir provinces to be annexed
by Serbia aad Mont©aegro.^7
b® aoeept®d by Austria.
Bid©

with. Tu-rkey.

fhls «©at certainly would not

Russia would not allow Austria to

Th© Eastern -Question was still open.

Wfeil# th® furkish-Ssrhlsa sltuatioii had been devel

oping, mttother Insurreetlon had taken plac® in the Turkish
laplr«.. Oa May 4, 1876, Sir H®ary Elliot reported that em
insurrectioa&ry &OT@m.mnt had broken, out in Bulgaria at th®
tillage of Otloukeui aot fur fro®. Philippopolis
informfttioa w&s aot so worded as to esuse alar®,

fhls
the Po-r-

«lsn Offie® regarded it lightly, for, after all, such dis
turbances w©r® r&th»r co«Bon.

Th« Bulgarians had ®ade at

l#ast thre# attempts, in th© sixties, to '*thrt>w off th®
Turki«l3.

This Insurrsetlon, which earn® to be toown

as the "^Bulgarian Horrors,** was not directly related to that
of B08nia-H«r£®g0Yia&, but it is part of this study, bec&us®
th© ©xtdnt of the popular reaction in Britain was such that
it tt&d© complet® freedom of action by th® governaant latpoasibl®, and it Influeaosd th© gowrnsant to modify its Balkan
policy.

It is not euggestsd, howerar, that the Bulgarian

Horrors were th© sol® cause of this modification,
16.
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2475ff.

17.

Debldour, Histoire diplomatique. II, 491.

16.
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19. W. M.. Qewehr, fhs Rise of Sationallsia in the Balkans.
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-25Tfae British people were first ffiad® avrare of the
ffiftssacrea on Jun® 25» 1876, by a Daily Mews artlcl®, based

on ft L9tt#r fro® Mr» Mwla Pears, a resident at Constanti
nople.^^

lv®situ&llj it itf&s learned that th© storj was

gr®atly exaggerated, t^t, upon publleation. It was b©li©vefi
toy hug# nufflb®r8 of the British populaoe«

Thrm® <3,»ys after

publication, Disraeli was questioned in th® Hous® of Comisons,
and again on July 10.^^

H© took the position, on both oe-

eaeions, that ^'th® Information which the aovernment had ree@lv#d did not Justify the stateaento amde in the Bally
"22

lew.

Articles contia«i«d to appear in the Daily Sew,

but Blsr&ell, though eon<s®rned, aaintained a rather calm
attitude, hecftuse the paper was the leading Liberal organ

and had be«n hostll® to hla in th© past.

Wheti, howaver. The

Tiaes printed elmllar articles, he becea© worried,

4 special

envoy, Walter Baring, was charged with finding out the truth.

His preliminary report fixed the nuaiber of Bulgarian vlctias
at 12,000,^^

This report, by comperiaon with the newspaper

report, per«itted Disraeli to isalntain that "^hls seepticis®
had been Justified.It was an event, he said, *which no
20. R. B, Mowat, A History of European Diplomacy, 1815~191^
(London, 1922), 225.
21.

Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 915.

22.
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23.
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OB© c&n thlaJc of without

||@

it clear in

hie last spetcii in th® Hous® of CoaJBOos that his foreign
policy was still headlined bj tto© fflai»t®aanc@ of th@ British
Sspire:
But Sir,
a«st »ot jump m.% eoncluslons so qalckly
__as ._i8 Jiow_
fl3B@r® Jl®-jio-tMag~ to-Jttfttl-fy -ug in talklag in such a v«la of turkey as has
an,a is being &t this meaent, entertained, fh® j>re««nt is a state of affairs wlileli r#Qulr@s th@ most vi
gilant exsaination and th® most caref«l fflsaftgeaent.
But tho®,«
suppos® tfeat Engl&ad @v@r wo^Xd up
hold, or
tbls ®o®eat partio«larly is uphoiaiag,
Ttirkey fro» blin<l sttp®ratition, »bA fro® a mat of
sympa.tfey wttb. tM« higb©«t aspirattens of laiaaaity,
sr® dec«lir©d. Wbat omr duty is at this erltieal
®o»en.t is to saintsin tls# Eapir© of Knglsnd, ior
will w agr®9 to ftaj at®p, tbotagh it may obtain
for a aoffi«n.t ooapsratiir# quiet and a fals® pros- ^
peritj, that bazards th® ®xlat©iie® of that ^plvm,
Thm agltmtloia of tbe Brltisb peopl# rea^hedl a boiling
point; public aettlngs w@r«

idealistic ®«a appeatraA on

public platforas; and e'y^ri'wber® tbe erj to ©xpel tb# Turk
was beard.
@ra3ad$«

Gladston® eaae out of retir#a®nit to l«ad tb®

On S®pt#aib«r 6 b® bsd published & paaspblet en

titled *Th© Bulgarian Horrors,'* la which he called on the

turks to quit the Balkans, '^bag and
for the goTemaeut was serious.

"2T

baggage.

situation

Disraeli was greatlj aided

by Derby during the crlaie, and together they were able to
survive, but aot without sose coaproffllse,

Derby's words,

in speaklug to the City deputation, express this wellj **I

25. Ibid. 919.
26. Ibid. 920. Disraeli was elevated to the peerage as
Lord Beaconafield. Heaee, his last speech.
27.

Ibid.

931.

-27do not at all wisla to dlsguls® th« fact that what has hap
pened iQ Bialgmrls ha® to a certain extent- changed the pos
ition, not only of our owa Qoirernaent, bmt of every European
OoTeriment.^28

returolag, bow, to the S®rbo-Turkish War

It atist to® k#pt In mliid that, duriiag the whole period of
the war., th© British goTeraaent fac@d thl® prohles of
popular hysteria, and eons®qu»iitly had to proceed with
eatatioiii

SertoisB ar»les suffer®d defeat from th® "beglrmlng
of th® conflict, a fact which cau»®d no little surpri®©
in th® European eapitals. It had bsen thought that S«rMa
and Montsnegro, md®r Hwsslan generalship and with th@ aid
of large rmabars of lusslaB voltmt©#ra, »fOttld be successful
against furkey, whoa® l®pot@Eic® was supposedly pro¥#a by
her liability to restore ord#r in Bosiila-H®raego¥laa»

It

caanot be doubted that th® British rrime Minister and his
Foreign Minister w«r^ soffiswhst pleased at th© turn of ©vents,
but, bec&us® of th® hostility eTioc®d by the British public
against Turkey, no public utterances to this effect ware
possible.

Montenegro achieved eoae ainor successes, but

Serbia suffered oiae disaster after another. S^t only vere
they unable to enter ^he furklsh provinces, taut they were
hurled back upon their own territory, fhe fanaticis®
of the Turkish soldier was as Intense as ever, and terrible
atrocities took place, in all parts of the Empire, against
28.

Ibid.

941.

-28-

th@ Christian population.

**Boenla an<3 HarKSgovlna. were

literally deluged toj fir© and blood.
From the beginning of tli© conflict, tii© Brltlsb
Foreign Office adopted a pollcj of **non-Int®rt&rmnae and
aeatr&lity

Tim Bowers followed this lead.

On July 31,

British tensions having Inersnaed with ©acfe Turtelefe Tiotory
and atrocity, tb,® British go¥#ra®ei4t b&rsly aurvl¥®d a great
debate upon th@ g«E©r«l East«ra policy.

At the eloee of th®

fi®bat#,. Bartinnton, th® leader of tfe@ opposition, stated %hm%
In general he agreed wltb the goir®ni«©nt's policybttt tbat
h© objected to th® »®aias used to oarrj out that polley.^^
TMs %*aB not th® #nd of tJje goir@raae»t*s troubles, for» on
August 11, th@ opposltioa launehed an inspirad attaek.
Hareourt shouted tfaat Mrop@an opinion ''would support any
Power that vould ©aan^ipst® Birop® from tk® cure# which
afflicted her, and r©d«@a Christendoa froa th» 8iia®«'bj
which sh® had
its effect.

too long dishonoured.This attack had
If ths goT®ratt«nt were to remain in power, soae

course of action would ha^e to toe initiated.
Derby instructed Mr, ¥hit©, the British agent at
Belgrade, to inform Prinee Milan that a request fro® hiai
that the Powers extend their good offices for aediatlon
29.

Debldour, Histoire diploieatlque. II, 492f.

30. Beaconsfield to Bradford.
of Digraeli. 909.
31.

Ibid.

910.

32.

Ibid.

919.
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-29would b@ favorably r©e©iv«<3 by df^at

In two

weeks, Milan acted upon this suggestion, and asked the
Powers for their help In r®-»«tafelisbing peae®, H® staggestftd that It would to® d©air&bl© to iaclud© Montenesro.^^
TMs country r®q««st«d Austria to act in h.®r toahalf in s®earing the ®id of tla.®

This being aecompll«bed,

Powers.

th® Powers agreed that '*the c^s-sation of hostilities aiioald
also apply to Bosnia mn&

**^6

M@rs®govlaa.

S#soti«tiom® w«r« not interrupted by the palaee
resolution whiels occurred at Constflintlnopl® on August 31#^'^
The new Sultan, 4bdul Saald, influenced by his First Minister,
Mldhat, a d#fifilt® Angloplill®, s®©*@d to offer hope.

Beaeons-

field, for one, was in a. ®ood of «latioa.

**fha new

H@ wrot^:

Sultan, I h®sr, really proaisss. H© has got the Co»«ons'
blu« book translated for Ma—a«d Forster's speeeh on
* atrocities.

It was not to b« vary long befor® Beacons-

field would regretfully »#« hia mistake, Just one day after
the revolution, Derby instructed Elliot to propose to the
Turkish govemaeat that it ^rsnt an araiatlce of not less
33.

French Diploffiatic Docufflents. 176f.

3^.

Ibid.

160.

35.

Ibid.

I87f.

36.

Ibid.

188.

37.

Mowat, European Blploaacy. 226.

38. Beaconsfield to Salisbury.
of Disraeli. 9^3ff.
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than a month's duratloa.^^ furMey did not accept the plan of
an, armistic©, tout sent a m@uor&.ndum to the Pow«rs on S@pt#ab©r
14,^0 It contained th® eoadltlons of peao® that would be
meceptabl© to b«r.

Upon l@a.Tniu^ from tb® Powers tbat a

suspeMion of bostillti®-® was ace#pt«ble, furkej put an »aA
to bostilitl®® until Sept@®b©r 25."^^
Botm of til®

eo«€itlo»8 of p®ac® w«re eonai-

d«red iBftdMimsibl® by Britain. H#a.C0, Derby entered lato
a series of negotiations witb the Powers for th© ptirpos® of
d@Ylaing a pr-ogra® -wMoh would b® suitable to tb® Pow©rs a®
a basis of pacification, the thr®© following point®, finally
agreed upon, wer® presented to Turk«y s (1)' the statys quo for
Serbia and Monteaegro; (2) adainistrativ# autonomy for BoenlalerssgoTisaj and. {31 a siisilar arrangeaeat for Balgarladetails to to® worked out lat©r.^2

Turkey would aot agr®e to

an araiatice, but prolonged tb® suspeaslon of boatilltl#a
until October 2.^^

Priaee Kilan, thm Barbian ffionareb, would

aot agree to a »©re suspension, but continued to deaand an
araistice.
On September 26 Russia proposed that, if Tus%ey
should reject the teras of peace offered by the Powers, she
should occupy Bulgaria, Austria should occupy Bosnia, and a
39.

French Dlploaatle gocutsents. 214,

40.

Hertslet, Map of Surope. 2482-87.
Fygnch Diploaatlc Pocuaents. 215.

42.

Ibid.

198.

^3.
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218.

-31united fl@@t of tfe# Powers should enter th© Bospboras.^^
Lord B@aeonsfi@ld r®aark#d that "England looks upon. th@
proposed occup&tlOR by Russia as a r®a.l Bulgarian atroeity.
Til© British Cabinet rejected tix@ RussIrq proposal. It was
ob-srlotts that Russia ted counted upon public opinion In 0rest
Britain <01ad8ton®'s putsphlst tead appeared shortly before}
to sufficiently iaflueoc® tlm go-rema»nt that it would f®el
bouad to aid© with th® Russians. TMs was s ibIstake.
ly October 3, Turl:@y had act aoc©pt«d th@ psoification proi^raa eubaitte-d by th# Powers, and an additional
suspensloa of hostlllti®®. had not b«@B arraaged.
ly, tbe w@r w«s resumed. ^

Consequent"

Russia proposed to th@ Powers that

th® bloodahed b® stopped laaediately by tli® iapositloa of a
slx-w#®k true®.'^'^

fh@ Brltisli Cabiaet d®cid@d to «ce#pt

th® proposal, llliot was instructed to infora Turkey that
«h@ liuat either accept th® terms of psac®, or grant an i®B®dl8t0 araistic® of not l#ss than a Bonth; that, if sh®
refused, he would be recalled and no further aid wuld be
given to Turkey.^®

How drastic a step this actually was can

be 8©©a In the words of Besconsfleld:
IMd. ai9. Se® also, O'« W. Ohrystal, tra^^lator,
Meiaolrs of Friaee Chlodwts of aohealohe-Schillliai^sfuerst;
Mlted by Friedrieh Curtlus for Prince ^lejeaader of
Hohenlohe-'Sehillinp.gfuerat {2 vols., Loadon, 1906T7 II, 181.
45. Beaconsfield to Bradford. Moueypeimy and Buckle, Life
of Siaraeli. 951.
ya*®nch Siploaatie Docuaeats. 201.
47. Ibid. 201.
Ibid. 202ff.

-52Th©r« vr©r® great, and jiiat, otojeetions to this course,
because, -when an Amteassator retires, h« cannot reap
pear. All p«rsormal lnfluene« is lost, and in 1829,
th« last tiffl© when the Effitoassles left Constantlnopl®,
war hetwe-en. Russia and farkey instantlj ensued.
tod j0t affaire had oo»e to such a pase, thro* th©
coBduct of aiadstone and Co., that it was neces
sary to try this l&st es,r<i—and it succ®«d@dl'^9
Wh«n 8@acongfi©l€l wrote to Lady Bradford ®xpr®seing
his Joy over th© Turtelsh aeceptano© of (m arntlstlce, h# knew
th&t furltey had accepted with th« pro-vision that the armistie#
was to b# of six-ffionth^'s duration,

this pleased hl» for as h®

s&ldg **this will giv® ue fer®sthing

It didn't ocotar

to hlffl that the Turkish provision alght he rejeetsd.

Y©t,

reject«d It was, on th® grotaoS that Serbia ^eould not keep
its aray on a war footing for s«eh a length of tlaa© without
putting too sever® a strain on its

resources."^Sl

British

pressure on Russia to induce her to force acceptance of th®
slx-aonth sraistic® on Serbia availed nothing.

Rusala felt

that she now had the upp®r hand, and, by leading the way.
Bight b« stole to procure the support of Britain.

Russia ®isjudg@d Lord B®aeonsfleld,

Once again

He refused to bring his

influence to b«ar on furltey that sh@ accept th© six-week
aralstice, but added that he would not oppose any such de
mands that other Powers might desire to aake.52
49. Beaconsfleld to Bradford.
of Disraeli. 952.
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952.

51.

Ibid.

952.

52.

Fi*eneh Diplomatic Docuaente, 212f.

-33r®ply had

givan to the Russian Affibassador, & diploaatle

attempt In another dlreotlon had l>®en made.

Althomgh It

failed, it aierlts narration, since it so aptly desct-th®®
the extent to which Be&corisfleld was wllliBg to go in search
for a solutioa to th« Eastern Question.
H© b®ll®¥©A that Russia was th® r««.l threat to the
psae® of Surop®j that sh®, alone, was reaponslbl® for th®
present stat© of confusion, in th@ Bslk&nsj that, if h# eoulA
find some me&ne short of war to thoroughly intlaldat® her,
his subsequent filploaacy would he successful, fo hi®, there
app@ar@fi tout on® method of aceoaplishiEtg this: the League of
fhr«@ laperors aust h® brok@n, so that Russia would he d®prlved of that s®curity wMch per«itt®fl h©r to act so audaelously a® ®h® had in th# reeeat p«.®t.

H@ knew th»t if he

could effect a treaty with Q^raanj he would ha-r^ nullified
th® efficacy of th© Thr»® Emperor's League.

Derby, Sallehury,

and th® Q«e®» w®r@ **g@a®rallf syspathetic** to the
Blsfflsrcfc wa« approached without success.

53

plan.

Beacons-

field felt strongly that Gladstone and Low® were responsibl®

for th© failure.

In a speech at Aylesbury, Beacoasfleld had

®a<3e the stateasent that **the Qor&rament had not the 'unani
mous' support of the country, but that a large party in the
country was using the 'atrocity cry' for party purposes,**5^
Gladstone and Lowe changed the wording of the statesent so
that it sounded as if Beaconsfield had a&ld that the

53.

Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Plar&eli. 953.

54.

Ibid.

955.

-34Sovsmaeat was opposed to the feelings of tb® majority of
the country,r

fhes© assertions, Beaconsfield said, ^had done

iamens© Ijara. in retarding oegotiatloas with Foreign. Powers on
this qu@etion.*55

g® believed that Bisiaarck rsfused to enter

liito a treaty with England on th# assuaiptlon that the country
would not go al©ng with tti® 0ov©rBaent; sad that th# following
"built up by Q-ladston# bad becoa® too pow«rful for the <}o"7erafflsnt to b® able to salntaiii its@lf.

¥fest®v©r the truth con

cerning the reasoQS for BisMarok's reftasal might

the

fact reasln® that he respond®d to th® British proposal with
only a polit® not®, >i'hieh stated that, whil# he sight have
vishad that Russia -would ha-re accepted th© six-sonth arslstice, h© didn't feel Justified in ©xercising a pr®asu3r^ on
her.^
When th« furkish proposal for s six-moath araistic#
was officially rejected by th© Russians, the Turkish arity was
given orders to attack,

fhe reeietsnce offered by the Serbe,

heavily supported by Rueeian volunteers, rapidly collapsed.
Town after town fell, until even the road to Belgrade was
without defense.57

Ignatieff learned of this critical pos

ition of the Serbian army Just when Lord Loftua, the British
Affibaesador at Saint Petersberg, delivered a British note,
stating that Britain had no intentions of advancing any
fresh propositions.58

on the next day, October 31, Russia,

55.

IMd-

955.

56*

French Diplomatio Documents. 226.

57.

Debidour, Hiatoire dlploaatique. II, 496.

58'

French Siploffiatic Poeuaents. 227*

-35fearlng that sli© mast act st one® in order to s&ve Serbia,
delivered an ultlaatuffl to Turkey.It dera&nded that Turfeey
grant an armistice of fro® aix weeks to two Biontha,

If

this was not done wltMn forty-eight hoxars th® Russian

Kffibassy was to be withdrawn.

When Beaconafield r@e#iT©d

this R®ws, lie adopted, for the ao®ent, an. extremely pesslaistic attitude. He ©atpreaeed Ms f«©ling.a wry plalBly
In the excerpt of th© letter to Ladj Bradford which follows;
A little after noon caa© th© awful news that
Q^nl. Igiamtleff 'had r«e®iT®a ord«rs fro® Llfsdla
to deliY@r tbe
aad hostile ultiffiatum
you ar# »ow w®ll aeq«alat@d with*.
f M s was th@ eonaeq'aene® of th® ,furkiato victories,
and tbe huslllatlon
Emperor felt at tl3«
probability of the farks reaohlng B«lgrad#.
The pretext that th© Turics e»rrl©d on hostilities
during negotiations for ar«lstl«® le quit® hollow,
fhe Rsisso-SerTiitn arsy fess nev«r ceased attacking
and har&sging th© Turks d'arliig the whole tia®.
Besides,- negotiatlona for armistle© never suspend
hOBtllltles as a matter of pablic law.
What will happ»n now? I thlnlc it looks as black
as possible. The whol® affair hae toe@n a coaspiraey of Russia from th© beginning, and sh»
has failed in everything—even in active warfare
the Port© haa defeated her. I don't think ah®
can stand it, and she will rush to further reverses,®®
Turkey accepted the conditions of the ultlBatum on Novaaiber
1,^^ the armistice to be for two »onths rather than six

weeks.
59.
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-36fh® ©-rent of the armlstic© did not permit British
diploaacy to r®st,

Tfe^r© was th® matter of arrangiag for

m conference of th» Powers aad tli© conference itself to contto© British For«i-gn Offlc© and th® Pria« Miiii«t@r.

TM®,

however, will be diseuss«d at leogth in the next chapter.
For th© pri&s#ntj it is well to r«view hrleflj th#
dlploaacj of the tour aonth period Jiist passetft,

Wh#ii it

was affirmed that Serbia »®a«t to iesake war^. Britain requ@gt@<i
of th® Po¥?®ra that they attempt to Indue# Serbia to »ala.taia
p®ac#.

In sMltiOD., a st®im waraiag w®8 giv&n Ruasis that,

in th® «-?®nt of a furkieh victory, Britain wotild coBsid^r
gravely any interf@r©no« by Eussia ia th® settleaent demand
ed by farkey a» th« victor.

fh®se steps did not prevent

S®rbia and Montsaegro froa d#cl®riiig war.

Britaia adopted

a policy of '*non-i»t®rf@r«n@@ and neutrality,** and was sup
ported in this policy by th® Powers.

In August Britain

auggested to Serbia that she ask for the mediation of the
Powers in securing peaoe.

Mediation followed, and a sua-

pensioR of hostilities (applying to Bosnia-Herzegovina also)
was aade effective until Septeisber 25.

Turkey subssitted a

list of conditions upon which whe would willingly isalce peaG».
The Powers devised a program of peace that would be acceptable
to them, since some of the Turkish conditions were inadmis

sible,

Turkey did not accept, Imt granted an additional

suspension of hostilities.^ This tera expired without any
thing definite having been decided upon.

War was resumed.

Russia proposed that the powers iapose a six-week truce upon

-3T-

the coatoatants,

Britain and tfee other powers co-operated—

Britain even golag so far as to threaten Turkej vlth a

Britlah withdrawal of lier £®bsssy if furkey declined th©
true®. Turkey accepted with th® proTlslon that the true®
be for a slx-moTitto, p#rlod. Serbia, backed toy Russia» found
this unacceptable to h#r, so tti« furkish ar«y pressed for
ward successfully, Russia* fearing for Serbia, dlspatcbed
an ultlaatua to Turik®y on th& last day of October. fJae terms
of this ultifflatuia, tba.t furk«y grant an laaedlate ar«lstioe,s
wer© accepted by T«rit®y.

Tbus figbtlng ceased, fb® out

standing fa.et tb&t ««©rg#s fro® tb® British diplomaey of
tbls period 1# that Britain's first point of h®r Eastern
diploaaey—that tb^re b@ & f»r^0y-ln-lurop@—was still a
fact in. spit# of prsssur® froa tb® opposition, fb© Russian
deslr# to adTaaee on tb® Straits was thwarted, Th@ British
Ssplr® was not really threatened.

CHAPfER III
COSFEBENCl Am PROTOCOL
file Goaferenc® of Coastantlnopl® wna a long time
b«ing t>oTO.

As early as M»j, 18T6, B®aeonsfl®lfi w»s Aware

of a d@8lr© on th® smrt of momm of tb-e Powers for a Congr«8s
or Conf®r«nc®. 1® wot#, on May 291

Is »o doubt

ttiat Fr«.Tice Is strongly urging s. Coagr«»s, and, 1 aa
ftssiired, at th® iBStsne® of Eussia,**^

a®, too, was In

favor of a. gstlierlag of tto« Pow®rs, sM luforaed Derby
that lie f#lt tfast & Goagress would to® "*tlae only practiesl
solution In tfe© long run.^^

Despite this desire of thr®®

of the Powers for & Conferene© it was not then brought
about, beeause tis© Palae© rsTolution at Constaut Inopl®
and the subaequent witMr&vral of the Berlin M®BJoraiidum,3
while not restoring order to Bosiila-H®rs@govlna, had ef
fected a temporal^ eession of dlplomatie atteapts by the
Powers to solre the lastera Question.
War revived the Conference idea.

The Serbo-Turkish

On October 5» 1876, the

British Foreign Office suggested to tbe governments of the
1. Sir Sidney Lee, Kin^ Mward VII: A Bioj^raphy (2 vols.,
M.X., 1925), I, 418.
2. Disraeli to Berby, iiay 31, 1876.
Life of Maraeli, 902.
5.

Above, 18.

Money penny and Buckle,

-59Powers that a Conference 1>@

This suggestion was

initiated by D®rby after learning fro® Schouvaloff that
•^this course would ffi@«t with the approval of his governfflent.*'^ Andrassy expressed rslnctauce to agrse to a Con,f#r©ac®
which Im thought could only lead to "abortive or dangerous
results.Inetruetions *«r® forthwitli dispatclied to
Buchanan, tb® British Aabasssdor at Vienna.

He was to

explain to tedrassy that the Coiaferenc® should aot as8@mtol«
''until a basis should have been. arrarig@d which should defin© the subjects to to-® eoaslder^d and secure their being
confined witMn certain liaits . . . and , , , that all
that is S8k@d of faim at present is that h@ should not
ohJ«ct to th@ priaciple of a Conference.
cour®«, did not objeet.

Andrassy, of

furkey, however, st tlils tia#

advancing on the road to Belgr&d®,^ informed th® British
Poreign Office that she absolutely protested against the
proposed Conf©r«nee.^

fhus the Conference idea was again

suspended.
On November 4 a Cabinet Council decided that the
British Foreign Office should issue a Circular inviting
State Papers. V, 6?, 269ff.
5.

Ibid,. V. 67, 269.

6.

Buchanan to Derby.

'«'•

Ihld.. V. 67, 272f.

8.
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the Powers to a Conferonee to be held at Constantinople.^®
Each governiaent was to appoint two Pleoipotentlarles,

fli@

basis for the deliberations was to b@ as follows;
1. Th® lad©p®n<3@nc@ and tb« t©rritorl&l
integritj of tts® Ottoman Smpir®.
2, A d©elaratiOB that th® Powers do not latend to &@®k tor, and will not s@«l: for, any ter
ritorial ad-^antagas, any exelwsiv® Influence, or
any conoe-ssion with regard to th© comaeroe of their
subjects, which thos© of #v@ry other nation aay not
aqually obtain. . . .
3« fh® bft8#e of pacification proposed to th©
Porte on the 21st of 8#pt@«ber, vis.:—
(a.) The status quo. gp@a«ing roughly, tooth
as ragards S®r"fia and }ioiit®n®gro.
(b.) That the Port® should siaultaneouslf
undertake, in a Protocol to b® signed at Constanti
nople with the Representatives of th® Mediating
Powers, to grant to Bosnia and H€?rz@govlna a syst®®
of local Institutions which ah^ll give th© popul
ation Bom® control over their own local affair® and
guarantees against the ©xerclse of arbitrary author
ity.
'fh®r® is to b© no question of th« creation
of a tributary Stat®,
Suarantaies of a slsilsr kind to b« also pro
vided agalnat -»alRdalnlstratlon in Bulgaria, fhe
refoms already agr®®d to by the Porte in the not®
addressed to the Representatives of the Powers on
the 13th of February last, to be included in th©
administrative arrangeaent for Bosnia and th©
Herzegovina, and so far as they say be applicable
for Bulgaria.11
By Moveaber 20 all the Powers had accepted the
invitation to th© Conferenee.^^

Russia had expressed a

desire to oalt the word "territorial'* froa point one of
the basis, since she thought It would still be necessary
10.

Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli« 959.

11.

Kertslet, Map of Europe. 25l6f.

12.

State Papers. V. 67, 297-322.
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to occupy certain Turkisli provinces.However, sh#
finally accepted the British progr&a as it stood Ctel
quel)Turkey accepted thm invitation to the Goaf«renee
only after Britain vamed ber that a refusal would result
in th® witiidrawiil of ''all support snd eouriteneac© froo
the Porte.**^5
Mone of the Fow®rs west to tfe@ Conf©r®n.€® with
much optiaisffi.

fh# British and Russian pre-Coaf«r©uee

attitudes wer® clearly revealed in spemehes and diploa&tic.
exchanges.

On Lord Mayor's Day, iovember 9, Beaconsfield

spok© in a, tone that i^&s described by Ms domestic critics
as on® of "warllfc© deflanc®.*^^

H® said that th© object

of the Qovemffient ^&b to secure psace toy obserranc-e of ttae
frsaties of 1856 and 1871» and to s#eure ma aaelloration
of the condition of the Turkish subjects.^*^

The passage

which caused so aueht ®xcitea®nt follows;
I affi bopaful, in the pr#s©»t t#®p©r of Europe,
we sfaall
atol# to accoapllsh the objects we bav«
in view without thot« terrible appeals to war, of
whicto, I think, we have beard too frequently and
too sucb. . . » fteer© la ao country so interested
in the ffiaiatenanc® of peace as &igland. Peace is
especially an English policy, Sbe is not an
sggreesive Power, for there is laothiag which she
desires. She covets no cities and no provinces.
What she wishes is to saititsiia and to enjoy the
3-3.

Ibid.. V. 67, 299.

14.

Ibid., V. 67, 303.

i3.

Ibid.. V. 67, 317.

16.

Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Msraeli. 9^2,

IT.

Ibid.

963.

-42unexampled eapire which she has built up, and which
it is her prid© to remeober exists as much upon
sympathy ss upon force. But although the policy
of England is peace, there is no country so well
prepared for war as our own. If ah© enters into
conflict in & righteoua cause—and I will not
believe that England will go to war except for a
righteous eaus@--if the contest is on® which con
cerns her liberty, her independence, or her empire,
her resources, 1 feel, ar® inexhauatihle. She is
not a country that, wh®n she enters into a caopaign^ has to ask herislf "whether 8h© can support
a second or a third campaign* Sh@ enters into
a campaign which she will not teriBlnate till right
is done.lS
On tb© following daj^ without .knowing of Beaconsfield's ap®®eh, Emperor Alexander addressed the nobility
and Municipal Council of Moscow, fh® European Press
erroneously reported the sp©@ch

an answer to Beacons-

field, which, of course, caused a alslnt«rpr@tatlon toy
the public.

Comparing th© following passage of Ssperor

Alexander's speech with th® abov® pAssage fro® Beaconsfield's, one can readily a©© th® tenseness of Europe at
this tiffi®.
Negotiations will coffioence shortly at Oonstantinopl® between th© Great Powers to bring
about a peaceful arrangement, My ardent wiah
is for a peaceful &gre«sent. Should we not
obtain from th® Port© such guarantees for carry
ing out th® reforas w@ hav® a right to deaand,
I aas firmly d»terffiln®d to act independently;
and I aiB oomrineed that the whole of Russia
will support »e, should the honour of Russia
require it, and that Moscow will give the exaaple. May God help us to carry our sacred
ffllasion,19
IS* Ihid, 964. The **app«als to war" of which Beaconsfield
spofee were those of Russia,
19. Lord Augustus Loftus, Th© Biplofflatjc Reasinlacences of
Lord Augustus Loftus, P.O., a,C,B.. 1662^1879 (second series,
2 Tols., London, 1894), II, 194.

-43As if in substantiation of the Sasperor's speech,

the British Foreign Office received information concern
ing Russian war preparations.

It was reported that 8,000

tons of lead were "being toroiight to Russia, and that the
Russlsn Army had placed an order for 800,000 pairs of
boots. The ton© of the Rwseian press was depicted as
being exceedinglj hostile; & large section of societj
was supposedly dlsappoiated at the eouclusion of the
Armistice I and a desire for war was **eTln.ced by a great
portion of the mrmy

On Sowatoer 18 Derby learned that

a portion of the Russian Army had been mobilized,Ar®@d
with this knowledge the British Qo-vemfflent was scarcely
disposed to believe in the peaceful liiteations of Russia,
which were convejed to Derby by Loftus, the British
Ambassador at St. Petersburg. He had had, on l^oyeaber
2, a long talk with Isaperor Alexander, who, with great
detail, had gone into the matter of Russo-British relations.
The dispatch did not reach the British Foreign Office until
Sovefflber 18.^2

it did little to allay British suspicions

of Russia, though it is true that the British Oovemaeat
believed that the Eussian krmj would not march until
spring.
20. Doria to Derby (received !4ovember 13).
V. 6T, 307f.
21.

Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2519.

22.

Ibid. 2506-12.
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On Moveiaber 20 Lord Salisbury, the Indian Seer©tarjj was appointed to represent Sngland conjointly witli
Sir Renry Elliot at the Conference of Constantinople,

His

formal instructioas stated that the isisedlate necessity was
**to restore tranquillity to the disturbed
•was going to be a reel chore.

fhis

Provinces.

The crux of the tblng lay la

©.sta'olishing *^religious liberty** and ''administrative raforas.
The Powers wer© to he pemltted to demaad that sseurity he
provided "for carryiag those aeasurea into operation.

In

addition, "it would b© oecessarj that soaa© steps should be
taken to establish an equitable aystes of taxation before
deciding on the distribution of the funds to be a&d© appli
cable to local

.**26

purpos®s

aost iaportant phr&s© of

the instructions was the last sentence, which read—'"should
the Turkish Government reject these proposals, the British
Government will reserve to itself entire liberty as regards
its

policy.**27

Salisbury left England early enough to per-

slt hiffi to oake a tour of the European Capitals.

In Paris

he saw Deoases, the French Foreign Minister, and Marshal
MRCMahon;28

Berlin the Eisperor William I, the Crown Prince

23. Stat® Papers. ¥. 68, 1064-80.
2^*

IMd. 1064-73.

25. Ibid.

1064-73.

26.

1064-73.

Ibid.

27. German Dlplogatlc Documents. I, 44,
28. French Diploaatlc Document, 256.
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and Princess and Prince Biaiaarcki^^ in Vienna Count Andrassy;^®
and In Rome Prince Huabert and several Italian minlaters.^^
fhe tour went far toward establishing a sociable ataospher#
for the Conference.
The Conference was preceded by preliainarj discus
sions lasting fro© Decem'ber 11 to 22. These discussions, to
whleli Turkey was not admitted, ^eve under the Presldencf of •
Senersl Ignatleff, the Russian

.52 g© easily

Plenipotentiary

brought Salisbury under his influence, and to® Prellmlnai^
discussions reflectad more Rusaiaa thinking than British.
Elliot attributes this to Salisbury's lack of knowledg® of
Turkish

affairs.33

Salisbury, it is true, felt the need of

Britisfct-Russlan understanding and was willing to aaJg:© eoncesaious.^^

These concessions were not all in accord with

Beaconsfleld's viewpoint.

As a matter of fact, h© waa quit®

disgusted vlth his representative and said, ^*Sal. seems most
prejudiced, and not to b© aware, that his principal object,
in being sent to Const., is to keep the Russians out of
29.

German Siploffiatie Docuaents. I, 59.

30.

state Papers, V. 66, 1082f.

31.

Ibid.

1084f.

32. French Diplomatic Docuw^nte. 267. Contains a 153 pag®
appendix covering the pr®liffiinitt^ and regular mestings of
the Conference.
33. Sir Henry G. Slllot, Soae Revolutions and Other Diplo
matic Sxperlences {London, 1922), 276ff.
34.

Langer, luropean Alliances. 105.

-46furk«y, not to ereat® an Ideal ©xlstenc® for Turklsb Xtlans.'^^S
The demands formulated by th© Powers were, brleflj, as follows;
Serbia was to be left as before the war, Montenegro
was to gain a port on the Mrlatie, two states were
to be formed to include the Bulgarians in the eastern
Balkans and these states were to have soae control
over their local affairs; for Bosnia and Herzegovina
a thorough scheae of refonas was proposed. An in
ternational cotBisission was to supervise these change®
and an international gendjiraerie of 6000 sen was to
secure their execution.56
Ignatieff referred to these demands as the "irreducible »inisiuffi,"^*^ because he had had to surrender the Russian occu
pation plan, and would surrender no more.

The demands were

to be subaltted to Turkey at the first meeting of the Con
ference; she could accept or reject, but she could not ne
gotiate.

Such was the will of Ignatieff.

On the last day

of the Preliminary Dlscusalon I>®rby sent a dispatch to Sal
isbury warning hi® that England would not consent to coer
cive aeasuree against turkey.

Turkey was to be told that

she could not expect assistance from Britain in ease of war.
In the event of a Turkish refusal to accept the demands Sal
isbury and Elliot were to return home, leaving the Efflbassy
in the hands of a Secretary.^
The flrat meeting of the Conference, under the
Presidency of Safvet Pasha, Turkish Minister of Foreign
Affairs, took place Deceaber 23In the midst of
35.

Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 983.

36.

Tyler, Euf^pean Powers. 75.

37.

Dlllot, Some Revolutions. 285.

38.

State Papers. ¥. 68, 1090.

39.

Qeraan Diploffiatic Docugents, I, 44.

-47<liscussloRs the delegates were interrupted by the booming of
canaon.^

Safvet Pasha explained that a new constitution had

Just been promulgated.

This constitution was the work of

Mldhat Pasha, who had toecoia® <Jran<3 Vizier only four days
pre'riouslyBeacosasfield, speaking of Midhat's ascension,
indulged in undsrstatenent when he said, ^ther© was a ehsnge
of Qovernment yesterday at Constantiaopl©, but I doubt whether
that will help

He w&Sj of course, antlclpatiag the

proiaulgation which had been reported in the aaking s® early
as October,

Haturally this e'fent greatly disturbed th® nor-

aal course of th© Conference,

Midhat desired to present the

Constitution to th® Conference in a formal way, but th® dele
gates would have rK)n» of that,

Elliot 8Ug6®sts that this was

a grievioua error on th© part of tha Powers, because as h© asld;
. , , if the offer had been accepted th® Powers
would hav#- obtainsd an eiigag«»®nt llttl® less
binding than & formal treaty, and would have se
cured the right of authoritatlYely inslstlns that
its provisions should be reapeeted; and, though
the Sultan mi^t, perhaps, endesTour to evad© it,
h© could not have ventured, as he afterwards did,
openly to repudiate it; for he would have known
not only that the Powers would sternly reailnd him
of the engagement he had taken towards the», lm%
that they would be supported in their protest by
th© ioaense aajorlty of hia own subjects.^3
An examination of Beaconsfield's writings at this tlae clearly

reveals that the British CfOvemsent had little hope of suc
cess at the Conference.
4o.

Beaeonsfleld was striving to get

Langer, European Alliances. 107.
yrench Piploffiatlc Pocuaeots. 267.

%2.

Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 960.

43,

Elliot, Borne Revolutions. 250.

•*48—
ffiilitarj preparations under way, and seemed to be a.i»ing
at the protection of Constantinople againet Russia and the
acquisition of a post in the Near East.^^

Russia had aot

stopped her program of military preparations. In fact, Franc®
was the only Power which seeaed to believe that the Conferenc©
might b®

successful.^5

jt

is quit© certain that the Powers,

believing and acting && they did, were reasonably confident
that Turkey would refuse the '^Irreducible ainlaum,"

When

th® Turks offered the quit® liberal conetitutlon (providing
for a Legislative Body of two Houses» and coaplst© religious
libertythey offered their aaxiaus. It would seem to
the author that Elliot was right in suggesting that the
Powers made a aistska in not settling for the Constitution.
As waB expected, the Turks refused to accept the de
mands, even though Salisbury strongly m^'ged acceptanee and
told them that England would withdraw all support in ease of
refusal.Safvet Pasha proposed a prolongation of the Armis
tice until March,

Ignatleff acquiesced, and the Powers gave

their adhesion to the proposal, Serbia and Montenegro were
notified of the additional armistice.

kB.

Odian Sffendl was

eent from Turkey to confer with the British Foreign Office.
He told Derby that Turkey could not accept the demands, not
44.

Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 970-86.

45. Tyler, European Powers. 80.
^6.

French Diplomatic Docuiaents. 272-83-

^7'

Ibid,

270.

48.

Ibid.

292.
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because of the proposed refortas as mucli as because of the
guarantees deaanded for their exacuiion.

He added tbat

Turkey had 600,000 men under arms and would face a campaign
with Russia rather than accept dlshouor.

Derby imiaedlately

informed Salisburj of th« contsnta of this coirimuiiication,
Th® Powers then, resorted to negotiation with Turksj.

On.

January 12 they submitted a modified plan to Turkey and as
serted that this would be the last reduction of desaads.,
that, if the latter were not accepted^ the Conference would
b© at en

end,50

f^e roodified plan still contained the '^points

relative to the International Gommiesion, and to the aoalnation
of the Valis (Governors) with the previous consent of the
"51 fhss© were the guarantees for execution which

Powers.

Turkey had InforiBed Derby that they would never acc«pt.
January 17 a Turkish Grand Council rejected the plan.

On

Sal

isbury reported that **the Sultan was anxious to accept the
terms of the Powers, but the Grand Vial@r was resolved upon
resistance, and brought the proposals before the Council in
such a for® that their rejection was a foregone conclusion.**^®
fhis was not very accurate reporting.

The Grand Council of

237 persone^^^ coaprlsed the laost laportant personages of the
Empire, including Mahometans, Christians, Greeks, and Araenians.

49. State Papers. V, 68, 1094ff.
50.

Ibid., V. 68, 1105.

51. Ibid.. Y. 68, 1102.
52. Ibid.. V. 68, 1103.
53. Ibid.. V. 68, 1103.

-50*¥lt1aout a slngls dissentient voice the Council pronounced
an unequivocal rejection of the Pro.posals conoernlng the
noailnation of Governors and the international CoMlssions.*5^
On the ninth and last meeting of the Conference, January 20
Turkey agreed to accept a proposal put forward toy Andrasey,
which called for the astablishment of "tv;o Comsilsslons coifiposed of equal numbers of Christians and Musaulffians, freely
elected by the Inhabitants of the

provinces."^5

fpiie

powers

refused to accept this last possible chance of conciliation.
Thus^ the Conference ended in coffiplet© failure. Salisbury
and Slliot returned to England, leaving Mr. Jocelyn as
Charge d*AffaIr«s.
The failure of the Conference left Russia and Turkey
oppoaed to one another, Seither, in her position^ had any
visible support froa any other power.

Russia could march

Into Turkey, or sha could wait to see if Turkey would grant
the desired reforms. Sh# decided to wait, and, in the »eantirae, try s^jain to gain the support of the Powers for her
anticipated venture,
Turkey's rejection of the Conference proposals
placed Russia in a serious position.

Very strong pressures

were being brought upon the Governraent by various organs
of the Russian Press.

The original outburst of national

feeling had become, by this tiae, a fanatically religious

Elliot, Some Revolutions, 289. Loftus, Olploffiatic
Realnieceneea. II, 201, Is In sgrseaent with Elliot.
55.

Slliot, Some Revolutions. 288.

-51ffioveaient, wfelch waa deaaoding Euasian Interventloa to al
leviate th© suffering of the brothers in the furkisb Sispire.^^
It would be difficult for tli@ Qovernffieiat to satisfy its sub
jects with any action short of war, but (k>rtcliakoff intended
to try.

On January 19, even before the last meeting of the

Conference, he issued a Circular Dispatch.

Be noted that

the Powers had reached agreement at the Coaferenc© as to
the measures relative to condition® of peace and to reforas,
wbich were subaitted to Turkey and subsequently rejected by
her.

This rejectloa called for further action, but he de

sired to know what the other Powers Intended doing before
originating an iadividual Hussian action.

He still believed

that, if there were any possibility, the Powers should pro
ceed in

common.57

it was obviously difficult for Britain

to answer this dispatch, since her view ws^ that nothing
further could be done, that the Powers should at least wait
to see what progress would be aade under Turkey's new constitution.

Derby drafted a reply which was wholly unac

ceptable to Beaconsfield, whose inatructions to Derby for
a revision of the draft follow;
. . . There runs throughout all Qort {chakoff]}'s
circular an assuaptlon as to the raieon d* etre
of the Conference.
fhe Powers were mediators: they were invited
by the Porte to mediate: by no one was the pos
ition of the Powers, as mediators, and the char
acter and object in which, and for which, they
36. Loftus, Piploiaatic P.effiiniscencea. II, 137, contains
a good account of the ffioveeent.

57. State Papers. V. 68, 1104.

-52ffiad© tli©s® proposals to Turkej, more clearlf de
fined than hj the PlenlpoftsntiarleQs of Russia at
the Conference.
As w© were all Be^iators only, the refusal of
the Porte to adopt oar r©coam©n<iatlo»s was no of
fence to the dlgnltj of Itirope.
tlffie would aot allow »@ to attempt a ®t;etch,
even were I physically capable, but I throw out
the8® rough iln®6.
If the draft is to reas-la, s@© that the word
reform J ete.» do not occur too often» and too
slangishlj.58
The reply» as flRally subaltted to Russia, was eonstrueted
along the liaes desired by Beaeoasfleld. It po«itl¥ely re
jected the supposltioa that furk«y had Insulted the Pow®r®
by refusin.g to &cc®pt the Conf@r@oe©

59

proposals.

Qortchakoff was persistent in hia attempts to re
vive the concert of Pow«ra, or, probably better said, in
his att®fflpts to rec@i"ve a. «an4at# froa the Powers for Indi'Tidual Russian action, fowrd th© last of February he
sent General Iga&tieff on «.ia ©xtraorfiinsry alssioii.

Ara@d

with a Protocol, Iguatieff mad® a roundi of the Capitals of
lurope seeking to indue® the Powers to sign th® Protocol
when it would b© presented in London.On March 5 Bisaarck
announced that (Jermany was in agreement with the «ch®a© and
would cofflEunicate this fact to London and Vienna.England
was little influenced by the action of Bisffiarek, Ignatleff's
alssion was not welcoffl© in England, and Beaconsfield expressed
58. Beaconsfield to Derby. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of
Disraeli. 999.
59. Langer, European Alliances. 114,
Qerman Diploaatlc Documents. I, 48.
61. Ibid.. I, 49.
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bis views In these wr^s:

**111© I^atieff arrival is a

thunderbolt; nothing e[oul]d ba aor® inopportune . . . ,'*62
Ignatieff was in England froa January 16 to January 22.^^
During this short stay hm fouad supporters among the oppos
ition and th@ (3overttffl.#nt mssibers who^ had shown an @sp®cial
Interest In th# caus® of the Eastern Ghrlstiari®.

This caused

the Cabinet to giv® a aor# careful consideration to th® Pro
tocol than jBlght otherwise h&v® beam given.

Queen fictorla

a little worried, that tb® Cabinet might wsak«», so
she wrote the following to her Priae Minister:
Th« qu8©» . , . trusts th@ Cabinet will b# verj
firp, and Lord D^rby eeaaed so jasterday. She
is prepared to apeaM or write to goo<S but u«rvou«
and @o«@what weak, and s©atl««atal Lord Carnarvoa,
if necassary, as wall as to Lord Salisbury. This
isawteiah sentifflentality for psopl® who hardly deeerre ths nam® of r@al Ghristiaiis, as if thoy ware
fflor® G-od's cr®atur®8 sad our fallow-eraaturas than
every other nation abroad, and forgetting th® great
interests of this great eountry—is really 1q06»pr^hensibl®
fhe Cablnat reBstalnad flra.

It rajacted tha Pirotocol as sub

mitted by Ignatieff, because of the Russian desire that Tur
key demobilize while she reaalned

armed.^5

After th© departure of Ignatieff, Schouvaloff revised
the Protocol and resubaitted it to the British Cabinet,
negotiations ensued.

Finally, on March 31, the London

62. Beaconsfield to Bradford.
of Disraeli. 999f.
63.

Moneypenny and Buckle, Life

German PiploBiatic Documents. I, 48.

64. Moneypenny and Euekle, Life of Pisraeli. 1002.
65.

Gera&n Blploffiatle Docuaients. I, 50.

-54Protocol was signed by the repr-esentatlTas of the six Powers.

It stated that the Powers desired to aaintaln the agressent
established between th«m at th© Conference of Constantinopi©
as regards the proposed reforms for Boania-HerzegOTlna and
Bulgaria; that they "take cognlxanee of the conclusion of
peace with, Serble^ 28th February, 1877'^*j that they consid@r
a rectification of the frontier of Montenegro to b® d«slratole;
that they inifite th® Port^ to place ite araies on a psac®
footing; that they hope furkey ®will apply energetieally
such ffi©aa«res a,s will cause . . . effective lmprovej®®at in
th® condition of the Christian populations'*; that they int«tid to watch over "the sarmer in which the proaissB of
th® Ottoman Government are carried into effect**; and that
if the condition of the Christians is not isproved they
will

consider In common as to the ffleaae which they may

deem best fitted to secure the wllbelng of the Christian
populations, and the lnt«r®sts of the general peace.
The wording of this Protocol was such that it appeared that
the Powers were truly united, and determined to force their
will upon Turkey, but this was far fro© the truth.
the Powers signed the Protocol with reservations,

Three of
Russia

stipxilated that Turkey ®ust send a Special Envoy to St. Peters
burg to negotiate disarmament, and stated that disaraament
would cease if new massacres

occurredItaly

declared that

she would be bound by the Protocol only "so long as the
66, Hertslet, Hap of Europe. 2563ff.
6T. Ibid. 2566.

-55agreeaent . . .

all the Powers'* was aalntalned;^^

and Inglaud reserved the ris^t to eonslder ths Protocol null
and void If **reciprocal disaraaiaen.t on. the part of Russia and
Turkey, and peaee between ttiea** w«r© aot

^9

attained.

the reservations of tii© three Powers rendered the document

practically worthless. D«rby etaluated th© Protoeol accur
ately in. tills report to th# Qiteens
Lord Derbj never has
and is not now, sangMin©
of the suceess of tbls domaent In ©nsarlag p®ac®j
but as it la now worded. It can do no har.« even, if
it falls to do any good: md it will at least pre
vent til# Russlftti Qo¥enia#nt: from throwing th©. blaae
on England, If war ensues; whlcb assuredly would
lia"«r© been don,® If signature had h&mn refused. If
th© Russian Effiperor Is sljie#r® In hi® alleged dsaire .for an excms© to ©nable Ma to disarm, he toas
got what b@ wants; If not, we are oaly wh®r@ w® w®re,
neither teetter aor wora® than l>#for«,70
In th© saa® Cabinet asetlng in which it was decided
to sign tb# Protocol, Mr. Layard w»» appointed Interla Aabass a d o r a t C o a s t a n t i n o p l © iti p l a c ® o f S i r B e n r y E l l i o t . T h i s
appointffleat was looked upon as sa unfrlandly deaonstration
tov&rd Russia, because Lsyard was considered «v©n sor© Turkophll© than Elliot, It was supposed that furkej would accept
the appolntaent as an Indication that England meant to ^hold
to her traditional policy of protecting

*"^2

Turkey.

schouval-

off was such disturbed by th© appolntaent, especially as It
68. Ibid. 2566.
69. Ibid. 2567.
70. Buckl®., fhe Letters. 5^^.
71•

Qeraan Diplomatic Documenta. I, 50.

72. Ibid.. I, 50.

-56occurred siaultftneously with the signing of th® Protocol.
It was only natural that Layard gbould have received his
appointment then, because th© Protocol charged the Powers
to observe th© actions of Turkey through their representati'srea at Constantinopi®.

What was not a generally teown

fact was that B®aconflfi@ld had long d«sired to replace Elliot»
and this wag an opportune time alnc® h@ was than In England.
As ®arly as August 1^ 18?6, Beaconsfi@ld told Derby that
**Slllot ["hsd^ shown a la«®ntatol@ want of energy and defic
iency of information throughout.**'^5

A week later he told

hi® that "Elliot has ®aay excsllant qualities, both aorsl
and lntell®otual, but ha has not energy. This is probably
the con8®qu®n©e of his wretched health; but, what[®v®jr the
eaus®, the result i® the
Turkey rejected th® Protocol, becauee, as she said,
it was both an attack on the dignity of Turkey and, because
of the stipulation calling for supervision of reforms by
the Powers, a violation of the Treaty of 1 8 5 6 . T h e
Powers were now no further than they had been before the con
vening of the Conferenc© of Constantinople.

All the negoti

ation at the Conference and concerning the Protocol was un
availing.

True—Turkey and Serbia were at peace, but not

Turkey and Montenegro, and it looked as if Montenegro was
being obstinate.

The terms they offered for peace were the

75.

Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 918.

7^*

Ibid. 921.

75.

French Biploiiiatlc DocuiEent®. 356-64.

-57proposals of the Confer®nce and the port of Spiaza, plus
three islands in lak© Scutari

On March 19» before the

signing of the Protocol, the Ottoisan Parliament was opened
for the first tlm©.'^'^

Russia still had two choices—to

give the new constitution a chano© to bring about the deaired reforms, or to »areh her armies acroas th® Turkish
border now that th© Protocol was reje0t©d,
76.

Ibid.

3^1f.

77. Hertslet, Map of Europe, 2531.

CHAPTSR IV
BRITISH SEOTRALITY IE RPSSO-fURIISe WAR

Saiperor Alexander, on April 19» 1877 ga'^© th©

Russian ansles orders to eross the Turkish frontiers,^
and CSortchakoff, on tli® same day, issued a circular dis
patch to the GoverBs«Bts of the Interested European Powers.
This dispatch *iot®d th© fact that all efforts for a conciliatorj agre@«ent had failed;, tliat the Porte had resisted
@verj '*und©rstandlag established between the Gabiaets";

that the Porte had Juat refused to sign th© London Protocolj
and that **in these circuastances, every chanc© is closed
for efforts of conciliation.*^ Th® dispatch continiaed:
There reaains no altern-atlf® but to allow the
state of thiog# to eontinu® which the Powers have
declared Incoispatlbl® with their interests and
those of Europe in general, or else to seek to
obtain bj coercion what the urianlaoue efforts
of the Cabinets hare not succeeded In obtaining
from the Porte by persuasion.
Our august naster has resolved to undertake this
work, which His Majesty had Inrlted the Great Powers
to pursue in cosaon with hia.
He has given his armies the order to cross the
frontiers of Turkey. . . ,3
1.

State Papers. V. 68, 840.

2.

Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2586f.

3.

Ibid.

2587.
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-59Th0 Russlaa resort to war, foraallzsa by a declaratloia 4at®d April 24,^ was taken in spit® of the fact that
Turkey and. Serbia had negotiated peace, Bulgaria was ©njoyiRg coBplet® trsnqulllitj under the surveillance of Turkish
r^ftgular troops, and the devastated -rlllsges lu Bulgaria **w©re
being rapidly

Montenegro wse «till fighting des

rebuilt.

perately, but th® furks laad shown gr#at wllllagn«»s to graat
peace og the statug quo aat®»^
Heraegovlna was still ragiiig.

ftee insurreetloa In Bosnia®

The furkigh ariaj, howster, had

been greatly streiigthened'^ by this tlffi®, so that It appeared
as If Turkey would bs abl« to resolve th© situation.

In view

of th#©© facts EnglaM f@lt th&t the war w«& unjustifiable,
Loftus, British Aab&saador at St. Pttsrsburg, approaehed
Qortchakoff with the pogelblllty of «@diatloB, but was told
®that It was too lat®, as th# Russian troops. If sot already
in aoT®a©iit, were on th® eve of aarehing.'^®
The Russian advaac® against Turkey seeaed a bold
and careless ao^®, because h«r flank was cospletely ex
posed to Austria, who had definite interests in th© Balkans.
It had heen reeogalsed for a loag tia« that Austria k#pt
her ®yes turned southw&rd, and ®v®a harbored tha hof®
that she sight one day be in Salonika. It was difficult
French Dlploaatlc Boouaents.
5«

Elliot, SoffiQ ReTOlutiOB®. 274,

6.

Abo'^e, 56f.

?.

above, 49.

8. Loftus, Dlploa&tle Re»inlecenc«8. II, 213.
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to understand how Austria, with these aspirations, eould
allow Russia to freelj inarch into tha Balkans. The aaswer
to this ©nigsa was contained in a long series of secret
negotiations b«tw#en Russia and Austria. On Julj 8, 1876,
the two countries had come to an agreement in a Secret
Conference of Helchstadt.9 The subsequent ©rents la th©
Balkan tangle sad® it necessary that th® two couQtrl@s
h&v® a new agreeaent. fhls was achieved hj th© Secret
fr®atf of Budapest, of Jsnuary 15, 1877.^^ Under this
treaty, Austria agreed. In eas« of war between Russls. and
Turkey, ®to ol>g«rv@ &n attitude of benevolent neutrality
in the presenc© of th® isolated action of Russia, and hy
its diploaatic aotlou. to par&ljz®, bo far &s this ["lay] In
its power, efforts at isterfsatlon or collectlT® mediation
which ffllght be attempted by other Powers,In retura
for this, Austria w&s to to® allowed to occupy BosaisHeraegovina whenever It d©sir®d.^^ fh©re were lifflitstions
placed upon the radlue of »lllt«ry actions of both Russia
and Austria, and Serbian and Montenegrin troops could
join Russia in military action.

On March 18 an additional

conTentlon was signed. This validated th® agreeaetit of
9. A. F, Pritoraa, fh® Secret freatle® oj Augtria-HaQF^ary.
1879-1914 (2 volE.."gaabrldg©, 1921), II, iSff. Austrian
and Russian texts ar« at variance, in ®xc®lient discussion
of this agr«®ffi©n.t Is contained in Lan^r, Suropean Allian&ee.
92f and Tylar, European Powera. 67f.
10. Pribram, Secret Traatlea, II, 191-203.
li*

IMd.. II, 195.

12.

Ibid.. II, 197,
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January 15,

eoaprlsed the territorial adjustaents to

to© made If Russia were

victorious.^5

fjirough these agr®®-

a®Bts Russia's flank was fully pr©tect®d. tootlier set of
negotiationa had been n,©e®ssary.

Russia did not h&v« a

fl®®t in. th© Blftck 3@« suffiel»ntly largs to permit her
to attack Turk#y from that direction*

fhua she had to

secure the prlYilsge of iWTin.g h®r troops through Sua&nia.

On 4prll 16 Rui®aiiia aad Bussia sigaed two conizations
which regulated th« passsg# of Russian troopa.^^
fh® Bussian dscl&ratlon of w»r, while not a sur
prise in aasland, w»s a highly proTOcativ® ©Tent,

fwo

distinct resctioas occurred! on® captained by tJladston®;
th® other, by %i®«n Yictoria aaid h©r Prlis® Minister.
Gladstone su1»ltt@d a series of r«®.olutlon» to Parllaireat,
which were alaost a plea that England Join Russia in h®r
^uaanitarian ertts&d®-.^^
ignoaiaious policy,

H® fomad littl® support for this

Qn th« other hand, th® inaction headed

toy th® ^##n and h«r Minister was aarkedly anti-Russian.
Victoria's words to Beaconsfield mak.® this apparent:
. . , there ought to h@ an und@rstandlng that
we cannot allow the Russians to occupy Constantlnopl», and that w« sast a®» that this is proais@d or th@ coiis®qu,@ne®B say h® serious. To
let It be thought that w# shall nevar fight and
that En^andv irlll^suteStittto ^Igy^t:'fe#iggutmder
Russia would h® to ahdlcat® th# position of
13. Ibid.. II, 199-203.
European Pow#rs. 8lf.

Cat© of si^atur® found in Tyl«r»

1%.

Hdrtslet, Map of Surop®. 2576-85.

15.

Money penny and Buolcle, Life of Disraeli. 100$.
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Great Britain as on® of th© Great Powers—to
which she ii®T®r will aubalt, and eoother »ust
wear th® crown if this is intended.16
On May 1 l>erhj 8©nt a replyto th© Russian dis
patch of April 19.

H« stated therein that the British

&ovmmmQn% was not of the opinion that the tsras of th®
Turkish protest to th© London Protocol **nee®8garily
pr®elud®d the posslhillty of th® conclusion, of p®ac® with
Montenegro, or of the arraiig@!B©tit of mutual disarmament''*;;
th»t It h®ll®ir®<l

that p&tlene® anS moderation alght ha-r©

obtained these obj®ct«; an<l that it could not agr«@ that
th© ©ntrasc® of Eusslaa araies on Turkish soil would all®Tiat© the difficulty,, "or iaprove the condition of th® Christiaa
population througlKJut th® Sultaa'e doainioas.'*^®

Dsrby con

cluded the note in saylag that, sine© l^saia assuaad that
she was acting in th® interests of Great Britain and th®
other Powers, it was B®e«8S&ry for Itogland to state in a
foraal aad public aanuer that th© *d®ci8ion of the Russian
<Jo¥ernfflent is not on® which can h&-r« [her^ concurr®nc« or
approval,^19

fMs clearly word®d note warned Bassla that

h®r action waa contrary to the wishes of England and could
•

IMd. 1005.

17. Britain was th® only Power that replied to the Russian
dispatch.
18.

Hertslet, Map of Kurope. 26(^7tf.

19.

Ibid.

2609.
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England, declared neutrality, but

a "watchful and condltloiaal"

.20

neutrality

At a Cabinet «e®ting on May 5 It was decldafi that
the not® already tlspatched to Russia w»s insufficient.
Derby was to prepare aaother dispatch wMcb would warn
Russia '*of tke elreutt»tane©6 which would render it iapo«slbl© ffor England] to continue & policy of abstention
and neutrality.fii« not®, dated May 6, wMch was csrt'lM
hj Seliowaloff to th® Eussias (loT«rns©nt, stated In @ff®cts
Britain desired to «ake lier iaterest® clear at th« outset
of th® war.

Th.e ®ost l»portant oae was th® Bu&z Caaal,

wad "ari attempt to bloekad® or otherwise to lnt®rf«r® with

tbe Canal or its approach®® woulii ba regarded . . . as a
aenac© to India, said &a « graT® iujury to the comm&rce of
th& world,'*

Aa attack on Egypt, or tii© occapatlon of it,

couM not he regarded with unconeem. Coaet&ntlnople was
not to to© allowed to pass into hansi® other *'tli«:i those of
its present possessors.*

ffe®r@ would b© serious objections

to the alteration of th© existing arr&nge.ffi®nts of tbe Boaphorua and Bsrdanellds. The Persian Giilf was another in
terest, and th® eoure® of @v#ats alght r®v®al still other
IntereetB.
tory.

Qortchakoff's reply to this note was satisfac

Thus the first stag© of difficulty was passed.

20. Moneyp«rmy and Buekl®, Life of Msraelt. 1006. The
Powers followed th@ lead of Britain In deelaring neutrality.
Se« State Papers. f. 68, 467f, T82. iSlf.
21. B#«eonsfl#ld to Victoria.
of Plsr&ali. 1007.
22.

Moneypeniiy &nd Buekle, Lif®

State Papers. V. 68j 86fff.

Other than th® war«lng giv#n Rassia by th© Brltlgh
doterament th«T>© was little la tli«
polief,

of a d@finit#

Th© Cabinet drifted wliil® B®aconsfl#ld gro,pe4

for a possible cotirs® of aetloo..

Even had Be&consflslA

»tu«bl«d upon, aome eowrse. It is probiable that the Cabin«t,
at tMs tl»®, wowld ha.-?®

to s&n^tlon It.

Hortli-

c6t», one of th# Catoia#t iB@»b«9rs4 Ms left a aeaoraMua
wliieh <5l»«rlf i«s«erlb«« tii# Cabinet division#

An mxmrpt

follow®;
...
Prim® Kitiister wa »OBt aoxioiaa to
k®«p «tt all tos«tb®r,
C#rbj w&® ehisfly
b«nt orv k»mplm,g m out 0f war» tout wa» rasdf to
go alaoat any l#agtii wMeli hi# eolleagweg 4«slr©4
in writing de»pat«li@@, »ppsr®atly not p#re®l¥lag
t&at th® »tr®»gt& of Ms l«jigwag# womld b# kel4
to inTolv«j, under poesibl® aM probabl# elrei4®-» •
stameet, tii# W'e#«»ity f^r e®rr#«poiw31ii.|5 aetioa.
Is th« earlier ftays of
aifflenltl#® th@ peae®
party 1r tlia Cabls®t »&y b© »«1A to b»v# eoii«i®t®d,
uiid®r Lortl ^rby, of Caira®» CrosB, the Buk® of
HiclssoM, 3«llebary» Gara&nroa, and «y»«lf. A-s
tlae wor® on^. Calms, Croais, an^ Mlehmond «e«a®<i
soffiewbftt t© »o41.fy tiwiir view#. I w®.s much in
coffiffluaieatioa with S&liiibtiry «id Camarvoia, and
I wffc» al»0 iR cosiattiaioation wltii D«rby., b«twe@a
whom aad the other two tb«r« was some ijoldness.
Caraarven was strongly iapr^a#®# with tM« bell#f
that th« Priffi® Minister was 4«sli»ous of il&r.
D®rby, Judging mQT9 e©rr®etly, said to »@j *1
don't think la® d®»lr®s wari la# desires to plaee
Eagland in & '^eoaaaitiding position.'*' TM® Frl»«
Ministdr hi«««lf «iiid to avt »ore tJisn oae* tlmt
hie gr®at f#®.r was that Serby^s policy wotald 1&&&
us to war I and, looking back, I sub
and more
convineed that tb«r» w&a »u«li ground for tla«
apprebansioa.23
On© of tbe postible eours#s of action explored by
B«aeonsfield was an mttespt to get the Britisb Fl#»t fttatio-rwld
23.

Moneyp«ariy «nd Ittckl®, Lif® of Diara«li. 1011,

at Constantinopi© and 20,000 British troops on th© P^nlasula
of (iallipQll.

It would b© necessary, Beaeonsfl^M wrot« in

a «acret letter to Lajard,24 that tlie proposal com.® fro®
Turkey.

Wltlaout such aja inYitatloa, accoffiplishffl«nt would

be liapossibl®.

Th® Sultasi, by aow suspicious of Eaglftud,,^

did not weleo®® the plan.

Mrlug these .negotiations,

B®acon.sfl«ld turned a d«af ©ar oa a proposal by Blsaarek
that the TurklBh Wmplr» bf psrtition.#d.

The nub of tb®

rather Involved aebem® was that laglaad was to take -Bgypt,
other Fow«rs wer® to bsw t®rrltorlal eospens&tion®, aad
Buesla w®s to b« allowed control of tbe Blaok S«s.^5
Sych a plan as tbl® was not at all sultabl® to Beaeonsfleld.

Hot only did hm b@li®ve tiiat saeto a partitioalag

would not briag p««e® asoKg tb# P©w#ra» but also be wm»

Mghly suspicious of Blsatsrek.

H« thought that SlsaArek

would welcoae & Brltisb-Russian war as aa opportualty for
Germany to msrsb hmr mrmi.es to Farla s^ala.
tb® history of tb« pr«Tio«»

Considering

Beaeonsfield *» inter

pretation of th® Bl»®areklan aeh«B® wa© act so sEurprlslng,
Still anotber courg® of aetioa ®xplor«4 by B#Sk.©OQafi»l<i was
tb® poesibility of m Britl«b-^«tri«un ullianc®.

If tble

eould b® aeco«plifili«€ Ryssla would be thoroughly intiaidatad
and sight Bot pr©e®»d south of th® Balkan range.
replied to the BritiBh «ugg®Btloii ©oolly.

Sfa® stated that

sb« could not acc«pt aay one of th® followlag

Ibid. 10l4f.
25*

Langar, gurop«a«. Alllane#». 123f.

Austria

polatai

—66*
CD tteist
@xc?l«siir« protectorate oT@r tli.@
Balfcaa Ckrlatlans sfeottld 'b# eoB©#<i®d to any on#
Christisn. pow®r; (2) tiist th® ^sfinltlY® pe&e«
aiaouia tak® plae# withomt the partleipatton of tbe powsrs glgaatorlea of tli® TF»Rty
of lS56j (3) that Eassla skottld ftcqiilr® territory
m% %lm rigtot bank ©f the BaRUls#;
timt Ro«®aais
should b# lneorp©i*«tr#d wttfe Eassla or sad© dep@ad«ttt
upon fci®rj (5) that a prl»e® of @itfa#r the AustFlaa
or %hm Rytsslsn r«lgiiin.® famllj sfe©uld fe® ««tablls&#d
on a Balkan thron®; (6) that Russia should oeeupy
Co«istaiitln.opl#j (7) tls»t a larg® Slmf atat®
l>@@8t&l5ll©te»d la tii® SikllcaiaB &t the ®xp®iis» of tb®
»on-Slair ®l#®«at8., @f» tkat th# r®<j.rg;siilS4tlonsS;iiaiald
go b®J6a4 th® grantiag &f aato»oay ^ to th® present
proline#®, mBd#r & a«,tl¥® pritiee.26
fills was act ©xaetly wfest B#s0oasfi#l<ft had want®d.

H® ia-

qytlr^d If Aix»trla wstild otoJ«et to »« Sagllsh. oeetipation of
Sallipoll.

Andrassj replied tb&t hm had. no otoJ®etloai, and

further, that "ii® woald r#gsM tb® retentloa of Co-ustafitiaQpl®
by Bueslm as a ^mmus te#lll.*^'^ Any more thmn this, Aradrasay
r«fus®d to graat.
On Jttn® 8 Russia e0fflaittiile»t#d to Sngla»4 tli® t®m» of
•p#ae« »fe@ would off«r If

for pea«® to®for# tfe#

Russian fore®s erosa®d tbe

Tills offer was d®p«n-

d»nt upon tbe «&lfit93aaa#« of n«tatrallty toy tto® Powers.
Btilgarla was to to® mutonomomt M®rit«a«gr© aad Serbia
w»r@ to *rse»lv® aa lasi^a®® of t®rrltorf**f Bosnia aM
i«i's©go¥lna vBTm to b® proirld®4 wltb institutions ^eoapatibl® with their Internal state®; Serbia was to **ra«ain under the suaaralnty of the Sultan"; Ruasla was to
to® cospensated for tha costs of war by the aanexatlon
26. 1m§. 125f
2?.

iMd.

126.

-6T-

•of 8atou» and Bessarftblaj mA Austria

to find any

eo®p®nsatlon she alflit d«slr® Im Bosnla-Hsrs^govlaa.^'^
fegland di<5 not stjlalt

tfa®#® term®

to

Ttarks, b®c«tts«

tb®

sh® regarded th^m to to® in ex©#«s of what th® furfes %rottM
i,ee«Ept.
Toward tfa# latt®r part of .Jiaa® the .Rtassiaas
and® a susc®ssfw:l erossiag ©f tto.« Daaato^.
1>«ea©® aop0 dlstiarte«'d a# t&#
a

Qtt©0R Iflctorla

advuneed, «a& se-sj'e#ly

weat tof thmt ak® did oat writ« t© b»r Prim® Mimist^r

urglog M,s to aetiOB.

After th« Baaub© erosslng, sb« wrot®?

. .. , B# tooldl Wtef not #all joar follower#
t©g®tli«r» of tfe« fio«3« of Cawsoii* a« will
of til®
of I^rdtf t«ll
tliat thm Ister•8ta ©f ar#8t Ifltftta
at «tsk«j tiA&t It i«
Qot for %hm GhTlBtlsas {and tb®j ®r® quit# as
eryt®l as t&« Tmr^s) toat for e©iiqw#®t tibet this
era®l, wiekM w.ar la
t&«t Hussia Is m
tomrbaroas sn# tyrsimi©*! m» tfe» tark«l T#1J.
%hmm this, ^nd. that tii®y iife®«ia rally round tte0lr
S©v@r#i|pi aad
foii will hiiir® a Isrg®
sBi pow^-rfttl msjorltj. Ani' ©Jiljr say Eassi*
sJ^&ll mt go fftrlft#r and sli® will atop. But if
this lb® m% doa#
^oo« qttlckly it will soon
to© too l«t®; and w# sb&ll then 3a®"?® to do sucfe
sore than v» eti&ll h&T# to do now. .. . ,^9
til® Russian angieis BOTSd rapidly, and, la «ld-J«ly, were

jpasMng south tlirorngfa the lallcaa mottsitaias.
^««n

Bi»a«&aafi<(»ld to s@»d th« fl««t to Cooatan-

tlnopla. 7he fleat vaa mot diapatehad.

frantic.
28.

On ^aly 16 th«

flie C^aan baeawa

31^ panaad a lo»s lattar of wMeb ao«a parts followt

Hertslat, Map of Europa. 265^-39.

29. Qtaaen yietorla to l®aeo»«fi«ld,
Mf® of Msraali. 1020f.

Moriaypauay asd Buekl®,

-6S«

, . . But uhm liifikTB of no troops moving or goi»g,
and beeostt®® aior-# and nor® alawied. fli# Qa«®a
alwajs feels liop®f«l aad eiiCGarag@ft when ®ii@
hm s@®B L©rdl B@seonsfl«ld, but aoasbow or otber,
wh«tfear iatentlonally or thro' w«Qt of energy on
th® part of ttoos® uiid@r M® or at th© offices,
nothing ®at«rlal 1® don®M It alar®® her seriously.
fh# Qti«®a «o®t #&rii«8tly urg®s or Lord 8«ac©nsfl@M
to hold '^•«ry strong Imrigaag# to tli« Cabla®t tosorrow aad to insist on the sp®@dj despatch of
th# troops to 3aer«fts« th« garrlmoM, as 6p®#dily
us poaslble.SO
Beaeon«fl#ld h«.d
the

to <Ieel»loa.

working earnestly to brlag
Th® position of

«iidOMbt®dly ftldet hi®» for sh# m# a strong
eowanded siiiah r®sp®et.

Vietorla
aad

Flaally# on July 21, th© Cftblm#t

agr@#<l un&ni»oytgly to declitre war against Eassla if sh®
occ-upl«a Oonstaatinopl# arid r®f\j8«d to withdraw iBsaeiiat#ly.5^

In addition, ordsrs w®r« glf«n to tlapateli troop®

to th® M«ait@rr&ii®iua garrisons,
Th® Rii®«i*a sdviMRfie w«§ cheeked &t Plevntt, a road
center on th® Russiiua right flimk.

It was i®p#ratl*« that

Pl»vna be tak^n teafor® th® RM«ai«ne proc®»d#d with any

eaapalgn south of th« mountslns, so,, by togast, it was
apparent that Conatantlnopl® was in no i®a«diat« dangsr.
This un©xp®ct®d d«if«lo|went eonalslarably r«ll«ir©d the
tension in England, and llttl® was don© offlelally aboyt
the Eastam Qaestloa.

However, Baaconsflald, outsld© tha

toowladg® of th© CaMaat and Poralgn Offlee, ®«nt an
ealssary, dlract from th@ Quaan and th« Priae Mlnlstar,
30»
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51,
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As tills emissary, Beaconsfleld used Colonel

Frederlclj Arthur W«llesley, British military attach®' In
Russia, who had coa# to England In August, with a aesaage
fro® the Tsar*s headquarters. Th© Russian difficulty
at Pleima had shaken, its con.fldenee to the point wh@r©
it was dsomed necessary to again assure the British Qoveraaent of the peaeefuln@«s aM purity of Russian int®n.tlo.aa.
The war was being waged only for the purpose of aiding the
Christians under Turkish rule; no annexations wer® being
considered except Bessars^bia and eertain areas in Asia
Minor; ao permaaent oecupation in Bulgaria was toeing
anticipated; Con.stantlnopl® infOuM only be occupied If
absolutely necessary; mn& British intereats la Egypt,
the Suez Canal, and India would be

respected.

of course, expected an offlel&l reply.

Rassla,

Beaconsfield

furnished Well@®l®y with s. Forel^ Office docuaseat
written in the conciliatory ffimniaer usually eatployed on
such occasions, but he also funilahed him with sofflething

»uch more important, -rerbal and top-secret instructions.
When delivering the official reply to the Russian eoaaunlcatlon, Wellesley was to personally confer with the Saperor
and inform hi® of the actual British policy.

In a ae®or-

andusi by Wellesley, that policy is stated to have been:
The Queen and H. M. QoTernasent have a sincere
desire to see the speedy re-establlshaent of
peace on ter»s honorable to Russia and would
be glad to contribute to such a result; should,
however, the war be prolonged and a second
32.
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-70campaign uadertajten, the neatrallty of Sngland
could *iot
malatalned and ah® would tak® h&r
part aa a toelligarent.53

In addition to British Policy, ¥«lleal@j wsa to let th®
Effip«ror know that the Que®ii and her Prlsa® Minister w«r«
In perfect agr©e»©iit, and w@r© the actual beads of » strong

ly united Qovemffient,

The rumor» of CaMnet dissension

were absolutely fsls®.

Siiould the Qovemm^nt d®cld@ oa

action it would be supported toy %h® peopl®..
Tb® E®p«ror, aft@r bavlag beard Wellesl^y,
bis gratitud®

for tb®

«3s:pr«s®®d

fraak «8aaa®r with which he had

treated. Bus#la forced th« war during th« winter of 187778.

It msy hmv® b#®a tii»t th® ¥«ll@sl@y aeasag« ©#n-yi.a@®d

th® "Tsar that prolon^Sitloii of tb® war would b® dasg#rotia.
Osa^ral Todletosn, oa® ©f tb,o top Swsslsa wllitstrj-atrateglsts,
mm cii«rg®d with the t&sfe of brs&kiag tia© d®feas@ of PIs^hr,
wMcii

ls«

was

flMtllf ®bl« to

do

was irl«w«d wltb alarffl toy
Cabinet to ffi«©t on D«e»®b©r 14.

on

D#^®b®r 10. fMs

field, iiad iia auawiOJiwd th®
Th« Foreign Offic« dl«-

p«tcli®d & not® to Eussia waming the latter tfeat aa occ^ip&tion of Con»t«&tiaopl® or tb® 0ArdaK«lle8 *®lglit eall far
aeasuras of pr«e«uition on tb« part of Grt^at Britain frost
which tfeay hav® kittierto fait Justified in atostaliilfig."^^

fh© Eussian asawar was far from satisfaetory.

Qort«Makoff

asa«rt@d that sueli ®m attitude on tlie part of Britain

delayed the end of th« war. He aaid;
33.

Ibid.
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. . . I f tfe® T u A s w ® r © t o acqttlr® tli@ eoBTietion
that a
or mi attsok dlr®ct®d stg&lnst ConstsBtlnopl® wqu14 csus® Eagliuad to d@p&rt fro®
h®r aeatralitj, tli®tr r#®lstaa©@i la spit® of its
©vl4®nt yi8®l©asB®ss, la sucli ft wmy m to fore®
Htissia. to pttrs^t# la®r ®p®r»tioiiS a» far a« tji®
espitsl,. It would to# sSiffereot, in all protoabllltf, if th® ®ttitttS® mnd laagaag® of tb«
Ca.tolm@t of Ijs'adoia w#r« eacfe m thorougiili' to
convimce tb,« Port# tfest It b&e no is-sfiistaae® to
bop® for fro® &fer©s«S..
lo Btteh ft ea®@ tl»» Porte would resign'itself
©or© profflptiy to ab-aadon. s r®«i«tanc@ wtiieti can
oalf aggrfiiirst© its po®ltioa.35
•©ortehakoff aM®d tii«% tfe® qawstioa of tfe® posa®s®l©ii of
Constantiiiopl# b@lomg@d to tli« P©w@ra, uot to anj oa®
.Pow«r. Winmllf t h® r»q,y@.st#d Britain to »tat« »or« clearly
whst th© Britlah lat»r«st« w«(r®, i.e. thos® tba.t algiit
toucb.®d by tfe® «T®fittiialltl®s of the war within th® llBsits
to nfMcJa the &B6ur«ac®s of thm Imperial C«bln«t
stricted th©®.**56

re

Sine# tMa dispateh was not c©»ynl«at#!l

to D«rbf mtil J&im&rf 2, tfe® r«qu««t«d d«finitiofi of
a©t feaadlad UBtil S&nu&rf 13.

iat®r®at8

In %h®

»®aattl»# mueh hsd fea.pp®aed» tootb on the war front and
its, th© British Cfttoia«t.

Or i>®c®ala®r 14 S«rMa d®elar©d war agaiaat f«rlc®j,57
fhis tiffl® &h& was «3r«( suec«ssfttl, and occupied »oiatte#rn
Serbia, inelMing Slab a»d Pirot.

Moat®!»gro» nihleh h&d

b««n fightiag cotttlmj©u»ly, was now in a position to {^»Ja
forward.
35.

37.

Sh» capt«r«d Dttleigno, Budua, and Antiisrarl on

Ibid.
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Russia began s war of «ov®-

ae-Bt aow tbat her rlgkt flaink was protested, and Sofia
wfl.6 i«ffi®di®tely @n.a«ng®r®di.

It fell to (Jeaeral Gourko

in tlie ©arly part of January,39
Beaconsfield, on B«c#sb©.r 1^, placed a mrf strong
progrsffl before his Cabinet.

He proposed that Parliftsient

suffiaooed iaB#dl&t®ly aad asked to graat a considefmbl#
Incrsas® la th® araei forces,

Siaultmeotielj, th® Brit

ish Qofernffiest should "coffi»®»c0 negotiations, as «®<iiator,
to«tMe«« the balligfreiatg.**^®
factions over tbls isso©.

Tfe,® Cabinet split lato

It 8©®»i as if the rift w®r@

b«jond r®p»lring, bat B®acon8fi#ld, la » Cabinet seating
on til© 8«v®nts@iitli, aa»oaHC®€ that be would resign if tb«
Cabinet did aot «gr«# to his progri®.
daj lile policy pr«T&il@tf.

On th© following

It was deel<i«d to eall Psrli-

aaent for Jmnumry 17.
England suggested to Austria tbat she Join tfe®
former in ft aot® to Russia offering mi^liition.

Andraasjf

declined to set mlomg th»s0 lioet^ arguing tbat it woald
be b®tt®r if the furks obt&lned the p@am tmrms aad th«n
&ppe«l#d to th@ Powrs to r^tduue
58. M«vill F&rh@B and @tli®r«,.
Bulg:yi&. S m M S * SES&ESt
1^15}» 124.

B#aeotiefield,
B&lfeaits i A Hiatory of
and furk^w J O x f o r d ,

39.

Laas«r, Earmmmn MMSBSSl* 129.

40.

B«®.coosfl®ld to Qu©@r.

Motieypenay and Buekla, I^if#

91 Pisra€li.. 1073f.
41.

Lang®r, Sarop®an llliaaees. 130f.

-75though dliappolnted by tfe# Austrian refussl, w«® 4@t®raln®d to act alort®,

ir this

wes aided fey an appeal

froa the Sultan CD®ce«to«r 24) for Sriglish aaediatloa.'^^
Tw®lv® days previously Tuvk^j bad r®qu»8t@d %hm Powers
to mediate, tout, b«c®u«© of Blsaarck's rsluctane# to set,
this g,p|5#sl 'toad resulted %n notMag. Th« British Aatoaasador
®t St, Peteraburg was eo®»l»siosed to a«te the Russlaa
ilo¥ern.»®iit if th® Sflap^ixsr voiald a®r@® to ov©rtwir®8 of p«se«.
Ofi jD«c©.»'b®r 30 Q-orti§toiakoff said that Russia did not d«sir#
through a iMrd party. TyErkey should eontaet tii®
Busalati G@n@r®l8 in th® fi®ld and find o«t th# csndltioiis
for teriBlnftting bostilitl®®

On January 9 Turksy,

hftvlag no other aimlm, approaetosd the Russian eoaaandera,
but t®n addltloaal days wer© a®e#afiary for Turfeieli d«l®gat#s
to arrlv® with pro'per er«d«ntlala, Th@ RiiSBlan advano«
waa Bot halted t»y tb® Turklsb. p@ac® approach.

Inglaad

Bour answarad tfaa Busalan raquast^ ©oatalnad la tl:» Russian
memorandisn of Daaeaber 16, for a daflnltlOH of Brltlab
interests.

All that was said waa that *aoy oparatloaa

tandlag to place the passage of th« Cardaaallea yiodar th©
control of Euasla would be an l«p#dlmarit to tb® prepar

conalderatloa of the t®r»« of a flaal settlaaant,"^^
aortchakoff was aakad if ha -would assur© that no troops
would b« seat to the Feiilnatala of 0alllpoli. H« aaswarad
^2. Ibid. 131.
^3. ganeant Slplogatie Poeuttctits« I, 58.
44.
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that Russia would »ot Slmct operations on G&llipoll
unless Turkish regular troops w@r® conc©ntrat@d there,
and that Russia would eonatria® & British, occupation of
tb© Peninsula m a -^fiolation of aautrallty.^^
On January 15 Baaconsflftld urged his Cabinet t©
feuthoria® oM®rs for th« fl#«t t«> be s#tit to th® Dardanelles,
©oaaualcatloaa to Auatrla attesptisig the creation of a
elos#r worktag sgr@®a:eiit, aad cosaualcstioRa to
4©cordlnglj Loftus wan instructed t© inform CJortchakoff
that *aay Tr@atj eoaeluded

tii«

of

Russia aad the Fort®, aff®eting fn@fttl«s of 1656 and 18?!,**
would hav® to be a $ur©p®fs.n ?r«aty,, and ''would not Im valid
witfaout the assent of tb® P©w®re •wbo w®r© Parties to thoa®
frestl®®.*^7

fh» order for fl®#t i!OT®m#nt ws» ia#ir®r .gent,

b#caus® L&jard t®l®graph©d th.® S«lt*n*s objections to
suetoi a aoT« and tfci® Russian aasw»r eoaeerming Qalllp©.H
bad b@®n recdived.^
Oct the same day (January 17 5 that Suleiman Pae^'^a
aray suffered coaplete defeat,^^ the British Parliaaent
convened.

The speeeh from the throne ooatained on®

paragraph of direet wamiag to Euseia.

It follows:

^5.

Ibid.

2656.
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49.
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-?5Hitherto,, so far as %h@ war .teas proceeded,
a®ittoer- of tte.e •b'®llig®r@intg ba® Infringed th®
coadltlOR® on wbleh «j n@atrslitj is founded,
and I wlUlnglj belief® tbat teotto p&rtl«« ar®
desirous to r@.sip@ct tfaw, ®© far a« it nay b®
In th®lr pQ'^&T, So lottg as tlj®s® eoftditioas
ar« not Infringed, my attitud# will eoatlaw® the
8a». Bm% t c&ftuot coBe@«l fro® ays®If ttiat,
should hostilltl®a be wifortuaately prolonged,
»om unrnxprnetm^ occuit#q.cs« »ay r«nd@r it %neu®b@at on »e to adopt «®ftsur#» of precaution.
Sueli «@astt.r®s ©o-uld na% b« taken witfeout sd^qaat®
preparation
I tra.»t to tli» llbtrallty of
mf Parllameat to mupplf the m@mim vMcb m&y to®
r#qulr«d for tkat parpoa®,50
In th@ debate conesralris tfe® Bp®®eb B^ajsonaflald spok® w®ll,
and an UB«xp@ct«d aid eaae to the Qu«@is and Prlae Mlalst®!'
tvom Salisbury» who spolt® In B®rbj*s mbseae®,

Frois this

point on Salistary »ov@d bm&j from tfee peae® faction of

the Cabinet, aad alllgm^d himsslf mor# and »©!*« clos®ly
with Beaconsfield until fiaallj b®

tfe« latt®r's

Foreign Minister.
Th® oosffiimlcations vltli Austria had h@mn prec«@dliis
satiafactorily, aad oa Jamaat^ 21 Inglsnd off«r«d her &
d«f®n«iv« allianeo and pecuniary aid, the lattar on tha
condition that Austria soblliase a force on h«r frontier
and Joisa England in an Identic nota to

Russia.51

On

the

saffie day Beaconsfield again pw)p©8ed to the Cabinet that
the fleet toe sent to ConBtaatlnople. fwo day® later the
fleet received its orders, and the Cabinet decided to give
notice to the House of Goffisons that a Vote of Credit
50.

Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 1C^6.

51. Ibid. 1099.
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on th® followlag Mondsj.52

Derby a.u€

CamarTOn r©slgri©i3 tlaelr po@itloii» Imt.tfe# Catela«it. fh®»®
two r@sii^«tlons laad been long ©xp®et#d.

B«aeoG8field

bad b«^n qmeatlonlng Derby'® stoility ais «arly as th©

aprlug of 187?.^' Q«®@ia Victoria alisred her Prin® Riiiister*s
¥l®ws, .and sseslnglj f®lt ewu aor® stroagly eoae®niias Imr
WoTBl^ MlnLi®t«r.

In Jiia« she wr©t©i

The reports in Mr. Layard*» laet lettsr of
tfee 13th last., %rhieli th#
bam yesterday,
mve v®ry alaraiagi Sur»ly Lord Berlaf esaaot
indlff«r®nt to tli® a®,»g«T8 e,xpr@88«d tto#r®la?
M&ming after w&ralfig arrli-^s mn6. b# 8«««s to t&k®
It all with^ttt 8»yittg » word.I Sueb. m For«l^
Minister thm %i®®o r®ally ii«v®r r@me«t»rsl5*

•On th© day aft@r %h» Catoiaet r«aigaation.s a t®X®grii»
fro® Lay®.rd was r®c®l-v®d, lmfor®lag tte.® Cablii«t that tb®
t#raB of p®&c® bad b@«B. agreed iipoa.

Aaoag other things,

the qtaestioa of th« Str»lt'S wag to to© settled b®tw«®ii tbe
•liBperor of Eussia wa& a C©agr®ss.55 fhl# b#w« ebanged
ffiuoh that had been d»cid®d apon the day befor*. fh®
•ending of th® fleet to Constantinople resulted from a

British fear that turkey and Ruiaia woald settle the qiaeatlon of the Straits between theseelveB, excluding the Powers.How that it was learned that this would sot happen, it
was decided to coimteraand the fleet orders,

fhe oi^er

was too late to stop the fleet, but it brought it hmtk to
52.

ihia.
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Th® next «5ay another t®l®gra«

oame from Layard, stating that h® had been, alstateen as
regards the Straits questioa.

Th® position of Brltaia

was 0xtreffielf emtoarraBing. Sh« coald @®nil a third Qrd#r
to the fleet caueiag th® first order to be aet@d upon,
or sh® eould le&vm th® fl#«t at th# »out,h of th« Straits
iind h0p@ for th« l»st la h«r walaeaed po»ltl©ii. Jokes
w@r@ begiimlog to b® heard la Constaatlfiopl® conceralng
th© strange now.ffient®•of th# fl#©t. th« Powers sight w®ll
los® r®speet for Britain, for .such a display of indeclsloa.
U,ltlssat©ly it was d®cld@d t© avoid th© ®i8toarr&S8»eat l>y
l«svlES th® fleet i» Its pr®s«n,t position.
Derby was a popular ®an.. ,Hls reslgiaation o«.«8®d
quit® a stir ia Eagl&ads for h» w&» toowra as standing
for **pru,deac® and ©o®mon8@as@ In politics.**^ Th® Party
Whips f#ar#dl that th« Qovmrmmnt woald b© defeated in th®
coaing Vot® of Cr®4it if B®rby w®re i«3t convlne#<a thmt li«
should retract his reaignation.

Slac© Derhy had haaed his

rssignation only on th# »0"?®«®nt of the fl@et, it aeeaed
that there was no loagar any eausa for hi* to raaign.
Sbrthcote was charged with th© taelc: of iMiiting D«rt^ ehanga
his ffiind. A dlffleult day was sptut by Mortheot@, but
h« was Bucc®«eful,

Barby told th© Rouse of Lords, upon

hi© r®twm, that hi© raslgnation and aubsaqaent retraction
had bean th# ®ost aattaral thl«g in the world, fh© caus©
having been r®»ov©d, ''h® had no hasitatlon la withdrawing
5<5.

Ibid. 1104
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resignation.

Csmarvon's resl^iation, iioweverj,

was fln&l, toecaus® h.® had objected to th® Vote of Credit
as ¥©11 as tb# ord#r» to tlem fl««rt.
At th© ti»® that Ingl&nd firat spproaelied Aiastrla,
January 15» the treaties feHCtween Russia aia€ Austria
to AndrasBj a safftel®nt gwarant®®, and hm told tte® British
A»ba»®ador that %hm 8p«®eli fro« tk« thron# opening the
British Parllaffl#nt h«d

a sr#«t di®«ppoliitm«at to hi®.^

All things coii»t<d»r#d, hm ifeougJit b# elioald prevemt a breals:
b0tw««n Aufttrlm SQd Russia, 'but lie wmld not object If th®
British sent tto.® fl»#t to Coastantioopl#,

As far its Awstrlan

ffioMlizatlon was coa«@rw®d» th»t w®,e too expenslv# to **b»
undertRkdn ub1«s8 absolutely luperatlire.''^^
aot IpIb iu

w©wia

li,®atle not® to Rassla warning b»r against

the eoptlnued occupation of Bulgaria, or th© occup&tioa
of th© 8bor«# of th# Bosphorus, %h.m S@a of Maraora, or th®
D«.ria»®ll«a^ to««au#® it aigtot to® ii4t«rpr®t®d by Russia to
mean tlaat Ingland aad Awstria did sot object to aay acts

but tb«s9.
SebouYaloff, on January 25^^ eoiwsiimlcated tfea Russian
peace teras to Bartoj.

For ma answer to th© Brltisfe note

of the fiftaentb, which, stated tfaat modifloations of treaties
would haire to be ««lMiitted to the Powers, BeboMirAloff said
that be was iustfnAeted by Oortebaloff to add a proals© to
57. imi-

1105.

58.

Lauger, European Alll&ncea. 132.

59.
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133.

-79tb® p#»0@ t«r«s that '*all pbases of th© treaty that con
cerned Europe would
Pow#re,"6®

8uto®ltts<l to the review of ths

This wor^lBg was aot tbe saa® as that contained

in tb® British not® aad was, tii®r®for«, unsatisfactory.'
fli® t©r®» tbeassl-^eR v@r© r@gRrd®<l toy tfe# Cabinet a® *mor©
studious of British thm. of tostri&n interests.The Cabinet
eolisidered that it wan ia#e®as«ry, feowsfer, to proe®©^ with
the ¥at® of Cr®dlt, and Derfey h&nAe^ &no%b&r ®©Borajaduis to
Sebouv&loff..

It stated tliat Englsad would not p®r»lt tli®

oacupation of Coastsatlnople toj Httseiaa troop®.

In tfm

@¥©nt that this bapp@a®d England wowld find h®rs©lf "eomp®ll®d to t&k® #ii@rg®tle measures to protect th@ thr@at#n®d
interests.^®^

Sua-sla te.&d eoa«4ialest@€ tfe@ p®«.e© t®r»3 to Aastria
and England at the »9m& ti»#,

Th@ Austrian reaetion w®s

wii€h dlff#r®nt from that of Stigland.

the term® were in

aapy instanees « violation of tfee Raaeo-Austrian «gr©©ffi«iit,
and in others thay w©r« so YSfp^® as to cause Andraeay to
to® gusplcious of th® Rttssiaa intentions.

Con8®qu@Btly,

li® orderad B«uat, th# Attatrian Ambassador in Londoa, to
gat in touch with I>©rby.

Sine® this was the period in

which Derby had r««igsaed, Bawst «sw Baacoasfield on th®
twanty-sevaath, who raportad that th® Austriana vara
"terribly alar®«d, and balieva thay hava baaa ©ntiraly
60,

fylar, Suropaao Powera, 96.

61..
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Austria even went so far as to

Russia,

ask England for armed aid,^^ but this was not granted.
An understanding between th© two countries was arrived at^
however, and in the coming period they worked together
against Russia.
In the ffioantiadf Eusela had occupied Adrlanopl®
and had aarcbed oa toward Constaatinopl®, Th© Turkish
delegates accepted th,® Ruasian terms on jaauary 2T.» and
signed an arHilstice on January 31. Tlie terms of th® aralatie©
©nded only hostilities, not tli® diplomacy of tbe Powers,
63.
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64.
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V

CHAPTER ¥
A

SHOW OP FORCl MD DIPLOMACY

It would ee©ffi, aow that

tli#

armistice was signed,

that England could hsT© sat toaek and rejoiced over h.®r good
fortuB® ia haTirtg avoided a sajor war. Such, how#v®r,: was
not tb.® e&se. ,4etu«lly,

was ©staring a period that

\

was to b@ on® of tb« aost trjl»g in. her p«ae®-tise Mstorj.
The »onth of February op«n®d rather serenely, but few days
passed in this ®ais.ii#r.

On tb#

s«v®Rth th®

streets of ¥«st-

ainster w«r® filled with "«xelt©d and pAtriottc erowda,**^
and the London Stoek EsEehang* 9xp©rl©ne®d a mlaor paale.
fh» night b®for« this day of aaxlety, news had cob© tpom
Constantinople that th® Russian® wer® ia "the defensir®
works^ of the city, and had cut th« wires so that news to
Lottdon had to be diapatched via Bombay,^

Thia report,

later found to b® exaggerated, had imffiediate results.
Opposition to the ¥ote of Cr«dit, which had been intro
duced January 28, collapsed, and a credit of six aillion
pounds for allltary preparations was
1.

granted.5

on February

Mon«yp®niiy:-and Buckle, Life of Sigraelj. 1114.

2. B«aconsfield to Bradford.

Ibid. 1114.

3. Langer, SuropeaR i,lliaBC«s. 135•
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-828 th® Cablaet r®®olv©<a to send the fleet to ConstantlBOpl©.
iButr®,! Powers were to "b® iavlted to do likewise.^ TMs
iBOv®, wMcli had previously produced two Cabinet resignations,
wa@ now received by the eountry as fitting and proper.
Bsaeonefield was pleased to h«ar that th@ "announceaent
was r®eelT®d with much cheering in the Sous© of Coaoons,**
and roaftrk®d that "th® couatry is greatly stirring mt
Truly, the peopl© of Eaglaad w®r® "stirring.-*

last. **5

They lifted

their ¥olC9S in a a®w song, which contribut®d the word
Jingoisffi** to th© English languagei
¥@ don't want to fight, but by Jingo if wa do.
We've got the
we've got th® shlpe, we've
got th@ aoaey too.6
Snglaad ajad Austria had been thinking for a long
ti«e of th© ®T@Btual e®ttl©®@iit of th« Suaso-furklsh war
In relation to a Confereaee. In May, In reply to the
British off®r of an allianc#, todrassy had stated, as ome
of seven points, that h© would not agree to th© definitive
peace settlement's taking place without the participation

of the Powers signatories of the Treaty of 1856.*^

Derby

informed Russia on January 15 that ^'any Treaty concluded
between the Qovertxaeats of Russia and the Porte, affecting

Treaties of 1856 and 1871 • . • would not be valid without
4. Beaconafleld to Queen Victoria.
Life of Dieraell. 1116.
5. Ibid. 1116.
6. Langer, European Alliances. 135.
7*

Ibid. 125.

See above, 67.
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-85tlia assent of th© Fowere wlio were Parties to those freaties,*®'
4s soon as Austria learned that Turkey aceeptad th® Russian
p©ac@ teras (January 27), sh® suggested s Conferene®.^
Eu-ssia quickly agreed, to tba principle of a aieetiag of
th# Powers, feat with reservations which abe did not ®ake
knowQ to Austria.

She would refuse to take part in a eon-

fereno® if it wer© to be held in either fisnna or London;
Berlin, how©¥®r, would b® acceptable,^®' Austria proceeded
with til® preliffllnsrj jaagotiation® with th® other Power®,
and, finding th#® agr©@abl®, extended an inTitatioa for

a conference to

held In Vieana.^^

On February T, th®

day of cheering cro*ds and sigtilflcaat decisions, IDerby
aecspted the iavltatioa, agreeing to Vienna as the sit®,^^
In aeeordanc® with th® decision tak©n by th@
CRtolri«t on. Fftbruary 8, th© fl®®t, linder Mairal Hornby,
coBm«nc«d its jomrney to Constantinople.

The fl®@t stopptd

at Chamak. Pewfeisliion. was supposed to be given by th®
Turks for th© fleet to proceed, but, since permission was

not granted, after waiting several hours Hornby ordered
the fleet to return to Besika Bay, The English Aabassador
at Constantinople failed to get this permission, beeaase
the Russians warned the Sultan that they would occupy
8. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2657. S®« above, 75.
9. Laager, European Alliances. 13^.
10*

Qeraaa Diplomatic Bocuaents» I, 61.

2-1. State Papers« V, 69, 79^f.
12. Ibid., ¥, 69, 795.

-84Constantlnopl© if the Britlsla fleet arri-red,
was Iti an ®xtr@«ely e»bsrra8Slng position.
tbe fleet had been th® B^toject of ridicule.

England

One® befor®^
TMe tia® it

was reported th&t placards had bdsn posted on the Brltisb,
effltosssy at Coastantinople, reading: **'Lost—b«tw@©i3. Besika
Bay and Gonstantinopl®—©n.e fleet,. Reward- to anyone funiisMng lnfo»atloa.

Obviously, Britain had to carry

through h®r original ord®r, with or witiioiit peraission.
Orders w#r® seat for the fl®®t to go to Gonstantiaopl© withoat peraission, -and to fir® oa any shore batteries that
fired first.
Marffiora.l^

<ki February 13 the fle#t entered th® .S®« of

The Sultaa #amestly appealed to England, with

the r«8ult that th# fl®et ws.b ermntxx&lly withdrawn to the
Asiatic sida of the 30& of Marsora. Russia did not «ak®
goo4 h©r threat of occupation, bat the situation was
p©rllou«. Englaftd and fhissla ©xehang^d s®Treral notes wMeh
ultimately resulted in an agreeaent that Russia would not
occupy Gallipoli nor enter ineld© the lines of Boulalr as

long as England refrained froa landing troops on th®
European side of the Straits.

AI0O, th® agreeaient was

extended to the Asiatic side, both powers agreeing not
to "occupy that side of th© Straits.
Just before the agreeaents with Russia had been
concluded, England had made another attempt to bring Austria

13. Langer, European Alllaneea. 156.
Diplomatic DocuRente. I 64,
^5.

State Papers. V. 69, 731f.

-85oloser to Kngland.

TIaes® negotiations bad b@#n conducted

by Beaconsfield, b®caus® froa the date of Derby's first
resignation lis bad tak#n or&r searlj all of the first-lln®
For®i^ Office duties. Dsrbj's position was siailar to
that of an under-seer®tarj.

Austria, was urged to plae©

300,000 ®©n into the fl#ld, mi& Join England in &n ideatie
not® to Rasaia.

The eot» would announce that neither

Austrie. nor Britain would attend the proposed coafereo©®
ualess Russia withdrew frota Constantinopl®, or coasented
to aallipoli's being placed In th@ cuetodj of Q-reat Britain
or of other n@«tral powers.Andraasy tried to pttsb th©
plan iQ Austria, biat, b«caus@ of the opposition brought
forward by the ailitarj aleaent, h& failed to eoavinc©
Ms government of the aeeessity of bo bold a aove.^'^
Meantiffi®, Sortchakoff had protested againgt the
selection of ¥l«naa as the slt« of the conferene® and had
forced a postponsaent.

With th@ fleet in th.9 S©« of Mairsora

and the Fussians at S&n Stefano (only ten miles from Con

stantinople), the situetlon was critical.

Rusasll, the

British ^sbassador In 0®many, and Monster, the German
Afflbasaador in Sigland, believed that war was not far off.^®

England urged Germany to arrange for a conference at an
early date, since this was ^the last reoaining chance of
16. Beaconsfield to Queen ¥ictorls, Moneypenny and Buckle,
Life of Disraeli. 1120.
17.

Langer, Suropean Alliancea. 137.

18. Bisifiarek to Schweinitz.
I, 65.

Ser»an Piploaaatie Docqaenta.

-86staining off war.^^^

Blsaarck inforaefi Oortchakoff of tta@s@

facts, and on February 21 It was learned that Kussla would
•^accept Badaa-Bsden as the s®at of the Congress, tout not
the second week of March as ths opening date.^^O
fhottgh England wm trying to avert war bj 0v@rf
mB&ns poBslhl®, sh® cobtinned her allltary preparations,
Ob February 16 Laya-rd was authorized to purchase

*Hbe

cM ®f

ship® of the Turkish fleet.Mothlng caae of this plan,
but th® fleet w&e b«lng coastaatly enlarged by hos® btalldIng. Beseonsfleld, In early March, told his (^eea that
"your Majesty will sooix have a navy superior to all th©
navi-e® uaited of th® world, and, la a short tla®, an sr®y
«OBt

efficient, not contemptible la nuaber, &nd with a

body of Officers superior to th&t of any existing forc®.*^^
An expeditionary fore® was being built on paper, and Lord
lapl«r was appointed ©ossander-in-chief, with General
Wolselay as chi»f of

staff.23

Another plan, elois«ly allied with the program of
ffillltary pr#parsti©ae, was launched at this time.

Aa early

as the precadiag November, Beacoasfleld had toy©d with th®
Idea of acquiring a place, either port of Island, in the
19.

Ibid.. I, 65.

20.

Meaioranduffi toy Billow.

Ibid.. I, 65.

21. Beaconsfield to Queen yictorla.
Life of Dlsr&eli. 1120.
22.

Ibid.

1128.

25.

Langer, European Alllaaces. 136.
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-87Lev&nt.

Wherever the place. It should be one tha.t cotald

be us@d both as a eoaling station and as a troop-aseerebly
point*

It occurred to Beaconefield that h© might a&k#

us© of th© Turkish need for finaaclal asslstaneo to gain
this ©n.<i.

On So-^effiber 22 h© wpot® a letter to Lajard ask

ing hl» to In'v^atigate- the possibility of a British pur
chase of soa# furklih territory •'conduciT® to British
*24

Intereste.

p^j^ehase was aade, but Beaconsfield

M®pt the plan 1b alad'. During th« erltlcal p®rlod at th©
@nd of februarj, the Csblti^t waa inforaed of th# project,
the Brltlgh Cabinet to®w that Russia asd Turkey
were negotiating a p@a,c® treaty, fhere was no knowledge
of th© t0r»s, but ruaor had it that th#y were aor® harsh
than thos© of the aralstio®.

B^acoasfield told his Cabinet

on March 2 that whatsver the teras sight be ther© were
three point® on which England should f@el anxious: *'the
Bilitary position of th® courstry, ae affeetiag its comminleations with th© East"; the flQancistl situation; and the
question of British trade with the Black Sea and 4sla.^5
With these points la alnd, Beaconsfield proposed the
foraatlon of a Mediterranean leagoye, which would include
Italy, dreece, Austria, France, and Ifegland. The object
of the league would be "to eeeure the trade and eoaaunlcatlone of Europe with the last froa the oTershadowing
24.

Moneypetiny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 1123f.

25. Sortheote to Queen Victoria.

Ibid. 1125.

-88lnt«rf@renc© of Russia.At tTals same Cabinet meeting
various places w®r@ dlsoussed in connection with the plan
of occupation as proposed bj Beaconsfield at th® end of
February.

Sine® no d®elalon was possible, a eoffiBitt«®

'*%ras appointed to consult th® fflilltsry and naval authorities
as to th© best course of action.Both projects, that
of a league and that of an occupation, were discusaed in
conjunction with one another in subsequent Cabinet ae@tings,
and so eafflo to be thought of &« on® plan.
When it was learned that Turkey and Russia were
negotiating a peaee treaty, Derby telegraphed to Layard,,
on Petoruary 27, tbat h® should request of the Porte that
sh© infora England, **witti as little delay as possible,* of
the t©r«g toeing TOgotiated.^^ fhe saae request was made
of Scbouvaloff, but thei^ was no response from either
party. On March 3 Turkey, under threat of a Russian
occupation of Congtantlnopls, signed the Treaty of San
Stefano,

As had baezi suspected in England, the teras were

stiffer than those of the swiistlee, though this fact was
not known by the British Cabinet until March 23.^ Even
so, the signing of the treaty caused much anxiety, and
the Cabinet dally worked on many different projects, one
of the most important being that of the Conference. When
26. Ibid. 1125.
27.

Ibid.

1125.

28.

Ibid.

1122.

29.

Hertelet, Map of Europe. 2672-96.

-89Baden-Baden had been proposed as tb® place of aeetlog,
Britain had aecepted th® invitation.However, an. Mareli
7 Austria vitMr®w th« proposal for a Conference to b©
held at Baden-Baden.

She sitagg®st«d that a Congrass toe h®ld

Instead of a Coiif®r@nc®, and that ths Coiig.r«88 be attended
bj the Priffi® MlTiist#rs of th® Powers.

Tills Coagrftas wa®

to take plac® at Berlin at a ti»@ iiaa@d "by th@ Geraan
Cafeinet, which had already declared Itself In fsiror of tbe
plan^.51

gngland declared hersalf in favor of Berlin, but

stated that **no alterstlott in th® condition of things
previouslj established by fr®aty should he acknowledged

slb valid until it £hadj r«c®iv®d th® assent of th®

Powers.

After the Cabinet meeting on March 8 Be&conafield iafora^d
Qu80n Victoria, with rsspeet to Berlin, that every 0overiiaent, except Great Britain h&d saocepted that eity as the
scene of the Congress, and if she declined to be r®pr€fseBt«d
there, the Congress wo«ld probably b» held without her,
•^which would not b©

desirable.

fhls fact, plus th© fact

that Austria assured Eoglaad that she had no secret under
standing with Russia, hastened the decision.

The next day

England foraally accepted Berlin aa the place of the Conference,
but she added that it aust b® understood ^that all questions
30. Ibid. 2668.
State Papera, V. 69, 797f.
32.

Ibid.. ¥. 69, 798.

33.

Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Bisraeli. 1128.

-90dealt with in the Treaty of Peace between Russia aiid Turfesy
should be considered as subject to be discussed in the Con
gress
Otfei®r projeets w®r® discassed in the Cabinet a®®tiiig
of March 8, The M«dit@rr&n@«n l®agw@ plan, for one thing,
was further developsd.

It was d®eid@d., in relation to tli®

occAjpation part of tla« plaa, to appoint a comaaittee to
further ©xaairie tb© barbor of Mjtllene. Pr-aTlously that
plae© had b®©s. s®leet®d, b»at .®» objeetlon was raieed b«caas® of a rocls: in the aain charm«l of the h,artoor.

If tli®

coffiffiitte© could dlsGO¥®r a preferable location thej wer® to
so report.55

in this plan, Derby did not concur, but sine©

no oceupation was ordered b© did not offer his resignation.
As for the rest of the plan, it was decided to launch **th@
L@«gu® with Italy and Q-r««ee alone," if the other M®dit®rr&nean Powers refused to Join.56

Representations wer@ a»d©

to Italy on Mareh 13» but a new Cabinst with Count Corti
as Foreign Minister rejected the British proposal.
Since Italy refused. It seeaed useless to proceed with the
plan, and it was aot aentioiaed again.

However, the origin

al portion, dealing with a new military base, was not dropped.
There was no reaction to th® reservation expressed
in the British coffimunieation to Austria of March 9» so the
-
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-91Foreign Office thought another st@.t@a®nt necessary In
order that the Povsrs toe perfectly clear as to the condit
ions andmr which Britain expected to attead th® Congress
of Berlin. On March 13 Austria was Inforaed that th®
British 0overa««T3.t '^Kust distinctly understand befor# they
@at@r into Coasr@ss that ©very Article in. the Trs&ty to®tw«®ia
Itissla and Turkey will h© placed before the Congress, aot
fiee-essarlly for accept®,no#, but Ib order that it may b#
considered what Articl®® r«quir« aeeeptsnce or concurr®nc«
by th© g@v«ral Powers, and what do not,^^^ th© followiag
day Russia ioforffisd Soglaisd that the Powers would r»c©lve
the t#xt of th® Treaty as soo-a fis It -urns ratified, that
BttBsla had nothing to cottceal.^^ fhls stat®»®!at was not
acoeptabl® to th© British Foreign Office, whleh deslr®d
an unequlTOc&l eoneurrence with its teras. Betw©®n th®
foart@@nth and nla«t®@Bth seveml dispatches wsre exchanged,
and finally, on March 19, Russia stated her position to b®
as follows:
. . . The OoT?©ra»@nt of th®
in lik® »aaner
»s the other drest Power®, reserved to th»as©lve8
at the Congress their full liberty of appreciation
and sctioB. this saa® liberty, which she did not
dispute to oth®r@, Raasia clai®ed for herself.
Mow, it would be to restrict her, if, alofi© Among
all th® Powers, Russia contracted a preliminary
®tigage«®nt."^0

3®*

State Papera, V. 69, 800.

39.
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-92Thls stat©ffient, too, was considered as evaslv®, so, on
March 21, Derbj Inforsed Schouraloff that England adherred
to the position alre&dj defined toy them.^^

Thus, Russia

and England w©r® deadlocked, fh© fata of the Congress
•depended upon tb® decisions of th@a® two powers.

Of cours®,

in England it was f®lt that tb@ Congress depended upon the
Russian r®ply, sin-c© th-#r© was no dlspoeition on the part of
th© British Qaremment to mske any concession. Th.® cjera&a.
Aobassador in London, who had he@n keeping hie l3ov®ni®®i4t
w®ll Inforffied, described th© situation as It existed on
March 22:
Sine® ths BrltiBh sld© adaita that a aajority
decision by the Congress eaaaot In ®ffeet be
binding, I really fall to .ss® how the Russian
'Liberie d'nction', which Princ® Qortchskoff
®«ntlan© in ©very d^spateh, ev#ry telegram,
can possibly b« disturbed. But it appears
Inevitable that th® Congress will be called
upon to mx&mlne th® Treaty now to b© subaitted
to it in the light of former treaties sanctioned
by the Powers, if It is to s«ttl© the Eastera
Question. That is all that England demands,
Prlnc# Sortchskoff's pretsnslon to subttit for
discussion only thoa# points, calling. In Ruesla'a
opinion, for alt®ration, in thd forffi«r Treaties,
Is quit© untenable,^2
Ratifications exchanged, the Powers received (March
23) the full t»xt of th® Tr«aty of San Stafano.

t«r«B

war© such ae would not b« accepted by either Austria or
England. It is not necessary to analyze that treaty,
because the major points were repudiated by the Trusty of
41.

Ibid.. ¥. 69, B05,

42.

Geraan Dlploaatlc Docugents. I, 82.

-93B®rlln. HoweverJ sine® th© British attitude toward tb®
treaty is important In this work, B®aeonsfield's description
follows;
The Treaty of San Stefano cospl^tely abrogates
what Is known as Turtcej-iu-Europ®; It abolishes
th© dominion of the Ottoaan Empire In Europe;
it er0at@s a larg© Stat® which, under th« n&me
of Bulgaria, is inhabited by many races not
Bwlgarlans. This Bulgaria go«s to the shore®
of the Black S®a aad a^lmea th® port# of that
s©a; it 0xt@nds to th# eoa®t of th® l®g®an and
appropriates th© port© of that eoast. Th#
treaty proirides for th« gov^raasnt of this rj®w
Bulgaria, under a priac# who l8 to be selected
by Russia; its adalnlstr»tion Is to b© org&ni3©<l
and supervised by a co®mis®«ry of Russia; and
this n#w Stats Is to b« garrison®^, I say for
«n Indefinit© period, but at all ©vents for
two years eertsin, by Eu8sia,^3
Th© only ©ff«ct of th« r»v#latioii of th® teriss of th®
tr©aty upon England wsa to stiffen the determination to
csontlnus a policy of reslstanc® to Russia. Plana, long
aiaturlng, were soon to be iiitro<Ju®«d in the Cabinet.
In the British not® of the twenty-first, the follow
ing question had been directed to Bussla;

Was the Qoverti-

®ent willing to treat the cofflatunloation of the entlr©
Treaty to th© various Power© ^&a a placing of th© Treaty
befor® th© Congress, lis order that th® whole Traaty, in
its relation to ©xlstlng fr@att®®, alght be ©xaialned ami
considered by th© Congressto affiraative answer,
which could have broken the deadlock, was hoped for but
not expected by Beaconsflaid. On March 27, one of the aost
43, Moneypenny and Buokl©, Life of Disraeli. 1130.
44. State Papers. V. 69, 805.
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©-ventful dajs of tMa period, the Russian reply was deliver
ed.

The flaal paragraph stated that the Russian Go'v«r»»ent

"leaves to th® other Powers the liberty of raising such
q\i©stlons at the Gongress &a they alght think sultabl#
to discuss, and reserves to Itself the liberty of accepting
or not accepting th® dlseusslon of th$se

questions.

Saturally, B®mcoiisflsld eonsldered this to b« a eategorlsal
refusal. His pr#par&tloQ for th® Cabinet aeetlng of that
day is wall revealed in th© few words h® 8.Mr#s5sed to
Hardy before th® seetlag;
'fhe critical time ha» arrived wh®n wa aust deelar©
th© ©aergeney. ¥® are drifting lato war. If we
ar© bold and deteralnad w® shall secure peac#,
and dlctat® It® conditions to Europ®. . . W®
have to maintain th® Eaplr®, amd secure peac®j
I think w® can do both.*^^
At th© Cabln®t aeetlng, Seaconsfleld proposed that
a procla»atlon declarlag an eae-rigency b© Issued,a
a.ee#ssary step, b@cau8# th© Reserves could be called
o«t only In eas@ of Immlneiit national danger or of great
©ffiergency,^ and h« wlehad the Reserves to be called.
fh« Indian {ksverajtent was to be directed "to send out
a considerable force, thro' the Suez

Canal.*^9

They should

^5. Ibid.. V, 69, 806f.
46. Moneypemy and Bwckle, Life of Pisraell. 1153.
IMd. 1136.
48. SeraaR Dlploaatic Pocuaeats. I, 86.
49, Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 1134.

-95O0capy Cyprus and Scan<5erooa,50 fo^ thm purpose of co®.«mndiag ®th© P«rslan Gulf and all tlie country round Bagdad,**
and n«utrall!5lng
Ar»@nia."51

Russien conquests srtd Influeoe© In

Only D«rby obJ@et®4 to this thr®®-proaged

proposal, H® reslgn-ed on Mareh 28.52
Both Beacotisfield and the Queen were happy'- about
th© resignation, tii® Qaeen regardlag it as "an unmlxM
blessing,"53

the decisions of tb@ CaMnet, except for

calling out th® Rs®®rT«s, wer® k®pt sacret, so th@ p®opl®
thought that Derby ixsd r@8igB©a on this isaue alon®. Thia
was unfortuaate for Derby, but eireusstaBe@s w®r® sucfe thut
notklng could to® done about it. Surely the other deelsioos
of th« C&bln®t ©ould aot b®. sad® 'knowa, bec&uae their suee®BS d#p®rii®€ upon s©er®cy,

Mucto later, Derby hB.4. hie say,

At th® end of March, it lo0k»^ v«ry «uch as if th®
plan for a Coagr®ss had failed.
iffl»in®nt.

War was thought to b@

Only B®aeoa8fleld f®lt assured. He, as & matter

of fact, quit® accurately pr«<aict«<t the futur® {mlamln^
only the tiai® ©loaeat) whsn h® informed Queen Victoria that

''Russia will, in; all probability, laaediately coaaeac® a
direct negotiation with your Majesty's GoTena»ent.**5^

50.

Ibid. 1136.

51.

Ibid. 1134.

52. Derby's resignation is discussed at great length in
Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Slaraeli.
53. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Oisraeli. 1135.
5^. Ibid. 1132.

-96Lord Salisbury was appointed to fill th® vacancy
created by Derby's resignation, lie, iamedlately on, t&felng
over the Foreign Minister's post, worked upon the draft of
a elreular dispatch, contiaulng until thr®® th® next aoraing.55 B«acoTj®fi@ld shared with Salisbury the reaponelbillty
for the forffiulatloji of this lemsthy document.

The Gabluet,

•fter a critical ®xa«inati©n> g&*e it® concurreae© to th®
content,

56 vhich was briefly as follows; a two aonth suieaary

of the British Ti@g©tlstions r©l»tlve to the proposed Congress|
a defining of th© British position relativ® to th© Congress
as b®ing a demand that every provision of th® Treaty of 8&n
Stefano b« subsittad to tha Congress; a orltleis® of th®
creation of a. large Bulgaria, a©gl©ct of Greek rights,
forcibl® s»izur© toy Russia of B#s®srabl&, atequilPttions; in
Asia Minor, and the virtual deatructloa of furkleh political
independenc®; and finally:
But neither the interests which H«r Majesty's
Qovsmsent ar@ specially bound to guard, nor
th® well-being of the regions with which th®
Treaty deals, would be consulted by the &sseffitollng
of a Congress whose deliberations were to be re
stricted by such reservations as those which
hsv© been laid down by Prince Sortehakow in his
»©at recent commnieation.S?
55. S«ton-W«t»on, Britain in Europe, 535. Lord Cranbrook
replaced Salisbury as the Indian Secretary. Moneypenny
and Buckle, Life of Bjgraell. 115^.
56. Beaconsfleld to C^een Victoria.
Life of Dlaraen, 1154.

Moneypenny and Buckle,

57. Hertslet, Map of Sui^pe« 2698-2706.
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"97TaiB ®xpllclt declaration -warned all Burop® that

England was firia in her policy and would not yield to
Russia.

Schouvaloff, who believed that there was no longer

any chanc© to avert war, d@llver«d the Russian reply which
was not so worded as to alleviate the precarious situation.
It eofflplained that England revealed, onlj that which she
did not desire^ and smgseat®d that Salisbury

good

©nottgh" to »ake known that which England desired, **with
a view to s,rriv© at a clear understanding upon th# situ
ation.**58

Salisbury ©aid that h® was not ready to present

th® English

59 jt sem® to have b@@n the intention

demand®.

o-f B®aconsfield and his Foreign Minister to wait for Russia
to approach England, s sov# which they were strongly anti
cipating.^®
While they w®r® waiting, ther® was danger in th©
proxiaitf of the British Fleet and the Russian troops.
England decided, th«r#fore, to suggest to Qeraany that she
lend her influence to the solving of this delicate problem.

Salisbury had reason to b«lleve that Germany would be happy
to act as mediator, because Hdnster, the Qei^an Aabassador
In London, had often spoken to hi® of the "danger to peace
arising from the neighbourhood of the British fleet and
58. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2?0?.
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60.
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-98tfa© Russian army near th© Maraora.'*^^

H® tbougbt that

Monster's Insistence was "laore than sceidental** and aeant
that Bisisarck wished **for peace and therefor© for the ces
sation of this dangsrous proximity.On April 6 Salisbury
Informed Russell thatt
Our fleet Is In the Marmora because the Russians
ar© at Comstantiaople, The Ruasiaos would say
th^ir aray was at Constantinople because our
fleet is la the Maraora. Sach is deterred froa
b&ing first to propose a simultaneous retreat hy
f®«r that ^nhs.nc®6. pretensions would th®r«hy b«
encouraged on. th® other sid«. A frlsndly sug
gestion fro® Prlne® BisffiareJk to "both that, pending
negotiations, the fleet should retire below th©
Dard&n©ll®s, aad th® army retire th® saa® number
of miles froa Coiistantinopl#, would evade the
difficulty.63
Bismarck f®ll In with this aehe««, and, on April 9, proposed
the following coura® of action to th© two Powers; '*'The
British Fleet to leave Constantinople and to repass th©
Dardmelles;—ti^ Rusaian forces to retire fro® the Bosphorus
to a dlstsne® equlYalest to the tia© required to relnstat®
the British Fle@t in its present position.'

Both Powers

agread to the proposal, but neither would moT« first.

A long

discusaion eaaued "conccmlng th® nuasbar of days r«qulr»d
to bring th© British fleat and th® Rusaian Ar»y back to
th®lr respecti-?® positions la front of Constantlnopi©.*^5
61. Salisbury to Russell.
62.

Buckle, The Letters, 612.
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63. Ibid. 612.
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-99fli® result was that neither the ariaj nor fleet were with
drawn until after the Congress of Berlin.

This factor more

than any other contributed to the extreai® tension during
April, May, and the first part of June.

two aoves, indicative of British preparedness and
determination, were made during April. First, Parlla®®nt
voted to call out th® Reser-ye, the Bouse of Lords without
a division, and the House of Cossmons by the ssjority of
310 to 64.^^ Second, on April 17, it was announced that
7000 Indian troops were being sent to Malta.These troops
actually arrived there before th© end of May,^®

These moves,

occurring so shortly after Salisbury's circular dispatch,
which in itself iapreesed Europe greatly, settled aay doubts,
still-exlstsat on the Continent, as t-o British fimness of
policy.

Beaconsfield'8 snticipation of the prestige value

of the Indian troops had been one of the chief purposes in
originating the move.
cision, he had said:

On April 12, prior to the final de
**After all the sneers of our not

having an.y great military force, the iffiagination of the
Continent will be much affected by the first appearance of
what they will believe to be an inexhaustible supply of
Ben.fhere is no doubt that the determined policy of

Britain, as revealed by the circular dispatch, the calling
66.

Moneypenny and Buefele, Life of Siar&ell. 1155.
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-100of the Resepvei &nd the deplojffl@nt of the Indian troops,
greatly influenced Russia.
concessions.

In May that Power »ad« hag®

believed England unprepared and un

willing for action, she may well h&vm saiatained a ®or@
stubborn adherence to h@p peaci® treaty with Turkey.
British policy, however, was act the only factor
contributing to the eventual Russian corscesslons.

Russia

had hoped that toy coming to aa agreenent with Austria
she could effectively Isolat© England, and thus force that
Power to modify its demands. Igriatieff, th« successful
diplomat of the Constantinople Cohfereace, exerted hl»
greatest effort toward th®s« end® at ¥l©nm*

H® discovered

a resolut© adversary in Aadrassy, who placed a high prie©
upon Austrian co-operation.

Briefly stated, that price

consisted of &-;.liM%&tion upon Moatenegrin gains to th«
®ast, the amlntenaac® of a corridor between Serbia and
Montenegro, and the exclusion of Macedonia from the new
Bulgaria.

without

Austrlati predoalaanc© 1h BoBnla-Herzegovlna want

70 Clearly—the Austrian aim was to keep th»

saying.

route to Salonika opan, and rasarv© that region for Austrian
©cononaic axpansion.

Ignatleff considered the price much

too high, so, since he could not laduc® Andrassy to lower
it, the Russian attempt failed.
felt helplessly isolated,

It was Russia who now

fhe fhree Eaperor's League still

existed, but It provided Russia with little actual support.
There was no point in approaching Blsaaarck, for,ion February
70.

Langer, Suropeaia. Alliances. 143.

-10119, he had revealed his position in a speech to the Reichs
tag. On that day he had s&id, '**what®-v«r will bring a^ut
a Chang© 1b th® stipulstlons of 1856 will bav® need, undouhtedly, of th® sanction of th@ signatory powers.*"?^
fhls aeatit, of cours©, that Bisaarck, thomgh remaining
ffly»path®tic to Ruasia, would n@T®r actively support her
against Sngl&ad.
England

kia.@w

only that Ignatieff and Andrsesy were

negotiating, not the nature of the aegotiatlons nor the
results, Y®t it was @asy for her to guess at th® natur®»
and, rsalising th@ danger of an agreeajsnt between Austria
and Russia, she was uneasy. During April th© Foreign Offlc#
sought in vain to ©statollsh to®tt#r illations with Austria.
Finally, ob th# tw©ati#th, Salisbury ask®d Aadrassy if h®
would b© willing *to insist on the restriction of th© new
Bulgaria to th® region north of th© Balkan

Mountain®,

Aadi^asiy did aot eomait hl®««lf on. tb® question of th«
Bulgarian southern houadary, but defined his prograa in

a aiessor&nduaj to th© British Foreign Office. It was sueh
th© saffi© as the one previously euboiitted to Igaatleff,
except that Bosnia was diseuesed at greater length.

Many

reasons were advanced to explain why Austria regarded the
occupation of that province as Indispensable.
71.
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Since th®

-102two countries could not ag^ree on Bulgaria, negotiations
csasM for a tiae, to b@ resumed later and sucesssfullj
concluded.
In ©arly May, after waiting longer than a aonth,
England finally received word that Russia was desirous ©f
coming to an a.gr®effi®nt, so that th© Songress could b@
eon¥©n@d.'73

Schou^aloff left England on Maj 8 with a

knowledge of British wishes relative to th© r^-vlslon of
the Treaty of Ssa Stefsno: (1) Bulgaria had to be reduced
in sis®, (2) Ruaala'i annexation# in Asia Minor had to be
reconsidered, and {3) England desired to hav« the Straits
opened co«pl#t©lj.'^^

Schouvaloff subaitted this list of

British dasandB to his aovamsent, which, because of th®
financial lapOBSlbllity of prosecuting a war with England,
was. desirous of achieving a peaceful aettlesasnt.

The Tsar

told Schouvaloff **to »ake us© of his influenc® with Blsfflarek
to g®t th® congress arranged for and to ©ff«ct an agre®»®nt
with England which would Isolate

Austria."75

Schouvaloff returned to England on May 23, prepared to
accept ^all th© »odifications of the Treaty of San Stefano,
except on© proposed by England, referring to the military

73. Loftus, giploaatlc Reainlaceneee, II, 251. Loftus
claims credit for hairing brought about the Russian init
iation of talks with Sallebury, but see Moneypenny and
Buckle, Life of Dlar&elJL, 1160, where Blsaarck Is credited
with th© original suggestion, fyler, European Powers. In
a footnote on page 103, states his preference for the
latter view.
74. Langer, European Alliances > 146.
75.
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-103occupation of Ruaella by Turkey,The Cabinet was un
willing to refuse to go into th® Conference on this atoor
point, and was ready to accept th^ Russian, concessional
but Bsftconsfield was slow in sanctioning the Cabinet •view,
li© was waiting for information fro® Conetantinopl© relatlT©
to a plan being urged upon Turkey. When, this wa,s r«c®iired,
h© author!a@d Salisbury to eonclud® the Britisfe-Russiafi
sgreeaent. Salisbury and Scbouvaloff signed it on May
Engird Had# a few ainor coneessions in th© agr©®»@nt, but non® that could compare with thos@ made by Russia.
The latter agreed to a coaplste revision of the Saa Stefauo
Bulgaria along tb® following lines: Bulgaria wse to b» ex
cluded froiB the Ji.#gean,; tbe western frontiers were to b®
redrawn; tb©r« w@re to b« two provinces rather than one,
with the Balkan rang® as tbe delimitation; only tbe north
ern proviQC-e would hav® politics! autoiiosy; the Turkish
right of military action in the southern province was not
finally decided upon, but was left to the Gongresa.

In

addition, it was agre®d that-England ^ould not coatest
Russian acquisition of Bessarabia; Russia would return
Bayazid (In Asia) to Turkey; and she would keep Kar» and
Batouffi.'^®

Concerning th© Asiatic portion of the agree

ment England used these words in th© aeaoranduo:
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-104In consenting aot to contest th© desire of the
Eaperor of Russia to occupy th® port of B&towa
and to guard his coaquests in Jtreenla, th© Govarament of Her Majestj €o not hid® fvom thessel-?®®
that grave dangers—seaacing the tranquillity of
th® populations of Turkey-ln-Asla—aay result
in the futur« by this exteaston of the Eusslaa
frontisr. But Ker Msjeety's OoT@rEi«@»t ar® of
opinion that the dyty of protecting th« Ottoaan
Eisplr© froa this danger, whieh heaeeforth will
r«st largely i(d*a.ne aeaur® special®) upon England,
CBM h© effected without e*po8lng Europe to th©
calamities of m, fr«sh war.<9

Th@ informstloa for which Besconsfleld had h«#n
waiting b«for© authorizing the conclusiOB of th# BritlshSusslan agr@«iBeat concerned th« phras® "d'une aesure sped ale"
contaln«d in the atoov® w&mlBg to Kussla.

In all probability ,

B«aconsfleld would hair® m«tgotlat@d further with Russia befor®
signing th© agreeasnt If th© news fro® Ck>nst&ntlnopl® had
been that th® Bsgotlatlons for th® "speelal aeasur®" had
failed. This a@s®ur@ was th® final dSTelopment of th®
proposal of March 27, whleh called for the occupation of a
place of arms in th® Letaat. By May 5, Cyprus, which Beaeonsfleld described aa "the key of Western Asia," had been
chosen a» the place to occupyLayard was laformed, oa
May 10, of the British proposals to Turkey conceraing the
occupation of Cyprus..

He consenced negotiations lattedlately,

but not with a Tiew of concluding them until he was further
Instructed.

On May 25, when it was evident that Russia

would insist on keeping far# and Batoua, Laysrd sub»itted
79.
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-105the draft agre©ffi©nt to

The secret Convention

b®tw©en Great Britain and Turkey wa.8 sifted on June 4. it
provided that Englaaid would join turkey in arms if Russia,
at Bo»e future tia©, were to take possession of any sore
Turkish territories in 4sla; that turkey would institute
reforffls in Asia; and that England would occupy Cyprus.®^
An annex to the Convention established the conditions under
which areat Britain would occupy Cyprus, the aost import
ant of which was the stipulation that England would pay
Turkey a certain annual .sum. With this Convention, which
was to be effective only as long as Russia retained Ears
and Batoua, Beaconsfield thwarted any Russian plana for
farther advancement in Asia. The concession to Russia
concerning Asiatic aequlBitlona did not result in the developaent of a new threat to the British Eapire.
The last of the secret, pre-conference agreements,
entered into by Sngland in order that she ®ight enter the
Conference with a reasonable chance of achieving her aiaa,
was signed on June 6 with Austria.

Andrassy, learning of

the Schouvaloff-Sallebury negotiations and fearing that
its results would be injurious to Austria, suggested that
he was ready to support the English plan for Bulgaria
which previously had been rejected,

Austria would ask

81. Laager, European Alliances. 148, See Tyler, European
Powers. footnote on 105, for an explanation of the document,
dated May 30, which is in Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2717-20.
It 1« reasonably certain that this document was merely an
official follow-up of previous correspondence.
82.
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-106onlj that Sagland support her designs upon Bosnia-Herzegovina
and plans for

Montenegro.®5

bj May 26 tbe British Cabinet

bad, agresd to support tostrla **in all her declared point®
of policy, @x0®pt in insisting, tbat the Montenegrins
([should] not have th® port of totivs^ri."^^ The Cabinet
did not think that England could mmke a "caeua belli** of
eueh a question. Th© teras of tb© agreement provided that
England, at tb® Congress, would support Austrian proposals
relsti"?© to Bosnla-Hersegovinft. Both Austria and England
would attempt to liait Russian occupation south of tb©
Danub® to six ®onths., passage tbroug-b Rumania to nln© ffiontbs,
and occupation to a force of 20,000 Russian troops. In the
southern Bulgarian province, tb© Sultan should ba^e ^adequate
polltleal and ailitarj supreaacy to guard against inTasions
or insurrections.*' The Balkan rang® was to b© the southern
boundary of the northsm province of

Bulgaria.^5

This

mgreement concluded British secret dlplo»acy, England was
ready and anxious to go to Berlin, for success was clearly
visible.
England won th® battle of diplomacy which was waged
during February, March, April and May.

three aaln fac

tors contributing to this victory were: (1) the patience and
skill of British dlplofflats; (2) a British show of force; and
83. Langer, European Mllances, l48f,
84. Beaconsfleld to %i»en Victoria. Moneypenny and Buckle,
Life of Disraeli. 1166f.
85. Langer, European Alliances, 149.

-107(3) Russia's Isolated position.

The diplomatic victory

consisted of gaining valuable Agreeoents with thre® coun
tries. With Russia, England gained an agreement disposing
of the major problems to b© presented at the Congress,
England*s chief concern was th« large Bulgaria created by
the Treaty of Saa St»fano.

Russia agreed to reduce Bulgaria

in size and to dlfld® th« San Stafano Bulgaria into two pro
vinces, onlj the northern one to have a large measure of
autonomy.

With Austria, England reached an agree»ent that,

in, effect, secured the British gains in the Russian agreeaent,
and added to those gslns with reapeet to the southern part
of Bulgaria.

Austria would support a British demmnd th&t

Turkey be allowed to have troops in that provlnee.

With

Turkey, England mad® an agreement that nullified the
Russian gain in Asia. England was to occupy the Island
of Cyprus in return for a guarantee of Turkish Aslatle
poasesslons against say future Russian attacK.

In addition

to theae three agreeaents, England had won the right to
enter the Congress on her own terast all the stipulations
of the Treaty of San Stefano were to be submittsd to the
Congress. This British deaand had been voiced for the first
time on January 15.

During the long period of negotiation#,

the British statesmen never lost patience.

They were rewarded

by Russia's eventual acceptance of this deaand.

Five sep

arate actions coaiprlsed Britain's show of force, the second
contributing factor to the English dlploffietlc victoryi (1)
sending the fleet to Constantinople; (2) voting a ©redlt of

-.106-

six ffillllon poimds; (3) enlarging the anay and navy; (4)
calling out the Rsaer've; and (5) ordering 7,000 Indian
troops to Malta, The combined effect of tbes© aeasures was
to convincs not only Russia but all of Surop© that 0r«st
Britain would fight rather than submit to a Russian settle
ment of the Eastern Question. This, in turn, contributed
to Russia's position of isolation^ the third factor res
ponsible for the British diplomatic -victory.

Blsmarcl: would

not Join Russia in a military opposition to England in %
m&tter which he b#ll©vsd to be relatively unimportant.

Th©

conflict of Austrian and Russian interests in the Balkans isad®
Russian Isolation inevitable, Bismarck had to choose between
Austrian and Russian interests.

He chose the latter, but

«Rd®avored to conoiliate both. The Russian concessions to
England resulted from her inability to proceed against that
Power alone.

The diplomatic victory, won by England at little

cost, enabled the British delegation to enter the Congress of
Berlin with an advantage over th© other delegations.

CHAPTER ¥I
"PEACE WITH HONOR'*
As th© negotiations wltb Russia, Austria, and Turkey
w«r® approachlag a conclusion, th@ British statesisen began
considering the choice of aa Ingllsh delegation to th® Congr»8a of Berlin. S&llsburj urged Beaconsfield to attend,
b#c»uee, ainc© Blssarck was requesting that it ^'tos a Congress
•without ^ referenduES,** bo one other than Beaconsfield was
qualified as the CM#f Bleftip@%«flt4&ryj :Oh1j h«-.could "d®ei«r«
with authority th® policy of England.Little urging was
necessai^, because B®acon8fi®ld deemed th© Congresa to be of
such importanc© that it would require his being there. If
only for th© first few days.

Queen Victoria, however, was

reluctant to persslt her aged Prime Minister to go as far aa
Berlin—his health was aot good. If the Congress were to
convene at ''Brussels, The Hague, or Paris," she would urge
that he go,^ Yet, when the Prime Minister expressed hie de
sire for the appolntaent,3 she felt she could not refuse hla.
1. Beaconsfleld to Queen Victoria.
Life ot Maraeli, ll66f.

Moneypenny and Buckle,

2. Queen Victoria to the Prince of Wales. Lee, Kin?;^
Edward VII. I, 434.
3. Beaconsfleld to Queen Victoria.
Life of Disraeli. 1178f.
-109-

Moneypenny and Buckle,

-110The Congrese wa© too far away, though, and sh© would be
worrieds twt not because of the quality of reprdsentation.
She wrote her Minister that no one "could carry out our
vl®w8, proposals, etc., except M®, for no on® ha® such
w#lght and such power of coaelllatlag men and no one such
flr®n@ss or has a stronger sens® of the honour and interests
of his Sovereign and country.®^

Beaconsfleld, Salisbury,

and Russell, th® British 4aba«s«d,or at Berlin, were ap
pointed by the Cablaet, on 3un& 1, to act as Plenipotentiaries.5
Finally, after four dlploBscy-flllsd aonths during
which war could hav© broken out at any tlae, the last re
maining obstacle to a Congress was removed with the signing
of the British-Russian Rgr«@»«nt.

Apprised of this f&ct,

Blsaerck sent invitations to the Powers, slgn.atori@s of th©
treaties of 1856 &nd 1871.

laaae^dlately on receiving th#

carefully worded Invitation on June 3, Salisbury notified
irtnster, th© Q®r»an Asbassador in London, that Great Britain
accepted th© invitation, it being understood that the "Powers
in accepting this invitation sesent to the terms stated**
therein,^

This reservation secured to Bngland the right to

withdraw froa the Congress if all the "stipulations of the
Preliminary Treaty of San Stefano* were not submitted there.
4.
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-111Thus, England would enter tlje Congress on the terms whloh
she had foraulat??d in th® very beginning. Thle diplomatic
•«-lctorj was an advantage which undoubtedly Bsaconefleld
intended to utilize to the greatest extent possible.
Beaeonsfleld's poor health caused hi® to plan care
fully for the coffling Congress. Suspecting that his endurance
would fall, he intended to roaaln. In Berlin for only the
first and isost Iffiportant aeetinge, leaving it to Salisbury
^to complete all the details,"®

In order that the British dele

gation could work harmoniously, Salisbury sent instructions
to Russell Inforalng hla of "^th© general principles upon
vhich ... a settleaient should be affected"; certain Artic
les of the Treaty, such as the arrangeaent of frontiers for
Serbia and Montenegro and the problea of Bosnla-Hersegovlna,
would not be considered as of primary interest to England,
but would nevertheless require "the vigilant attention of
the Plenlpotentiarlee'*; England, In treating this type of
question, would '^support any legitimate proposals tending
to benefit and strengthen the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and,
as far as possible, would work toward securing "the welfare
and the good govemBsent of the populations concerned"; in
such matters, however, Russia would not be opposed so
strongly ass to break up the

Congress.9

fhe points of ®aJor

iaportance were laid down in the agreements with Austria
8. Beaconsfield to Queen Victoria.
Life of Disraeli. 1178f.
9. state Papers. ¥. 69, 832-35.
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-112and Russia, so that It wse unnecessarj to discuss ttoe® with
Russell. With respect to lars and Batoum,

though Eng

land had conceded this point to Russia in their seeret
agreeiaeiit, England would stronglj urge at th# Congress that
Russia surrender these acquisitions.^'^ It would be b®n@flclsl to hav@ **Interviews with all th© chief statesffien** toefore th« first a®@tlng of th# Congress, In order that Beaconsfield would be well rested and up to the task of conversing
with Europe's leading statesmen, he would allow four days
for th© trip, and »t least one for interviews.^3Leaving England on Juae 8, Beaconsfleld traveled
oalj as far as Calais the first day, Brussels the second
day, Cologne the third day, and Berlin the fourth day, June
11.^^

Almost on arrival he was inforsied that Blsnarck de

sired a personal ajeeting.

Beaeonsfleld, delighted that

Bisfflsrck'a plan fell in with his own, went to the CJerman
Chancellor, fhat which he learned in the interview is beat
described in his own words:
The interview was not una&tisfactory, and Lord
BCe&consfleldJ arrived at the cosclusloa that the
Prince was anxious for a peaceful settlement. He
suggested to Lord B(eaconsfieldl that, as, probably.
President of the Congress, he should, in his initial
speech on Thursday, group the questions according to
their importance, and that he should like to begin
with Bulgaria, as perhaps the aost weighty. 'Tho'
we need not avoid a single article of the Treaty of
San Stefano, if we took the® in their regular order,
10. Beaeonsfleld to Queen Victoria, Moneypenny and Buckle,
Life of Disraeli. 1180.
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-113aany days, and the freshness of the Congress, woiild
b@ expended on siaish Insignificant topics as th© port
of Antlvari, **« eswm. In a rockj" and th® borders
of Montenegro and S#rvla, and places of which no
one ever hoard b®for« this war. 411 these concern
Austria and h® wished to B&rre Austria, but Austria
is Bot going to war with Russia. Lst us therefor®
deal with the great things that concern England,
for England is quite ready to go to war with Rusais,*^^'
On the day before th® Congress was to convene Beaconsfield talked with th® ®or« Iffiportant Pleni|>oteritlarl@8 as
well as with certain a©ah®rs of the aersan S o b l l i t y . S a c h
aeetlng was utilized hy Beaco^nsfield in studying th® «®fi with

who« h® would ha-?® to deal at th® Goaf®r®nce table.

He trl@d

to ftseertain ®thalr purposes and their pow®r to ©nforc© theiB.**^^

Th®e® a#n asking up the delegations, to the Gongr#ss w#r@ for
th© fflost part th© leading statesmen of Europe, Th® English
representatives are already known. Fro® Gtermany earn® Blsfflarcfe, Hoh@nlohe, and Bftlow; Russia, Cksrtchakoff, Schouv&loff,
and Oubril; Austria, Andrasey, Kar^lyi, and Hayaerle; France,
Waddlngton, Saint-Vellier and Deeprez; Italy, Cortl and
Launay; and froaa Turkey, Caratheodorj Pasha, Sadullah Bey,

and Meheaet All Pasha.The three men who played the moat
Important roles at the Congress were Blsroarck, Beaconsfleld,
and Schouvaloff.

The latter two sen carried the greatest

load in diplomatic fencing, and the former was kept busy
13. Beaconsfield to Queen Victoria. Ibid. 1187.
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16. Langer, Suropeap 4111aaees. 152f.
Powers. 107.

Tyler, European

-114trylng to conelllate tha one or th@ other. Gortchakoff
seeaed perfectly willing to withdraw from the heated con
troversy and allow Schouvaloff to fight on in defeat, for
defeat it was alaost certain, to b®,

Andraesy, whil© the

ffiost Interesting and colorful person at th® Congress, was
not Influential and was satisfied to act as Beaconsfield's
echo.

Th© other men, although they were leading wen In

their own countries, played a minor role.

Soto, like Salis

bury, had to work hours at th® boring details and be satis
fied with a strictly secondary role.

All in all, th© assea-

blag® was aa great, man for aan, aa any aiaiilar one in
previous history.
At two o'clock in the afternoon on June 13 the many
Pleaipotentisrieis assefflhled at RadislTill

Palace.

opening the Congress, Bisaarck said that the object of the
assembly was to discuss freely th® Treaty of San Stefano.
There were no objections—England's policy had prevailed.
The meiBbers elected Bismarck aa President of the Congress,
and he proceeded to act in the role of the "honest broker,*
a phrase coined by hla in his speech of February 19 when
he had said that he would be willing to play the part of
the "honest broker" In a meeting of the Powers concerning
the Eastern Question.^®

Blsaarck outlined the order in

which the problesis would be discussed, placing Bulgaria
1?« Beaconsfield to Queen Victoria. Moneypenny and Buckle,
Life of Disraeli. 1189f.
18. Tyler, European Powers. 98.

-115flrst, on the agenda.

Beaconsfleld followed Bismarck with

th© sugR©stlon that the Congress attack the probl®® pre
sented by th© proximitj of the British fle«t and the Russian
army.

He represetited this situation as a serious threat to

the peace and

danger to the success of the Congress.

It was suggested that this was not s matter for the Congress,
bat for direct negotiation between Russia, and England.

Though

an attempt -was «0,d© to eff©ct a withdrawal of th® fleet and
the arfflj, th® situatioa was not resolved.

Several weeks

were to pass before the fl^mt »t»&«©d out of th® Sea of
M»r»ora.
fhe second weetlmg of the Congress was not echaduled
to tak® plsce until June 17.

Work, however,'"didMiQtceesse

on t.hls account, and although the week ®nd was filled with

social eveats and iiaportant receptions, many important
meetings occurred. Be&consfield ®et with Bisffiarek, Caratheodory Pasha (the first Turkish Plenipotentiary), and
Schouvaloff.20

The aaeetlng with SchouTaloff, on June 14,

warned Beaconsfield of «. cosing struggle in the Congress.
Schou-raloff said that Russia would not permit the Sultan
to employ his araty in the southern province of Bulgnrla,
A rather heated discussion ensued, from which each party
gained a knowledge of the determination of the other.
Nevertheless, Beaconsfield emerged from the meeting without
19.

Langer, European Alliances. 153.

20. Beaconsfield to Queen Victoria.
Life of Disraeli, 1191f.

Moneypenny and Buckl®,
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loss of confidence. In reporting the Interview to Queen
Victoria, he stated simply that th© demand "will be giv«n
up by St. Petersburg.
June 14 turned out to be a very disturbing day for
the English dlplo»»ts» because th® Glob® published the con
tents ofthe British-Russian- secret-agr©e»©iit.?2'- The .Eng-lish, not toowing th® oth«r half of British diploisacyi.e.
th© Cyprus conY®ntlon, w®r# aueh perturbed concerning th®
English concessions to Russia la the portion of the agree
ment dealing with Asia, lor did they knot? of Bsaconsflaid'®
intentions to attempt, vis th® other Powers, to indue®
Russia to giT© Kars and Batoua back to Turkey.

Th« positloa

of th© Qovemaeiit was certainly awkward at this iEO»«nt;
it could not r©Y©al the text of the Cypms contention,
nor could it prosise that, st th© proper ffiosent, English
influence would again be brought against Russia in th©
Asian question.

Beaconsfield and his aids in Berlin had

to suffer some ©abarrassing aoanents, even though the effect
on the other Plenipotentiaries of th© Qlobe article (June 14)
was not really astounding.
surprised.

Maijy, of course, were not e^en

Neverthelees, sofflsthing had to be done, at least

in the opinion of th© Cabinet Members in Snglsnd.
was instituted, and the guilty party was found.

A search

Mr. Marvin,

employed at the Foreign Office as a copyist, had sold the
21. Ibid. 1191.
22. fyler, European Powers, 105.

glob® is a London newspa|>er.

-11?Infor-fflatlon to tfe® newspaper.Marvin was prosecuted In
eomplianc© with an order froie Salisbury, but this aove,
n&turallj, had no calaing effect upon the English populace.
It Is interesting to note how such Beaeonsfield*s view dif
fered from Salisbury's In respeet to the prosecution of
Marvin.

He wrote to Sir Staffard lorthoote, his Chancellor

of th® Exchequer, expressing his extreae perturbation In
words that, coming fro® hlis,, had « husoi^us ring;
. . , What in the naa® of Heaven, or rather Hell,
and all the infernal regions of all religions,
could have Induced you all to. arreat, and prosecute,
that poor wretch Marvin? This is the dirtiest linen
that was ever washed in public by any family on
record. You will not, probably, be #ble to punish
hiffi, and. If you do, he will have general syapathy—
this sad wretch entrusted with secrets of State
with a salary of 8d. an hourl Before this we were
supposed to be the not conteaptible vlctias of an
ifflperlal iBlsfortune; i«>w we are ridiculous.24
A probable result of the affair was the stiffening In the

attitude of the British delegation toward Russia, which was
clearly noticeable during the first few days of the Congress»
Perhaps Beaconsfield and his underlings would have maintained
the same attitude even If the event had not occurred, but It
is probable that there was so«e effect.^^

23. Ibid. 105.
2%. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Diaraell. 1175. Beaconsfield believed Marvin waa being prosecuted as a cover for
someone else. He later learned that Marvin was guilty,
25. Langer (European Alliances. 15^} states^ without
reservation that Beaconsfield became "aore and ffiore stiff in
his attitude** as a result of the Globe article.

-118At the second meeting of the Congress, Jua© 17,

Article VI of th® Treaty of San Stefano (the Article creat
ing the large Bulgaria) was read, and thua, the Bulgarian
problem was submitted to the Congress.The BrltishRassian agreeaent hsd estatolished the principle of a division
of Bulgaria into a northern and a aouthern provino® with
the Balkan range aa the deli»ltatlon. Little ©Ise of »
definite nature had been agreed upon,^"^

Sow that the prob

lem was before the Congress, England proposed two resolutions;
"1.

That the ehaln of the Balkans should be the new frontier

of Turkey. 2. fhmt in the country south of the Balkans, the
Sultan should exercise a real political and military power.*2®
Hussia argued against the proposals &nd subaitted her desire
for a longitudinal division of the two pro-flnces.

Turkish

troope were not to be persitted to enter South Bulmrla.
the naae applied by Buesia to the southern province. Bisaarek
adjourned the question until June 19, counseling the concerned
parties to confer with each other in the Interl®.®^ This
policy of introducing the problea to the Congress and
26. Hertelet, Map of Europe. 2736, Protocols in short
English version are contained herein, 2726-2758. The entire
protocols in the French language ere in Stat© Papers. ?. 69,
862-1078. Since the aajority of decisions were made outaide of the Congress, the story of British dlploaacy at
the Congress aust be found in sources other than the pro
tocols. However, they serve as a guide and check on dates
and events.
27.

Above, 104.

28. Beaconsfield to Queen Victoria,
Life of Disraeli. 119^.

29. Ibid. 1194.

Moneycenny and Buckle,

-119s@ttllrig it outsld© was adhered to bj Blsaarch; throughout
tbe duration of the Congress,
Schouvaloff, Oubril, Andrassy, and Hayiserle m@t with
Beaconsfleld and Sallsburir on the next daj.

Andrassj and

Hayaerle, living up to the Austro-Britlsh agreament, sup
ported Beaconsfleld In his presentation of the Bulgarian
problem.

Schouvaloff regretfully accepted th® line of tha

Balkans, but, aft©r four hours of diecusslon which Beacons
fleld described as ^nearly the severest four hours I e-sn well
recall,** the solution of the eeeoiid question was deferred
until Schouvaloff should have r«f©rred
Eaiperor.^O

question"-to th®

When the Co»gr@®s aet oa Jun© 19, Schouv&loff

had not received word, so the Bulgarian question was again
deferred.

That ©veniag Beaconsfleld told Corti, anticipating

that he would t«ll Bisasarek and perhaps other Plenipotentisrids,
that he took "th® gloorsiest view of affairs," and that if
Russia refused to accept the English proposals, he h&d *r©solved to break up the

**51

Congress.

There was aueh discussion at another ffieetiag between
England, Austria and Russia on June 20, but no decisions were
reached, because news had not yet corae fro» Russia, A special
envoy, who had been sent to speak with the Eaperor, would not
be back until the next evenin^^ (June 21). For this reason,
Russia was granted twenty-four hours in which to have an
50. Ibid. 1194f.

51. Ibid. 1195.
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saswer for

England.next

aornlng, B®aeori8fl«ld, h®-

llsvltig that tli® time had arrived to prove the sincerity
of Ms threat to break up th« Congress, ordered his Secretary
to arrange for a special train to b® in

53 i.at«

readiness,

that afternoon Bls«s.rek called on Beaconsfield, asking hi®
if h® intended his demand to h© an ultlfflatua,

B®lng an-

8wer®d affiraiativelj, Bisaarck asked Beaconsfield to din©
with hiffl that evening. This eventful aeeting b®twe®n the
two men Is best d^acrlhsd toy Beaconsfleld hlasaelfi
After dinner, w@ retired to another room,
wh@r# h® saoked and I followed his @xftapl«. I
believe I gave the la.«t blow to «y shattered
constitution, but I f®lt it absolutely necessary,
I had an hour and i of th# ssoet interesting con
versation, ®intir®ly political; h® was convinced
that the ultiaatu® was not a shaai, and, before
I went to bed, I had the satisfaction of knowing
th&t St. Petersburg had surrendered,3^
fhe next aomlng Be&consfield telegraphed to Queen
Victoria and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Inforising
the® of the Russian acceptance of ^the Englieh scheme for
the European frontier of the Empire, and its Dsilitsry and
political rule by the

Sultan,"35

f^e sajor points had been

decided, but four additional aeetings, devoted almost ex
clusively to the Bulgarian probles, and part of the aeeting

32,

Ibid,

1195*

33»

Corry, Beaconsfield's Secretary, to Lady Ilchester.
Ibid. 1198. *At on® SKJffient all looked as if Russia could
not give in, and I had »ade arrangeffients for a special train
for England
3^'

Beaconsfield to Queen Victoria.

35. Ibid.

1196.

Ibid,

1196.
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on Jun® 28 w#re required to settle the many minor points.
England Insisted tbat '*Soutb Bulgaria** {Russia's nam® for
the southern province) to® called ^'Esatern Ruaella,*

The

actual delialtation, particularly In tb® west, and th©
problem of garrisoning Turkish troops nseessltsted consid
erable

56

debate.

fh©

final 8®ttl®»ent called for dividing

the San 3t«fano Bulgaria into three parts, the northern
part to b© an autonomous principality undar the suzerainty
of the Sultan, the southern part to be a Turkish principality
'^under conditions of adalnistrstlTa autonoffiy^** and the third
part to be a part of the Turkish Eaplre in Europe, fh®
northern province, called Bulgaria, was to have a prince
elected by th© people *aad conflraed by the Sublime Porte,
with the assent of the Powers.^ The Sultan was accorded th©
right to maintain troops in Eastern Ruiselia.

Russian oc

cupation of the two provinces was "fixed at nine leonths.
The Bulgarian settleaent havlns been defined, the
British delegation could relax until the introduction of
the lara-Batouffi problem which Beaconsfield considered to be
th© only reaainlng problea of great importance to England.
Between June 28 and July 6, aettleiBents were made in con
nection with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Oreece,
Rusaanla, the Straits, and the

Danube.58

Except for the Straits,

England had no vital interests in the settlement of any of
36. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2737—
57•

Ibid. 2764-78. State Papers. V. 69, 7^9"^7•

38. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 27^3-50.
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tb.®s© problass, but ®he had sad© coiBBltments ^Mch she ifiterided
to fulfill,

Accofdlagly, on Jun® 28, after Andrassy spok®

generally on the Austrian

of a satisfactory ssttleaent

for Sosnla-Herz^goTTlaa, Salisbury proposed that th® two proirlnces by occupied by Austria-Hungary.59 fhis proposal was
®ad« in coapliantce with an agreement isade with Austria in the
©arly days of th® Coagr®8ss

Auatrla wae to support a certain

English demand relatiT® to Bulgaria, "^in return for which
the English wers to propose th® occupation of Bosnia and
Herzegovlss toy Austria,**^®

England, desiring to haw tfe©

approval of the Turks b®for® aaklag the propoaal, had tried
unaYailingly to secure Turkish assent.

Although all other

Powers at th® Congress agreed to th« proposal, furkey mairu
tsin®d a stubborn reslstarto®, A«®tria did not press the
aatter at that ti»e, probably wishing to maintain some msasur®
of Turkish friendship. Megotiatlons b©tw®en Austria and
furkey resulted, on July 11, In a Turkish proposal, which
stated that Austria-Hungary and Turkey reserve the right
**to COS!® to ati understand lag between themselves on aatters
of detail" concerning Austrian occupation of Bosnla-Heraegovlna.^^' Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin restated the

proposal, adding only that Austria-Hungftry would occupy
and adalnlater Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, while not wishing
to "occupy Sovl-Bazar (an ancient Vilayet of Bosnia extending
59.

Ibid. 27^3f. Tyler, lurope&n Powers, 111.

40. Langer, Baropean Alliances. 155f.
41.

Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2755.

-123in a southeasterly direction betv«eB Serbia and Montenegro),
would reserve th© right "of keeping garrisons and bavlng
ffillitary and commercial roads in the whole of this part
•

•

•.

»»42
The British delegation supported all the Austrian

proposal® relative to a settleaent for Serbia and Montsnegro.
Both, obtained territorial acquisitions and coaplete inde
pendence,

Montenegro gained scc®ss to th© se©,- via the port

of Antlvarle^3

Eumnle received independence, but had to

surrender B®ssaraMa In return for Dobrudja.^^ On Jian© 29
Beaconsfleld bad protested in Congress against tb.® retro
cession of B0S8»r«bia as b«lng a violation of the Treaty
of 1856.His speech was apparently laer© oratory for the
record, sine© th© pre-Congress agreement b«twa«n England
and Russia contained a stipulation that England woiild not
^2. Ibid. 2780, Holland, Earopeftti Coneert. 292f. 8tate
Papers, ?. 69, 758. On Juiy"~2S"7 iS78 Aiistrla-Hungary issued
a Prociaaatlon to the inhabitanta of Bosnia-Herzegovina, an
nouncing th® Austrian intention to occupy the provinces.
Hertslet, M&p of Europe.. 2800f. State Papers, V, 69» 1107ff.
The inhabitants of Bosnia-Heraegovlna resisted th© entrance
of Austrian troops and peace was not restored to the pro
vinces until the end of Septeaber. On November 9 AustriaHungary issued a Proclaaatlon of Aianesty to the inhabitants
of Bosnia and Herzegovina who had taken part in the Insur
rection against luetrlan troops. State Papers, Y, 69, 1124f.
43. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2781-90. Serbian independenee
was dependent upon the institution of equality among aaeabers
of all religious creeds in respect to civil rights.
Ibid. 2790-93. Rumanian Independence was dependent
upon the saae condition applied to Serbia. The condition
to independence for Serbia and Ruaanla was proposed by
Salisbury.
^5. Ibid. 2745.
1205.

Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli.

-124protest against Russian acquisition of Beaearatola.. It
ffilght be claioed that Beaconsfield was instrtiaental in
obtaining Dobrudja as eompensation, but evldene® for thle
is seanty.'^^

England waa a littl® aor© interested in G^reeoe

than in Serbia, Montenegro, or Ruaanla. Even before th®
convsning of th# Congress sh® had us®d her influence in be
half of the Qr«©k lingdos's request to b® represented at th©
Congress.The Question of a revision of CJr©«k frontiers
was introduced on June 29, aud th® Qr@@k r^presentatl-yes
requested annexation of the provinces of Eplrus and Thessaly."^®

Beaconsfield, still endeavoring to retain Sngllah

influence at Constantinople, proposed on Julj 11 that tl^
Governments of furk®j and {lr«®e» arrive at an agr@@«#nt,
out of the Congress, on th-e north*»rd rectification of th#
frontier. Mediation of th« Powers would b© granted if the
two Qoir@rna©nts so desired,Article 24 of the tv&aXj of
Berlin, b@ing only a restatement of Beaconsfield'« pro
posal, did not provide a satisfactory

aettloaent.^O

On July 6 th® protolsa of the territories In Asia
(th® long awaited Ears-Batoua problea) was brought before
the Congress.

Russia ifflffiediately conceded **Er2eroma. B&yazld.

46. The only statement to this effect, discovered by the
author, la in Koneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 1205.
State Papers. ¥. 69, T95ff, 799.
48. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2744.
^9.

Ibid. 2756.

Langer, European Alliances. 161.

50. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2779f.

-125and the Valley of AlasMcerd, containing principal Co«®erelal
Houtes towards

Persia.**51

These eonesssions lisd been sasie

pr^viouslj in th© Anglo-Rusalan agreement, tout the remainder
of the agreemeat was rather vague. Sngland liad consejited
"'not to contest the desire of the Eaperor of Bassia to
oco«pj the port of Batoua and to guard Me conquests in
'**52

Ariaenla,

Beaconsfield, after the Ruaeian coneesslon

had been announced, begsa a struggle to liait the Russian
occupation of Batou®.

H« desired that Batoom he »ad© a free

port,This seeaed agreeable to the Russians, but the other
deaands relative to a limitation of the other Russian g&laa
in Asia provoked a strong reaistance. Just as the Bulgarian
problem had been decided outside the Congresg, so now the
Asian proble® was decided.
Unfortunately, the delegations did not work together
as they had on the previous occasion.

?his time Beaconsfield

and Gortohakoff ««t together while Salisbury and Schouvaloff
carried on separate discussions.

It seeas that, during the

negotiations, Beaeonafield and Salisbury did not keep each
other informed as to the course of the negotiations anyaoire
then did Qortchakoff and Schouvaloff.

Naturally, this re

sulted in a very confused picture with neither side knowing
Just where it stood in relation to the other.

At one point

51. Ibid, 2750,
52, Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 1208,
55. Beaconsfleld to Queen Victoria. Ibid. 1204.
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Blsaarck had to Intervene to prevent an extremely bad
situation from developing.
The Sftllabury-Schouvaloff discussions asBuaed a
hostile tone fro® the beginning, because Sallsburj, unlike
Beaconsfleld, desired a complete surrender of Batoua. Up
to this tla® there had been no aeutlon In Congress of the
Straits, so Salistourj thought It might be advantageous to
aiscyss this problea la conjunetlon with the Asian problem.
He thought that tim Straits might be a convenient Isver with
which to prj lose the Russian, hold on Batoua, for it was
known that Russia desired a sodifacatlon of the Straits
clauses in the forser treaties if that aodiflcation were
favorable to Russia.

If this could not be accoaplished, she

wished the Straits clauses to re«aln unchanged, Salisbury
threatened Russia with a change In the Straits clauses if
she did not give up Batous. He even approached Turkey with
a proposition that Turkey allow the English fleet to enter
the Black Sea If Russia retained Batoua, but furkey rejected

this plan,5"^

More than this, Salisbury infornsed Schouvaloff

that England would not keep her proalse *'not to resist the
Russian possession of Batou«.*55

Vhen Schouvaloff insisted

that England was bound'by Salisbury's signature, the latter
replied that "he would resign and be replaced by another

5-%.

Langer, European Alllanoes. 15?.

55. Tyler, Sut^pean Powers. 109.

-127foreign secretary who would be free fro® any obligations
incurred by the agreement of Way

30.

**56

In the ®©anitl»0, after Bisaarek had intervened in
favor of Russia, Besconsfield and Gortchakoff had reached
an agreement with respect to Batouffij Russia agreeing that
it was to be a free port, essentially

eoB«®reial.57

fhe

establishing of the boundary eaused further trouble^ but a
settleaent was finally achieved when both parties agreed to
a line midway between the two extreaes.^
Following the Aslatie settlement Salisbury read a
British declaration relative to the Straits, the concluding
paragraph, stated;
I declare on tee&alf of England that the obllgatioas
of Her Brltanaie Majemty relating to the closing of
the Straits do xiot go further than an engagement
with the 3ult«.n to respect in this aatter His
Majesty's independeat deter»lttatloiis in conformity
with the spirit of existlag freaties,59
Obviously such an interpretation aeant that Turkey would be
free to permit any countfT^ at war with Russia to enter the
Black Sea even though Turkey were at peace. This interpretatlOTi waa not in harmony with the clauses of the foraer
Treaties which prohibited th® use of the Straits to ships
of war when turkey wa® at peace.

Consequently, on July 12,

56, Ibid. 109f.
57«

Langer, European Allianees» 158,

58. Articles 58-60 in the ffreaty of Berlin. Hertslet, Map
of Europe. 279^—lars was retained by Russia.

59. Ibid. 2727.
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Russla r®ad a counter deelaratloa to %h» Congress, whleli
concluded as follows;
. . . the prinelpl® of th® closing of th# Straits
Is an European principle, and . . , th® stipulations
concluded in this respect In l84l, 1856, and 1871,
confiraed ©t present toy the Tr«stj of Berlin, ar«
binding on th® part of all th® Po-w#rs, in accordance
with th® spirit and l@tter of th© ©xisting Treaties,
not onlj aa regards th® Sultan but also as regards
all th@ .Powers signatof^ to th@s® transactions.60
kf%^T th® reading of the«@ two d@claratlonB, th® Straits ques
tion was not d®tosited in th® Congress. The Treaty of Berlin,
und«r Article 63» l®ft th© Straits und#r th® regulations
preseritoied toy the Treaties of 1856 and 18?1.

Thus, it may

toe considered that the Russian Tlew prevailed.
On July 6, while the Congress w&a concerned with
t h © p r o b l e m o f Battous!, Englsaid o c c u p i e d C y p r u s . T h i s
fact was announced to the Power®, of which only France and
Italy reglatered a eosplalnt, Salisbury is supposed to have
suggested to Fr&nc© that funis be occupied toy her. To Italy,
he remarked that the ^Mediterranean was large enough for all,*^^
Many congratulationa were received by Queen Victoria, and
Beaconsfleld was highly acclalaed. The Powers, for the most
part, looked upon the aove aa a brilliant feat of diploaacy,
the British people, except for the Sladstonians, were elated
that their (hovernmmnt had not betrayed thea, as had been
suspected when the 01otoe putoliehed the contents of the
60,

Ibid. 2728.

61, Langer, European Alliances. 159f.
62,

Ibid. 160,
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For the Government, th® long

drawn-out Cyprus affair, which had caused mueh dissension
in the Cabinet and two resignations, had a satisfactory conelusion.
Exactly on© month after the convening of the Congress
th© work was finished and th® Treaty of Berlin signed.

B@acon®-

field and Salisbury returned to England in th® same leisurely
manner in which Beaconsfield had eome to Berlin. Th©y were
greeted by crowds at Doirsr and London on July 16,^^ In I>ownIng Street, Beaconafleld happily announ.c@d that they h®d

brought b&ck "'pg&c® with Honour I
Looking back oir#r th© three-year period" it becomes ap
parent that British policy, starting In 18T5

on© of caution

and inactivity, gradually grew into a policy of boldness and
action. It is imderstandabl© that Disraeli advocated *nonIntertrentlon'* at the outbreak of th® Boano-Herzegovlnlftn
insurrection. In the previous decAde similar occurrences
in the Turkish B»pire had not produced an uncontrollitble
situation.

It was not unwise to assuae that Turkey, If

left alone, would be able to suppress th© insurgents.

More

over, It is entirely possible that Disraeli was eueplcioue
concerning the actual cause of the Insurrection.

He prob

ably knew, considering the reports froa the consul In Bosnia,
about the intolerable conditions under which the peasants of

Bosnia-Herzegovina lived. It Is not certain, however, that
he believed this to be the cause of the insurrection. He

63.

Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Plsraell. 121?.
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was recelTing reports from 11Hot at Constantinople that
told of help being given the insurgents by th« Russian consul
in the area.

Also, Eaperor Praaels Joseph of Austria had

Just been visiting bis Dalastion province and there w@r@
ruasors concerning the purpose of his Tislt.

If Disraeli

©ntertalsed the slightest suspicion that either Austria or
Russias or bothj, wer© partiallj responaibl© for having stir
red the peasants to revolt, h® naturally would try to dis
courage interyention. on th© part of th© Powsre. fh® last
thing that he wished to see was a reopening of the Eastern
Question, for if that happ@ned it was reasonably certain
that th© final settlement would be contrary to England's
Interests,
By autuan of 1875, Disraeli knew that he could not
prevent the reoy^nlng of the Eastern ^©stlon. Yet, in
January, 1876 he favored non-adherence to the Andrasay Not®,
which, drafted by Qermany, Austria, and Russia, was designed
to compel Turkey to grant certain refonas to Bosnia-Herzegovlna. Disraeli did not believe that presenting the todraa8y Note to Turkey would resolve the situation. He did be
lieve that, by presenting the Mote, the principle of inter
vention by the Powers would be firaly established and not
relinquished thereafter.

In both of these contentions,

Disraeli wa« correet.. The Andrasay Note,.though accepted by
Turkey, did not provide a fiettleaent. In May the Three Powora
exercised the established principle of intervention by for
mulating another note known as the Berlin Meaorandua. It
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used was ®or@ seTer© and the reforas demanded were aor©
©xtensiv©. Disraeli deellned adherence to the Berlin
Meaorandtt®,

M»aj writers have taken the view that this action

was & ffilstaMe. They believe that the concert of Stirope was
broken^ and that the only ehanee of solving the prohlea
was lost. The author 1© much Inelined to agree with the
view held by Disraeli, that certain of the stipulations of
the Mefflorandut-ffl were quit© beyond, the ability of furkey to
perform. Consequently, the end result of the Keaoraiiduo
could only have been that the Powers would have broaght
iBeas^res of force agfeinst Turkey.

In any sueh an action,

England stood to lose, for the interests of the other
European Powers were unlike those of England. Disraeli
believed that the English ai» eould be better achieved
outside the eoneert of Powers than within. It was a con
troversial point in England at that tiae, and, a®ong the
historians devoted to the subject, it is equally eontrovereial. It la often stated that England should have
offered a counter proposal, since she refused to adhere to
the Meaorandua as it stood. The author subalts that Disraeli
would hardly propose anything that was designed to bring the
Powers into the settlement of Turkish probleais. This is
supposed to have been his great aistake and the cause of
the wars that followed. That fact aay be, but looking at
the probles with Disraeli's eyes it would aeea difflcult to
state that he should have known the ultimate result of his
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Powers Englamd would hav® to aake concessions.

TMs she later

did, both St th© Confer©nc@ of Constantinople and at Berlin.
The episode of the Berlin Meaor&n4«» ®ad@ known to the Powers
that they would not b© able to act without consi^Serlng -Eng
land, as they alght formerly have thought as a result of a
long period of British isolation fro« European power politics,
War between Serbia and Turkey broke out in July, 18T6,
further coBplie&ting the Balkan situation. Disraeli believed
that Serbia was wholly unjustified in commencing this war,
that it was siaply an opportunist measure. Serbia wanted, in
his opinion, to take advantage of the supposed Turkish weak
ness to acquire additional territories.

The author believes

that ffiuch of this was true, taut wishes to point out that, in
respect to the Serbian people, their emotions, relationships,
aims, and desires, Disraeli was woefully ignorant.

It was

beyond hi® to believe that the Serbians really and truly de
sired to help their oppressed brothers In Bosnla-HerEegovina.

However, even had he understood the Serbians, his policy
would have been unchanged, for in this war he adopted a
policy of '*non-interference and neutrality.**
The Bulgarian atrocities, occurring at about this
time, caused a great stir in England.

Gladstone came out

of retirement to lasbaet the Govemaent at every opportunity.
His following was treaendous at first, but as time passed it
gradually dlalnished.

It was extremely unfortunate for Eng

land that this prevented Disraeli's putting forth as bold a
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It is certain that Russia

was undeslrablj influenced by the agitation in England.
Russia fflay not have declared war on Turkey had it not been
for her belief that Dlsra®ll would b© pr®Yent«d by the pop
ular will fro® taking counter measures.

Be that &s it »ayj

th@ Busso-Turkish war occurred.
Prior to this, howe'Sferj th© Powers had convened at
Constantinople for the purpose of bringing peace to the
Balkans,

fh© event hardly merits more than ©entlon, since

it turned out to b@ «. failure*

Th® interesting thing to

note Is that Disraeli's prediction that an interreatlon by
the Powers would ultimately result In English concessions
was proven correct.

Salisbury, for England, made the con

cessions at Constantinople.

The Conference was of aoae

value to Engl»od as a rehearsal of the later Congress of
Berlin.

At least, when the Congress of Berlin -was in the

foraatlve stage, Disraeli laad® certain that it would be held

on his terms, thus gaining for England as auch advantage as
possible.

The Russo-TuriEish War, as it developed in favor of
Russia, brought forth a deteriBined policy In England. The
people gradually gave support to the Governaent, so Disraeli
could gradually expand the policy along desired lines. How
ever, thei^ was a knotty problem to be solved.

His Cabinet

contained a peace faction headed by his Foreign Minister.
This resulted In a long battle In the Cabinet, which was
finally won by Disraeli when the Foreign Minister reslf^ed.
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Cabinet, Disraeli would hav® pl?ing#d England into war.

Ttoe

author does not ahare this view. He h^lie-v®® that Disraeli
wantdd p@ac© at all times an^ would have endeavored to keep
the peace ev^n had there been no opposition.
On Mareh 3 th# preliaiaarj Peace of San Stefano was
signed bj Turkey and Russia.

Th® ®ain feature of th® tre&tj

was the creation, of a large Btilssriaj which w&e not acoeptsble
to either Ingland or J^ustria. Sngland reiterated a for®er
atat@«ent aade to Russia that no Peace would be final until
agreed to by the Powers. Austria co-operated with England
in this respeet and the Congress of Berlin was bom. It did
not convene, howe's-er, until Sngland had three secret agreeaenta
coaclttdedj one with gwssia, eoneeraed aostly with Bulgaria,'
one with Austria, ©stahllshlng a basis of Austro-Snglish eooperation at the Congressj and attother with Turkey allowing
England to occupy Cyprus in return for an English guarantee
of the Turkish territories in Asia.
The Congress convened on June 13, 1878, and proceeded
along lines laid down in the SSiglieh secret agreeisent®.

One

month of negotiation waa required to draft the Treaty of
Berlin.

The great significance of the freaty fro® th® Sag-

lish view was the re-estatolishaent of a Turfeey-in-Surope.
Actually, it was-a stronger Turkey than had existed in 1S75.
The territorial loaaes served to tighten the Turkish line of
defense, and released troopa that had been employed in former
tiaes in the outer provinees.

The line of the Bslkaaa was a

-135defensifel® position as showa
th© Russo-Turkish Wsr.

th@ battle for PlsTna In

It la said that thla did not repre

sent a Turkish victory sine# Turkey never mmde us® of her
right to fortify the pass®©.

To this, th® author e&n only

ask—how could Beaeonsfl©ld kaow that Turkey would QOt take
full advantag® of h©r right to fflllitarlse Eastern Ruaeliat
With th® settle®®nt provided by th® fr«aty of Berlin, Russia's
ad^aric® toward Constsjatiaopie was postponed.

With the oceu-

patlon of Cyprus- and the Anglo-Turkish defensive alli&no® In
Asia, Husgla's Of®rlan<l threat to India was nulliflea.
British alffls h®5 be©n achieved without reeours® to
war.

In July, 1878 British Mploaaey emerged victorious.
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